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
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THE PRINCIPLES OF WRITTEN  
DISCOURSE.



THE PRINCIPLES  
OF  
WRITTEN DISCOURSE

BY

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## PREFACE.

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The title of this Treatise—PRINCIPLES OF DISCOURSE—has been purposely chosen. The book is designed to be philosophic and suggestive rather than technical or formal.

It has been specially prepared for use in our higher collegiate classes and assumes a familiarity, on the student's part, with some elementary manual, as—Hart, Haven, Jameson or Kellogg. We believe that it will thus meet an urgent need in our more advanced rhetorical teaching and give to the student a healthful stimulus in this most important branch of liberal culture. We present a discussion of the subject that is substantially complete, while the various principles are sufficiently illustrated to confirm their correctness and guide the student.

We desire, moreover, to state that while the treatise is so systematized and presented as to answer the purposes of class-room instruction, we have been anxious to make it a readable book for literary students at large. This is especially true of Part II.—a division of the work to which we would invite special attention. We have aimed to place Discourse upon a basis from which it cannot be permanently moved and so to co-ordinate it with all our mental processes and activities that it shall rise at once from a mechanical artifice of the schools to an essential Science and a practical Art and be seen to be instinct with intellectual and moral life. If students of Discourse are in any wise helped by it to higher views and better work in the special department with which it deals, we shall have realized our fondest hopes.

T. W. H.





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# INTRODUCTION.

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## CHAPTER I.

### PROMINENCE OF THE STUDY OF DISCOURSE IN ANCIENT TIMES.

THE birthplace of this science was Sicily. It arose in the fifth century B. C., occasioned, partly, by the disputative character of the Sicilians, and also by those peculiar political events which called that tendency into exercise. After the overthrow of the Sicilian tyranny, those who had suffered in person and property sought redress. Those who assumed their cases soon became the leading disputants and discourses of the time. We are speaking of the study in its scientific aspect. As such, it was founded by Korax of Syracuse. His "*Τέχνη*" was the first treatise on the subject theoretical in its character. He gives in it a system of rules for forensic speaking, calling special attention to two things—the arrangement of the different parts of a discourse and the method of arguing from general probabilities. Tisias and others followed him as teachers and authors and the way was fully opened for the systematic study of the art.

It is interesting to note, here, that Antiphon, with whom the history of Athenian Oratory begins, was himself moulded by the teachings of Tisias and Korax. Greek prose, as we know, must be studied through

Greek oratory. In 92 B. C. the formal study of Discourse was initiated at Rome by Plotinus. Reference is here in place to the large number and high character of the special schools established for the cultivation of this art; to the fact that the instructors were masters of the art\* they taught, and that they numbered among their disciples the leading spirits of the time. We know upon the authority of Quintilian that Cicero, in his maturity, went to Asia to study under his old teacher, Milo of Rhodes. We know that Aristotle, in his old age, gave lessons in the art; that many of the Roman Emperors personally prosecuted the study; that Plutarch, for four years, was under the teaching of Isæus; and that Athenians and Romans alike would not listen to the *untaught* orators. The ancients held that the pains needful to produce a good speech were the same as those needed to produce a good statue or picture. "Great is the labor of oratory," says Cicero, "as is its field, its dignity and its reward." We know that the old discourses prepared their work with scrupulous care. "Much has been written of old," says Aristotle, "on this topic." Quintilian in his "Institutes" gives us a long list of teachers and authors and refers to Korax and Tisias and Gorgias as the first who viewed the subject in its formal aspects. Large sums of money were paid by the ambitious young men of the day for the best instruction that could be afforded.

If we seek an explanation of this wide and genuine interest, we find it to be a varied one.

(a.) With the Greeks, especially, and to some extent, with all the older peoples, speech was the sub-

\* See Mahaffy's "Old Greek Education."

limest act of the soul of man. They believed, with the Psalmist, that the tongue was the "glory" of man. The theory of Gorgias—Expression is Power—was endorsed to the full. When they came to see that beauty of form could be manifested in prose as in poetry—in the oration as in the ode—they at once devoted themselves to it with assiduous zeal. They believed in *αγορητύς*—eloquence—its force and its beauty.

(b.) The practical nature of Discourse enters here as an explanation. The people were to be reached by oral instruction. Students could well afford to recompense their teachers, inasmuch as they would thus be enabled so to display this art, especially in disputation, as to make it lucrative. Although this element in ancient Discourse made it liable to abuse as an art and caused it to become mercenary, still, its practical character, in the best sense, was demanded by the time and led to its zealous pursuit.

(c.) The main reason for its flourishing condition, however, is found in the fact—that, in the opinion of the ancients, Discourse was always and inseparably allied to Philosophy, and this, as we know, was the one study of prime importance in the wide province of human knowledge. Hence, the aptness of Quintilian's remark—"Philosophers have applied more earnestly to this art than discoursers themselves." Having, as thus conceived, the same range as philosophy itself and having its intrinsic dignity, it naturally commanded a similar deference and devotion on the part of all thinking minds. Aristotle and Cicero boasted in the name alike of philosopher and discourser. They desired and professed to be philosophic discoursers and acknowledged no system that divorced

these sister sciences. Whether, in all its aspects, this view was a correct one or not, is not here in point. As they conceived it, they devoted their energies to it as a philosophic art—a substantive part, indeed, of philosophy itself. These three facts are quite sufficient to account, as we believe, for the high regard given by the earlier schools to this special study.

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## CHAPTER II.

### CAUSES OF ITS DECLINE.

THE fact of its decline is a matter of history. It began at an early date (300 B. C.—150 B. C.) and was rapid in its progress. The tendency among the existing and the later schools to further the declension was strong and aggressive. The language used by Socrates in the *Gorgias* of Plato indicates the extremity which this destructive criticism had reached, even at that date. It is true that this deteriorating process has been, at times, arrested both by distinctive schools or epochs and by separate individuals. This was true of Cicero and of those general influences which have been at work since the revival of learning in Europe. Still, the declension went on. Since those primitive days, the science has never occupied that high position which it then did, nor has it even approximated to it. We seek the causes of this. They are manifold and satisfactory.

(a.) As far as Greece itself was concerned, we find an important cause in the loss of its political freedom and rights. This changed the whole order of things,

the most disastrous result of which, as indicated by Jebb,\* was—"The decay of the citizen life of the Greek Republics." Popular thought and action were repressed. The rule of the few began. The national spirit was deadened. The occupation of the discourses was gone.

(b.) We note, as a partial cause, the marked difference between the earlier and the later civilizations as to their methods of reaching the popular mind. By necessity, the instruction was, then, mainly, oral. It was the golden age of the oral teacher. The vast mission of the Press, with which we are now familiar, was unknown. Written Prose Discourse, therefore, which is, now, the dominant style, had an inferior place. After the invention of printing, the aspect was wholly changed and Discourse, as the ancients named it—the Science and Art of Oratory—has come to mean, more particularly,—the Science and Art of Written Expression.

The decline of the art, however, is not confined to its oral aspect. As an art, it has, to some extent, lost its earlier character. This brings us to the main cause.

(c.) We notice, on the one hand, that in classical days the science soon became identified with the most unscrupulous sophistry. Hence, it could not but be denounced by so exalted a mind as Plato. In modern Europe, on the other hand, the perversion took another form and we find the science so identified with the merely ornamental or æsthetic that men who were demanding rigorous mental stimulus could not waste their hours over it. Each of these errors arose from the fact that the natural bond existing between Discourse and

\* Jebb's "Attic Orators."

Philosophy was rudely severed on the part of those teachers whose only object was, to make a matter plausible and pleasing. Hence, the well-deserved and pungent rebuke which Cicero administered to Socrates, in that he was the first to effect a permanent divorce between Discourse and Philosophy, whereby, he suggestively adds—"It has become nothing more than a verbal art" presented only by those whom Plato calls "word-joiners." Similar rebukes have been justly administered on the part of later philosophers to all those modern students of the art of Discourse who, in any way, have sanctioned such a separation. Here, we reach, therefore, the main cause of the decline. Discourse has declined not because of any intrinsic reason in the science itself or its want of practical utility, but only because the conception of its principles, methods, relations and final ends is at variance with the truth in the case. It declined especially as a written form, because sophistry and ornament took the place of thought originally expressed and these obtained in that the study was divorced from reason and the common sense of men.

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### CHAPTER III.

#### METHOD OF ITS REVIVAL.

DESPITE the decline to which reference has been made, there is, still, a good degree of interest in most enlightened minds in the science of Discourse and a growing conviction that the study demands a more ardent devotion. It is conceded that after some plan

or other, it should enter into our courses of study as an integral part of a liberal culture. The question as to the particular mode of its revival becomes, thus, of increasing value. This question might be answered in general, by saying that, in so far as the conception of its province and function has been wrong, it should be rectified and the science placed upon a more satisfactory basis. The specific and sufficient answer, however, is,—Discourse, as a Science and an Art, is to be revived in its best forms by reinstating it upon the basis from which Socrates and the Sophists deposed it,—by reconnecting it with philosophy. We need, most of all, a philosophic, rational art of Discourse by which to reach the best results. The history of the revival of the art of oratory in Greece is most suggestive in this respect. The period of decline closing in 150 B. C., we find in 110 B. C. a reaction occurring, reaching its full completion about 20 B. C. The author of this revival was Hermagoras of Temnos. His leading object was to resist the tendencies to literary formalism and conceit which had so long prevailed and the method by which he accomplished it was to build up the oratorical art on a practical and philosophic basis. He called attention to the real nature and ends of discourse, exalted it in dignity above the merely verbal and mechanical and allied it to all the best activity of the best minds. The success of these efforts is a matter of history. Not only Greek Oratory but Greek Literature in all its forms received a new and nobler impulse. From Greece the influence passed to Rome. Schools were founded to teach this better art and Cicero himself became a masterly representative of the new awakening. The method then adopted is the method now to be adopted. Discourse either as

theoretical or practical, will never regain its rightful supremacy save under the conditions in which it ruled of old—as a philosophic art based on reason and effecting its ends by rational means.

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## CHAPTER IV.

### OBJECT OF PRESENT TREATISE.

(A.) *To give a true Definition of Discourse.* To adjust it to its proper limits and mark the true relation of its different parts. It is to be a definition which may abide the test of close analysis and uniform application. This definition will be two-fold.

(B.) *To establish guiding Principles.* Here, as in all other departments, what is most needed is the statement of laws in the light of which the whole subject may be viewed and by whose agency the best results may be secured. Even if the student himself does not, as yet, discover the excellence of this higher teaching, it is the duty of the instructor to apply it. It will be no small part of the value of his work as an educator to have the student feel, that the discovery of a central, living, permanent principle in Discourse will be a hundred-fold more valuable to him than volumes of barren precepts. There is no need in Discourse of a something made to order—a statute warranted on good authority to do precisely this or that. What is needed is, an idea, germinal and governing, which the student himself may develop and apply in accordance with the dictates of his own mental life. The law that must reign supreme over all others in



Discourse is, the Law of Liberty. This is possible only upon the basis of principles. It is only when the method of instruction is minute rather than comprehensive, technical rather than suggestive, that we hear of undue restriction. When precepts are thus pressed in place of organic principles, the entire art descends to the level of pedantry and is not worthy the devotion of intelligent minds. "Nothing can be of greater benefit to the student," writes Dr. Shedd, "than to compose in the light and under the government of ideas." All true Discourse is liberative. Freedom of expression is the result of the government of ideas.

(c.) *To reveal the basis of Discourse in a true Philosophy of the Mind.* The science of Discourse is not a mental science formally viewed. It finds therein, however, its basis, laws and most suggestive method. He will utterly fail in this department who attempts the study out of its relations to the laws of the human intellect and, thus, fails to connect, at every point, the external forms of expression with the inward action of the soul. The student must be familiar with these mental powers, their laws, methods and condition of action. He must be acquainted with the mind that he is using and addressing. He must know how the mind works; must understand his nature as mental, moral and emotional. In a word, he must know man in his complex character. Here is seen the psychology of Discourse. It is an art whose discussion need not be metaphysical, but shown to be based upon those fundamental facts which have been derived from a close observation of our mental processes. Discourse is the art by which rational minds express themselves in a rational manner. He is doing

a most valuable work in the interests of this art who ever insists upon thus exalting it above the sphere of the purely verbal into the higher realm of the philosophic and mental. We believe that the more thoughtful young men of our colleges are feeling the need of this higher teaching. Distinctions between pure and impure words; between loose and balanced sentences; between simile and metaphor—these have their rightful place, but as elementary and preparative only. There is what Spencer calls—"A Philosophy of Style"—a creative as well as an artistic function, an organism as well as a mechanism—a science and an art, of Discourse something more than "from the teeth outward."

(D.) *To present the true relations of the Science and the Art of Discourse.* Laws and their application, principles and praxis, must ever go together in order to the excellence of either. The old discoursers were eminently right in making the study both philosophic and practical.

(E.) *To connect the study of Discourse with that of Literature and Language.* If Discourse, in so far as written, is the art of embodying thought in the forms of literature through language as an agent, then, the study of these forms and this agent in their relations to Discourse is essential. So vital is this relation that the study of authors as to their language and general style is one of the best methods of the study of Discourse itself. Thus viewed, Discourse is a study instinct with life. The student must feel that he is studying a science exemplified in the actual products of literature and not a mere theory of the schools.

(F.) *To reveal the close relations of Discourse to a practical knowledge of the world and human life.* Not

only should the discourser be conversant with the world but such a knowledge should shape his theory and methods. The art of expression must find its origin, processes and ends in the people—their profit and pleasure. Good Discourse as good government is of and for the people. Hence, the vital bearings of this art upon the Liberal Professions, especially Law and Divinity—its practical import to the statesman and popular orator. There is a dangerous tendency in scholarship to become monastic. Injurious as this is to the scholar, to the discourser it may be fatal. He must be first and last a man among men. Important as it is in written Discourse, in oral Discourse it is essential.

(g.) *To make emphatic, throughout, the Moral Element in Discourse.* “Discourse,” says Quintilian, “reveals character; and not without reason did the Greeks teach that as a man lived so he would speak.” Pagan authors, followed by such men as Pascal and Theremin, taught that eloquence was a virtue. “It is my creed,” said Cowper to John Newton, “that the intellect depends as much on the operations of God’s agency upon it as the heart depends upon the influence of the Spirit.” The processes involved in the expression and impression of our thought are ethical as well as intellectual. The discourser is bound by every consideration to show all that is elevating and to dwell upon the highest levels of thought and emotion. It is to such authors as Addison and Bunyan, and not to such as Smollett and Byron, that we are to look for a true expression of that morality so germane to English letters and the art of Discourse.

## CHAPTER V.

## LIMITS AND RELATIONS OF THE SUBJECT.

*Grammar.* The knowledge of this is presupposed in the study of Discourse. Its forms, principles, and methods are used, but are outside of the science itself. Many of our treatises upon Discourse are at fault in that they are grammatical in character rather than rhetorical. They deal with words and sentences in their syntactical relations rather than as the basis and media of expression. It may be added that the subject of Punctuation, with which so many of our treatises are burdened, has no place in the science. It should be studied in connection with Grammar.

*Logic.* In treating of the argumentative form of Discourse, the true relations of Logic and Discourse will be shown. Suffice it to say that they are distinct sciences. Each has its sphere and function. Discourse, however, in its true conception and application, involves a radical knowledge of the laws and methods of Logic. The discourser, as such, is expected to express his thought logically.

While the study of Logic, in its formal character, is thus excluded from Discourse, the Discourser must be the Logician.

Whately has made the error of including the two sciences in one. Others have made the error of presenting them as in no way related.

*Æsthetics.* In discussing Beauty as a Quality of Discourse, the science of Æsthetics is especially noted. It

comes into prominence, also, in the study of Poetry and Figures. This science, however, is a separate one. It has its own sphere and principles and ends. Discourse involves some knowledge of these principles and makes use of them. Discourse, in some of its phases, is an *Æsthetic Art*. It is not *Æsthetics* itself. It is a practical art, as well, and touches the department of *Æsthetics* simply through one of its qualities, Beauty, and through one of the faculties, Taste, and for one of its objects, Pleasure. Other qualities, faculties, and objects are involved. The writers of the French school generally, and many of Kames' and Blair's imitators in England and America, have done great harm in presenting Discourse either as co-extensive with the science of *Asthetics* or making it mainly *æsthetical* in character and aim. Discourse has an *Æsthetic* element and aim. This, however, is but a small part of it.

*Mental Science.* As already indicated, the formal discussion of Psychology or Metaphysics has no place in the treatise before us. The subject of Discourse, however, involves a practical knowledge of mental laws and processes. It will thus be seen throughout to rest upon an intellectual basis. A brief reference to our mental and emotional powers will be given in its appropriate place.

*Language.* The formal study of English Philology or general Linguistics has no proper place in the science before us. Dr. Blair's chapters on the Rise and Progress of Language, and Dr. Hart's pages on The Study of the English Language, are full of interest but irrelevant to the subject. Language in its practical uses is assumed as understood. It is the very medium through which Discourse is presented.

The study of diction in its purely rhetorical aspects as bearing upon sentences and general style has a place. Language, however, in its history or scientific principles, belongs to a sphere of its own.

*Ethics.* Moral Science has a province of its own. Aristotle, Theremin and others have made it include Rhetoric. Though Discourse is supposed to rest upon a moral basis, to proceed by moral methods and aim at moral results, it is not to be confounded with Ethics. It is ethical in some of its elements. It is not Ethics. It involves some knowledge of ethical laws and principles, and applies them in the act of expression. Ethics, in so far as related to Discourse, will be discussed in treating of Persuasion.

*Poetry.* In any comprehensive view of Discourse, this must not be overlooked. Thought may be expressed metrically and such expression may be governed by substantially the same principles as obtain in prose. Each imparts valuable elements to the other. Though differing in structure and final aim, they together make up the unit—Discourse. Hence, all treatises upon this science must admit some discussion of Poetry. If asked—to what extent this discussion is to be carried, the answer is important and consistent with what has been stated. It is to be presented throughout as subordinate to prose. In nature, general characteristics and, most especially, in the governing aim as purely *Æsthetic*, it is inferior. It represents a literary luxury rather than a mental staple, an accomplishment rather than a necessity. Natural and elevating as it is, the world would go on without it. Men converse and debate, quarrel and barter, in prose. Even in literature itself, much error has arisen from magnifying Poetry unduly.

Despite the fact that Prose makes up the body of literature it is found that Poetry and Literature are far too often used as synonyms. Poetry, then, must have place in Discourse. Its place, however, must be subordinate. Our substantial theme is—Prose Discourse.

*Oratory.* Though written and oral Discourse may differ in form and procedure and specific object, they agree in being parts of a whole. Being thus joined, they cannot be sundered. Moreover, inasmuch as the final end of all thinking and composing is the influencing of other minds personally, there is a sense in which oral Discourse is the superior form, because ultimate and all-inclusive. The question arises—What place is to be given in our discussion to Oral Discourse? Historically, we find that Aristotle and the older authors and such modern ones as Thoreau and Campbell have committed the error of making it synonymous with Discourse itself. Others, as Haven and Hart, practically ignore it, while a third class, represented by Bain and Bascom, Whately and Blair, give it a place of modified importance. The theory that occurs to us to be the true one and which we shall follow is this—In presenting the subject of Discourse we shall not be careful to make either of its divisions—written and oral—prominent, at first, over the other. We treat the subject of Discourse in its comprehensiveness as the expression of our thought in language. We study its laws and processes; its qualities and objects applicable alike to the writer and orator. This being done, there are two specific courses to be followed in addition to this general one, arising out of the desire or purpose of the writer to deliver publicly his composition.

(a.) To make emphatic in his study and discipline those parts of the subject of Discourse which are distinctly oratorical and which would be of special service in the sphere of oratory. All this, it will be noted, is provided for within the province of Discourse. Hence, his special attention would be called to the quality of *force* as the oratorical quality, and to the *argumentative*, *impassioned*, and *persuasive* forms as the oratorical forms. Those classes of words and types of sentence and figure which are especially oratorical in their effect would be made emphatic. If this impressing of the *oratorical* elements in Discourse were given its true place in the teaching of this art, less basis would be found for the criticism of our style as insipid and powerless, and less ignorance be manifested as to the vital relations of written to oral Discourse.

It will thus be noted that in so far as oratory proper is dependent for its character upon the mental, emotional, and moral qualities of the writer, it may be cultivated substantially in the regular process of the study of Discourse. In this respect, the present treatise will have to do with Written Discourse as oratorical.

(b.) The second specific method for the writer to adopt when needing to deliver his writing is, To subject himself to a course of *vocal training* with special reference to oral delivery. It is what might be termed the *external* or *physical* phase of oratory, and yet, dependent somewhat on the character of the orator as a writer and a man. It includes the question of quality and quantity of voice; of inflection and emphasis; of pronunciation and articulation; of attitude and gesture; of general action and manner. It supple-



ments and completes all that has preceded. With this phase of Oral Discourse the treatise before us has nothing to do. Our substantial theme is, Written Discourse.

The full presentation of the subject will include:—

### PART FIRST.

CHAP. I.—DEFINITION OF DISCOURSE (1).

CHAP. II.—PARTS OF DISCOURSE. (SUGGESTIONS AS TO THEME.)

CHAP. III.—MATERIAL AND MEDIA OF DISCOURSE.

CHAP. IV.—PROCESSES OF DISCOURSE.

CHAP. V.—LAWS OF DISCOURSE.

### PART SECOND.

CHAP. I.—DEFINITION OF DISCOURSE (2).

CHAP. II.—QUALITIES OF DISCOURSE.

CHAP. III.—FORMS OF DISCOURSE.

These parts and chapters, it may be stated, are arranged in the order of difficulty, of logical dependence and of practical value.



# PART FIRST.

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## CHAPTER I.

### DEFINITION OF DISCOURSE.

#### (FIRST DEFINITION.)

EVERY careful student of Discourse has, undoubtedly, been impressed with the great diversity of opinion as to its nature and province. While such diversity exhibits, on the one hand, the eagerness that has always existed in educated minds to arrive at safe conclusions on this subject, it, also, reveals the serious difficulties that lie in the way of reaching such conclusions.

Hence, the need of a clear definition. The general name of the subject may be given as follows—The Science and Art of Discourse. The definition of each of these terms and their combination will give us the result which we are seeking.

*Science.* By this is meant,—The principles or laws pertaining to any subject *formulated* into a system—as, the Science of Geology, of Chemistry, etc. It is knowledge not as yet applied but so adjusted as to be available for use.

The Science of Discourse, therefore, is—The Laws or Principles of Discourse in systematic form.

*Art.* By this is meant,—The laws and principles of any subject in actual *application*, as the Art of Paint-

ing, of Sculpture. It is knowledge reduced to use. The Art of Discourse, is, thus—The Laws or Principles of Discourse applied to the specific production of Discourse.

*Discourse.* By this is meant,—The expression of thought in language. The Science and Art of Discourse, is, thus—The principles which govern the expression of thought in language actually applied to such an expression.

From this definition we may infer—

1. Discourse includes both Prose and Poetry.
2. Discourse includes Oratory and Composition. It may be both Oral and Written.
3. Discourse is both a Science and an Art. It has a body of rational principles in systematic form and these applied to visible production.
4. Discourse is the expression of *thought*. The excellence of the form will depend on that of the *subject-matter*.

## CHAPTER II.

### PARTS OF DISCOURSE.

#### Suggestions as to Theme.

DISCOURSE implies a Theme (θέμα)—a topic (τοπικόν)—a something placed before us for discussion. Some suggestions as to its choice are here in place.

1. It must be in keeping with the *special form* of Discourse adopted—didactic, argumentative, oratorical.

The Essay, Debate and Oration as marking definite types of discourse, demand corresponding themes.

2. It must be in keeping with the *mental ability of the discourser*. If not, the ideas and expressions are, alike, meaningless and we are educated in the direction of literary vagueness. The name of Milton is quoted by Whately and others as an argument against the utility of early systematic practice in the expression of our thought. The origin of this statement is found in Milton's Tract on Education addressed to Master Hartlib. If we carefully study the language, it will be found that it is not against early practice in expression that the author protests, but against giving to young minds themes so *abstract* and *complex* as to be above their mental reach. It is simply an error of judgment in teachers with

which he is contending. By simple themes we do not mean to include those general subjects which are so general as to beget looseness and superficiality. Nor, do we mean to exclude topics with which the writer is not, at present, fully familiar. If they are themes upon which he may readily obtain information and which will become clear after due reflection and reading, they come under the principle laid down. In fact, these are the most desirable subjects. They educate the student in thoughtful reading and stimulate to research. Hence, Milton wisely insisted that the topics treated should be vitally connected with the student's regular intellectual work.

3. It should be as *varied* as possible. The law of variety in Discourse has its first application here. If, as stated above, the kind of theme depends largely upon the form of Discourse, it follows, that variety of theme will be best secured by a studied variety in these forms. The student is to guard himself, from the outset, against the adoption of any one class of subjects to the neglect of others. Uniformity here will be sure to induce monotony of expression.

4. It should be, if possible, of *personal* and *present interest*. Being thus practical, the student will discuss it with a good degree of zeal and consequent success. A great negative benefit would also follow—that not a few errors which arise from doing heartless work would be unconsciously obviated. Deep devotion to a topic prevents many an error otherwise committed. Other things being equal, in proportion as the theme is chosen in deference to individual tastes and surroundings, its treatment will be easy and effective. There is a partial difficulty that arises

at this point with reference to those who are in process of training and are forming a style. Success in Discourse depends largely upon frequent practice. Much of such practice, however, must be of the nature of class-work and, thus, more or less mechanical. It is for this very reason that special care should be exercised as to the choice of themes. If the student is on the alert for topics of present interest, many more will be discovered than he at first supposed possible. They will be suggested by his reading and studies and his contact with others in academic life. As he advances in his course such subjects of local and genuine interest will multiply. Isolated as student life may be, the college is not a monastery. A world within itself, it has vital relations also to the world without. To those who keep the eye widely open to these relations, themes of practical moment, even for prescribed drill work, will not be wanting.

5. It should be *significant* in character—something worth discussing and revealing, in its choice, a worthy seriousness of purpose on the part of the student.

Early exercises in composition are apt to be based on inferior and superficial, if not frivolous, topics. There is involved here, however, a practical moral principle—that a man cannot afford to be careless in the initial stages of any work, lest, when the time for special excellence comes, he is not able, from very force of habit, to meet it. The presence of a “good conscience” is of great value even in the choice of subjects—such a high conception of the dignity and final end of our work that we cannot allow ourselves to be careless. The advice of Quintilian is

here most appropriate—"Aim at perfection and do as we can."

6. The theme should be suggested by the *specific object* or *purpose* we have in writing—evolved out of the final aim of the Discourse. In fine, as to the principles of guidance thus mentioned, all of them have more or less reference to what may be termed, the Law of Fitness in Discourse—the nice adaptation of the discourser to himself and his surroundings. This is a law whose successful application depends more upon general culture and good taste than upon any prescribed statutes. At this point, as at so many others, the composer must be a man of discretion.

### *Parts of Discourse.*

In the last analysis of the subject these parts might be reduced to two—The Proposition and the Proof. Most critics, however, have enlarged the classification. Asistotle gives us four—Prologue, Proposition, Proof and Epilogue. Quintilian mentions five—The Introduction, Narration, Proposition, Division and Conclusion.

Cicero states his opinion briefly, thus—"To *premise* something before we come to the main point; then, to *explain* the matter in question; then, to *support* it; next, to *sum up* and come to the proposition, is a mode of speaking which nature herself prescribes." We call attention to the fact which Cicero makes emphatic, that such division of Discourse is not arbitrary but natural. Though the divisions may greatly vary, some division is called for. Discourse cannot be unified and symmetrical without it. These parts themselves simply state the habit of the best dis-



coursers, "The art itself is nature." We may adopt a five-fold division as follows:

1. *Introduction.*
2. *Proposition.*
3. *(Analysis).*
4. *Discussion.*
5. *Conclusion.*

### (1.) *Introduction.*

The *natural basis* of these parts is nowhere more manifest than in this initial one. It is a form of address common to all writers and all species of Discourse. In poetry, we often see it in the form of an invocation or general reflection, as in Milton and others. In the drama, it is often a song or a conference of characters, as in Shakespeare. Even in the daily intercourse of social life it is not omitted. There are, indeed, times when Discourse may dispense with it. The subject to be treated may be so plain, at the outset, to all as to need no explanation; the minds of all addressed may be in the right attitude toward it, and, further, all the time that can possibly be secured may be needed for the discussion proper. When omitted for such reasons, it indicates the writer's love of brevity; his perception of what does and does not need explanation; a becoming deference to the mental abilities of those addressed; a knowledge of their state of mind; and a commendable eagerness to enter at once upon the subject. It still further tends to save Discourse from that unpleasant uniformity, which is induced by an inflexible law. Abruptness itself, or even the purposed violation of a literary precept, is, at times, preferable to rigid routine. The orations of Cicero

against Cataline could well dispense with an exordium. As a law, however, Discourse requires its presence. An inquiry into its objects and nature is now before us.

### *Objects.*

(a.) The first object which the Introduction has in view is, *clearness*,—the better understanding of what is to follow. “The most necessary business of the exordium,” says Aristotle, “is to throw some light on the end for the sake of which the speech is made.”

It is on this very principle, as we have seen, that it is sometimes dispensed with; when demanded by clearness, however, it is fatal to omit it. This would be especially true in Argumentative Discourse, where apart from what is called, the opening of the question, it would be useless to proceed. It is here and now the business of the writer to adapt his subject to those whom he addresses, and to establish common ground on which they and he may stand. This may demand the definition of terms, the statement of the general purpose, and the giving of any information bearing on the subject to the knowledge of which the reader may not otherwise come. The Introduction must be, in the fullest sense, Explanatory.

(b.) A further object of the Introduction is, *conciliation*—adapting the feelings of others to the subject presented and the person presenting it. There is a special reference here, also, to Argument. There must be the removal of all prejudices or opposition.

(c.) To *awaken attention and interest*. It is, here, taken for granted that the reader is clear in his mind as to the meaning of the subject, but is somewhat indifferent as to its merits and claims. If such indiffer-

ence is deep and decided, great skill and vigor are needed to awaken the mind from its lethargy. Hence, the bold and exceptional methods adopted by some of our ablest writers and orators. Paradox, startling antitheses and other figures are used to do the essential work. The boldness is warranted by the emergency. The mind must be reached and roused, else it is useless to proceed.

*Nature.*

(a.) It must be, in its character, *discreet* and *modest*. This evinces a love of the truth and a sense of propriety. The minds addressed are especially critical and sensitive as the discourser opens his subject. Moderation of sentiment and manner must, therefore, mark it.

“Nature herself,” says Cicero, “has introduced everything with a moderate beginning.” “Even gladiators,” he adds, “hurl their first lances gently.” If Discourse is a growth, its first expression must bear the marks of early life. If it is a climax, the opening clauses must be reserved and preparative.

(b.) It must be *brief*. It is strange that the violation of this simple principle is so common. In the very nature of the case, introductions should be short. The word itself is a plea for brevity. To make them otherwise is to make the vestibule the main part of the building. This is a direct reversal of relations. Even when they are too brief, the error is on the side of safety and often escapes detection. The lengthy introduction is seldom unnoticed. The orations of Demosthenes are models in this regard. We speak and speak correctly of—Double Introductions. They

may be called, general and special. The Preface and Introduction Proper are often found together, the former having a closer reference to the writer and the latter to the subject matter. With respect to these double forms, however, it is to be noted, that they have their proper place only in books and extended treatises and not in the short productions of the younger writer. Even in the prolonged discussions of topics; we frequently find that what might be called the second introduction or specific one belongs justly to the discussion itself. The separation is more formal than real. The older writers were wont to teach that long preambles argued a bad cause—a fear to enter at once upon the question at issue.

(c.) It should be *vitally related* to the *discussion* that follows. This may be said to be the most important of the principles adduced. The language of Cicero is here in point: “Nor is the exordium of a speech to be sought from without, or from anything unconnected with the subject; but to be derived from the very essence of the cause.” Hence, it follows that the introduction should not be written till after the discussion is substantially composed in the mind. In the order of place or time—the merely *topical* or *chronological* order—the introduction always precedes. In the *logical* order—the order of thought—it follows the discussion; for it is out of the bosom of this discussion that it is evolved. In this particular, Sallust is at fault, and even Cicero, in violation of his own creed, kept introductions ready made for emergencies. It may, further, be stated here, that the introduction should enable the reader, in a general way, to *forecast* the discussion. It is far safer to err on this side

of close relationship than on that of irrelevance or studied disguise. It is not the object of the general writer, as of the dramatist or novelist, to conceal and even mislead at the outset, in order to surprise at the close by the sudden unfolding of the plot. The object, from the first, is clearness and unity of parts. The introduction must be that one belonging to the particular production and to no other. The statement so often made, "that no part of the discussion should be anticipated in the introduction," is apt to deceive us. No part of it should be formally given or developed. It must be, in a sense, anticipated. Having read or heard the opening sentences, we are not to be surprised by any expressions that may follow. "As to the manner in which we are to begin," says Quintilian, "we are to be led to it by the nature of the cause." Things essentially related should be formally related.

## (2.) Proposition.

This, we shall note, is distinct from the Theme. It is the *formal statement* of the theme in connection with the *special object* of the Discourse. The Theme Liberty, expressed in propositional form, might be—Liberty is essential to good government.

The entire discussion is thus indicated in the Proposition. Just here we come in contact with a very common error. We refer to the discussion of *themes* in distinction from *propositions*—a discussion based on the most general notions rather than on definite truths definitely stated. With experienced writers it is not so essential that the Proposition be always verbally expressed, inasmuch as it is mentally before

them and they have formed the habit of following it. By the beginner, however, the theme should always be put into form, so as to preclude all error. Herein lies much of the injury of resorting to Manuals of Themes—subjects expressed in the form of precepts and prudential maxims, such as may be found in "Poor Richard's Almanac." They are mere themes, prepared to order, loosely expressed and needing statement in logical form. To discuss them as given us, leads to a rambling, vapid indulgence in platitudes without pith or point. Much of our academic and political oratory is at fault in this regard. We are no wiser after listening than before. The method is circuitous and superficial. "No one who is conversant with the popular eloquence of any of the leading professions," says Dr. Hope, "can fail to observe that public speakers constantly come before the public without knowing precisely what they mean to establish." In Argumentative Discourse, the theme and the proposition are one. The theme is, necessarily, a proposition. It should be practically so in all Discourse. We ourselves in treating the subject and the minds whom we address alike demand such a definite statement of the topic. 'Tis neither our place nor the reader's to spend that time which should be devoted to the discussion itself in ascertaining what our special purpose is. No judicious writer thus refers to a later period what should have been done earlier. 'Tis the writer's function to make his meaning plain, and the reader's, to receive the truth and act upon it. As to the place of the proposition, it may be said, that although it properly comes immediately after the theme, it is generally reserved to the close of the in-

troductio, and forms the natural transition between it and the discussion. Even in argumentative discourse where the proposition is the first thing, it is commonly repeated in a more formal and extended manner just before beginning the argument itself. The two parts are happily combined when the paraphrase of the proposition constitutes the introduction. It may, hence, be noted:

(a.) That the *diction* in which the Proposition is given should be *clear* beyond a question—so expressed as to find an immediate lodgment in the mind addressed. It must be verbally plain.

(b.) That the clear statement of a Proposition is a mark of *mental power*, inasmuch as behind the clear statement lies the clear conception. This mental insight is acute and far-reaching just in proportion to the inherent difficulty of the subject in hand. To discuss the inner meaning and the full scope of an abstract theme and then to embody these in a satisfactory statement is as difficult as it is desirable.

### (3.) Analysis.

This important subject will be fully discussed under the Laws of Discourse—Law of Method. Suffice it to say, in this connection, that after the Proposition is given, its central idea is to be resolved into its appropriate divisions and subdivisions and these are to be developed in their unity and logical order. Other things being equal, the success or failure of the discourser will be decided at this point. His work here takes on its fixed forms from which there can be little or no departure. Lying at the centre of the

Parts of Discourse, it guides and governs all. In the presentation hereafter to be given of it, it will be our purpose to exalt it to its due prominence in Discourse.

#### (4.) Discussion.

The first idea with reference to this part of Discourse is, that it is the *most important* one. It is that to which the Introduction, Proposition and Analysis look forward and back to which the Conclusion ever refers. It is the full treatment of the Theme, the unfolding of that which the Introduction has led us to anticipate; the proof of the Proposition, the development of the Analysis and the basis of the Conclusion. It is, as we say, the body of the Discourse. It is, essentially, the Discourse itself. To discourse (*discurro*) is, substantially, to discuss (*discutio*) not in the special sense of arguing, but in the wider sense of general treatment. It will be necessary, therefore, to touch only very briefly upon Discussion as a separate part of Discourse.

As to any special *form* which it may assume—this depends upon the special *object* in view. The old writers, followed by Whately and others, made it mainly *Argumentative* inasmuch as with them the conviction of the judgment was the final end of all Discourse. Properly preceding this, however, is the Explanatory or Didactic form—the object being to impress or enlighten. Still again, we note what may be called, the Oratorical form, its aim being to work upon the feelings and motives of the soul. Allusion may here be made to the Narrative and Descriptive



forms more general in character than the others and mingling freely with them.

Many writers insist upon making the *Æsthetic* or *Ornamental*, a distinct form of the discussion. To this, serious objection may be taken. In poetry, indeed, where the final object is to please, this view may be endorsed. In prose, however, the ornate is to be regarded simply as an element of style entering readily into all the specific forms. Mere *æsthetic* pleasure should never constitute the main end of prose composition any more than mental instruction should that of poetry. Pope's "Essay on Man" should have been written in prose, and Sidney's "Arcadia," in verse. It simply remains to be noted that the Discussion must be nothing more nor less than the direct unfolding of the Analysis. The unity of the two parts must be ever conspicuous. The error which consists in their severance is so common among younger writers that the principle cannot be made too emphatic. The discussion is not a Digression. Discourse must not be too discursive. We must keep within the limits assigned us.

### (5.) Conclusion.

The special form of this part of Discourse depends, as the Introduction, upon the kind or type of Discourse in hand. In theory, therefore, it may take any one of a number of forms. As a matter of fact, however, we find that one form prevails. We may call it,—the *Emphatic* or *Oratorical*. The time for explanation of terms, adducing of proofs, narration and description, has passed. The time for impression

has come and the result will depend upon the manner in which the opportunity is used. According to Aristotle, the Peroration included four things.

- (a.) Securing the favorable judgment of the mind addressed.
- (b.) Enlarging upon points already stated.
- (c.) Awakening recollection.
- (d.) Influencing the passions or emotions.

It is to the last of these that special attention should be drawn—impression with reference to immediate personal action. Hence, we find Cicero placing the conclusion among those parts of Discourse which “by excitement and solicitation produce great effect.”

No form of Discourse, oral or written, can afford to close tamely or impotently. No amount of merit in the opening and progress of the production can altogether atone for the absence of power here. The special type of conclusion to which we have referred may be said to embody the essential idea of any conclusion. When the mind works naturally and freely in Discourse, we find it working toward just such a closing as this. This may be largely illustrated in various kinds of literary efforts. In the drama, we see it in the final catastrophe to which every act and scene has contributed and in which all is consummated. The same is evident in epic poetry. In fiction, we see it in the plot unfolding with ever-increasing interest until we come to the final revelation.

In argument, the proof is always accumulative and progressive, until, at the close, it overpowers and convinces us. In impassioned Discourse, we note a kind of oratorical climax, whose effect is intended to rep-

resent the sum total of power in the Discourse. In sacred oratory, this often takes the form of Appeal or Exhortation—a direct address to the feelings and will. In fine, Discourse in general and every separate Discourse is climacteric. We speak correctly of the “growing theme.” There is philosophy as well as poetry in the phrase. It is the law of Discourse as an organic process, developing from the crudest forms to full maturity.

The quaint advice of Dr. Litchfield to a student of divinity is appropriate to all Discourse:

“Begin low, go on slow,  
Rise higher and take fire.  
When most impressed, be self-possessed,  
At the end, wax warm and sit down in a storm.”

All true Discourse waxes warmer and stronger as it goes on to its ending. To violate this principle is to exhibit a Reverse or Anti-Climax—a structure which either decreases in power as it advances or in which the clauses are not arranged in the regular order of relative strength.

The ability thus to advance in interest and effect is of no inferior type. It indicates that we have a definite object before us—so definite and real as to control us. We know just what we are doing and why we are doing it. The eagerness to secure our proposed end tends to make every succeeding statement more telling and the last words more potent than all. The classic orations of literature are evidence of this. In many of them, the closing sentences epitomize the entire oration—its meaning and its force. They gather up in a few compact utterances all that precedes, and

send it home to heart and conscience with magnetic effect. Such progressive power also indicates a good degree of control over the mental faculties. In their natural tendency to wander, we hold them steadily to the one work in hand. We retrace no steps, lose no ground once fairly won, but conserving every increase of power, use it as a basis for still larger effort.

As to just how the fullest effect of a conclusion is to be reached, this may, perhaps, best be left to the intelligent judgment of the writer.

There are certain methods which have received the sanction of others and may be briefly stated.

(a.) The *summary* of the leading principles and facts of the discussion. This method proceeds on the view that no direct attempt at making an impression is needed, beyond that made by the simple statement of the argument. It does not pretend to advance anything new or to address the feelings as such. It simply re-presents the subject. This method has special fitness to logical Discourse and is not without value in other spheres.

(b.) The emphasis of *repetition* and *enlargement* of what is regarded as the *main* point of the discussion—that on which everything turns. Here, we have a direct address to the emotions and motives. This, also, has special relation to Argumentative Discourse and has been used, therein, with marked effect.

Whatever the form or method of the conclusion, however, it is to be constructed with special care. It is true that an able production will naturally close ably. This kind of unconscious excellence, however, is always the result of a vast amount of previous

labor. With beginners, this part of Discourse, as others, must be made a separate study. To know when to close is important. To know just how to close is more so.

In the best sense of the word, our Conclusions should be composed and expressed for the sake of effect.

## CHAPTER III.

### MATERIAL AND MEDIA OF DISCOURSE.

#### WORDS.

If the student of Discourse were asked, what the subject matter of his study was, his reply might be given in the language of Hamlet to Polonius—"Words, words, words!" In a very important sense, the study of Discourse is the study of *words*. Other things being equal, he will be the ablest discourser who has the richest and most vigorous vocabulary and knows how to use it in the accomplishment of definite, objective ends.

"The use and command of proper words is," says Cicero, "the groundwork of Discourse." They are the media of communication between mind and mind. If so, verbal power as a separate form and measure of power must be understood in its nature and methods of application. In such a study, the normal relation of words to ideas must be made prominent. In the words of Müller—"Language and thought are inseparable. Words without thought are dead sounds; thoughts without words are nothing. To think, is to speak low; to speak is to think aloud." "There are certain ideas," says Ruskin, "inherent in language itself." The exciting controversy as to the compar-

ative importance of words and things is a matter of history. It was, in fact, a controversy between the exponents of mental and moral science, on the one hand, and those of physical science, on the other; between the philosophers, so-called, and the naturalists. The later controversy which has taken definite shape since philosophy came into prominence as a science, is one as to words and ideas and the sharp distinctions drawn are even more confounding and misleading than those mentioned in the old discussion.

Hence, the principle must ever be made emphatic that the thought and the idea behind it cannot be summarily detached. We cannot speak of words as mere arbitrary, conventional signs, just as good in one place as another and having no deeper occasion or purport than the convenience of those employing them. As Mirabeau expresses it—"Words are things." They are real as well as nominal. The declaration of Pope, that language is "the dress of thought" has received its needed modification by his more reflective successor, Wordsworth, that it is the "incarnation of thought." It is not a something put on or off as a man's clothing, but it is the vital organism in which the idea finds residence and exercise. Thus, Mr. Emerson, in speaking of the words of Montaigne remarks—"If you cut them, they will bleed." They have flesh and blood. True verbal power, then, takes its character from the mental power behind it. There is such a thing, indeed, as "Sound and fury signifying nothing." This, however, is abnormal. The idiot is often the most talkative of persons. The language of rational men is rational. Their speech is

a part of their being as intellectual and should express its type and measure. The term, Man, in its original form, means, the Thinker. In Anglo-Saxon, he is the Speaker or Sayer (Secg.) The word Person, in its Latin form (*persona*), has a somewhat similar meaning. The relation here is not altogether accidental. Thought and speech, and these in unity, make a man what he is.

A position even higher may be assumed. The divine mind, in human revelation, is the *Λόγος*, both the Reason and the Expression of God—the Truth incarnate.

“Words,” says Cousin, “are the most simple and fruitful manifestation of the absolute.”

With reference to the practical needs of the student of Discourse there are two topics, as to words,  
*Kinds of Words—Sources of Words.*

## KINDS OF WORDS.

### (1.) Native Words.

Those derived from the language in which we Discourse—English words. By most writers such terms are placed under the head of—Purity of Diction, a quality in which, according to Dr. Campbell, “All other qualities have their foundation.”

The name Barbarism, by which a violation of this principle is known, arose among the Greeks. As those were called Barbarians who were not of their own nation, so, they were guilty of Barbarisms who used other than Greek words. The principle, that we should use our own words, is certainly a natural one. For



the use of others, to any large extent, we are bound to show good cause.

In referring to native words, those called Anglo-Saxon are prominent. Mr. Emerson, in his "English Traits," remarks: "It is a tacit rule of the language, to make the frame of Saxon words and when ornament is sought, to interweave Roman." The body of English is, still, Saxon. Its joints and sinews are Saxon. All its homeliest, sweetest and strongest expressions are Saxon—words in which, as Macaulay phrases it, "Men make love, drive bargains and quarrel." If so, we must accord them a large and leading place in daily use. "Depend upon it," said Lord Stanley to the students at Glasgow, "it is the plain, Saxon phrase that goes straightest and strongest to men's heads and hearts." "I observe," adds Emerson, "that all distinguished poetry (English) is written in the oldest and simplest English words." One-half of our present words being traceable directly back to a Saxon source, this element must be magnified.

The simple and safe principle here is, that the English writer is to use Anglo-Saxon or native words whenever it is possible to use them with effect. When the claims of the English and of other tongues are comparatively equal, the preference should be given to the English. The faithful English writer uses foreign terms under a kind of protest. When he uses them, he does so, not because he loves the English less but clearness and force of expression more. It is well that there are those among us who are ever pressing with zeal the claims of the mother tongue. The tendency to the excessive use of foreign words and the pride of novelty are so strong, that they need decided

rebuke. Many of our leading authors have yielded to this tendency far too freely—Hooker, Barrow, Gibbon, Johnson and others. We are, thus, not surprised to find Addison desiring that certain men be set apart as sentinels to guard the pureness of the language.

(USE OF FOREIGN TERMS.)

In the nature of the case, the law as to home terms must have its exception. This is especially so as to words from the Latin and French, making up fully three-tenths of Modern English. To ignore such an element would be as unwise as injurious. It would show a devotion to native words that overreached itself and defeated the very ends for which they should be used. As far as the Norman-French is concerned, we should be favorably disposed toward it, in that the Northmen before settling in Gaul occupied that part of Northern Europe which was the home of our own ancestors. They were Teutons. It may, further, be argued that there are provinces of knowledge not as well covered by native terms as by others.

In the simple forms of Discourse, in all the more common speech of daily life—domestic, social and moral—we must use Saxon or fail, but when we come to the scientific and the abstract, we must betake ourselves to other sources. Pedantry, which is the excessive use of foreign terms, is an extreme. So, also, is Purism—a blind devotion to native words. We can be loyal to our native English and yet give due deference to all related languages. The sum of the matter is, We are to use the best words in the circumstances. As a law, we shall find these to be native.

When these are not the best, we are to be perfectly free in the use of foreign terms.

To adopt the best means for our ends, is one of the first laws of Discourse. It applies in full to the subject now before us.

*Examples of foreign Words in good use:*

Item,	Anathema,
Quorum,	Fiat,
Omnibus,	Dépot,
Alamode,	Exit,
Ultimatum,	Role,
Alibi,	Memento,
Finale,	Alias,
Protégé,	Verbatim,
Rendezvous,	Impromptu,
Vespers,	Acrobat,
Residuum,	Matins,
Fête,	Patois,
Instanter,	Extempore.

Prof. De Mille has given us a valuable summary showing the prominence of the native or Anglo-Saxon element in the various departments of literature,—

	<i>Per Cent.</i>
The English Bible.....	93
The Prayer Book.....	87
Poetry.....	88
Prose Fiction.....	87
Essays.....	78
Oratory.....	76
History.....	72
Newspapers.....	72

Taking these eight leading departments of literature together, we note an average of over eighty per cent. of native words.

The following extracts from Bunyan and Hooker will show the difference as to the use of native and foreign words—

(a.) "Now I saw, upon a time, when he was walking in the fields, that he was, as he went, reading in his book, and greatly distressed in his mind; and as he read, he burst out, as he had done before, crying, 'What shall I do to be saved?'"—*Bunyan*.

(b.) "He that goeth about to persnade a multitude, that they are not so well governed as they ought to be, shall never want attentive and favorable hearers; because they know the manifold defects whereunto every kind of regiment is subject, but the secret lots and difficulties, which in public proceedings are innumerable and inevitable they have not ordinarily the judgment to consider."—*Hooker*.

The same principle may be shown by a reference to Addison and Milton as compared with Bunyan.

(a.) "It gives me a serious concern to see such a spirit of discussion in the country; not only as it destroys virtue and common sense and renders us in a manner barbarians toward one another, but as it perpetuates our animosities, and transmits our present passions and prejudices to our posterity."—*Addison*.

(b.) "Thus did the true prophets of old combat with the false; thus Christ Himself the fountain of meekness, found acrimony enough to be still galling and vexing the prelatical Pharisees. . . . There may be a sanctified bitterness against the enemies of truth."—*Milton*.

## (2.) Standard Words.

The word *standard* is used in this connection, as we use it in its application to books. It refers to that which is authoritative,—sanctioned, according to the Horatian law, by the usage of the best writers. The three marks which Dr. Campbell gives us of a word in good use are all included in the class now before us.

(A.) *Reputable Words*,—those in use, among the educated and refined. They are the language of authors,

who, as such, have a right to accept and reject. They are the words of courts, of capitals and central cities.

Special care is thus needed in the daily use of words, in common conversation. It is here that we are the most frequently off our guard. Though cautious enough in the study of language and literature and in the act of composition, we are negligent in social speech. Able writers yield to temptation here and weaken their power. Carelessness in this lower sphere begets the habit of carelessness. Hence, we have books calling our attention to "Improprieties of Speech," "The Mistakes of Educated Men." Schele de Vere has exhausted this subject as applied to our own country in his work on "Americanisms." "A tendency to slang, to colloquial inelegancies and even to vulgarisms," says Whitney, "is the besetting sin against which we as Americans have especially to guard." It is so common as often to make up the body of an hour's conversation. This error is strongly prevalent in our institutions of learning and among liberally educated men. From such sources it naturally spreads rapidly and largely through the common speech of the people. The early resolution of Chesterfield was a good one—"Not to speak one word in conversation which was not the fittest he could recall." He charged his son "never to give a command to a servant but in the best language he could find." The fact is that these common relations of life determine our speech more than those which are unusual. The man who uses poor English to his family and domestics will not be without fault when he comes to the work of composition or before an assembly.

(B.) *National Words.* These are opposed to those that are local or provincial. They are in general use and readily understood in all sections. We find both in America and England ample illustration of this law. The different portions of our country—North, South, East and West, have terms and phrases peculiar to themselves. They are, in no sense, national, and are regarded, even by those who use them, as subordinate to the speech of the people. In England, the Northern, Midland and Southern districts are distinct from one another and from the common speech. The differences extend not only to accent and pronunciation, but to the syntax. It is manifest that such terms cannot be *standard*. Standard English could be easily understood by an audience gathered from all the various sections of the various English-speaking nations. The same principle holds as to Technical Terms—the peculiar diction of the trades and professions. They answer a purpose, but a specific one, and are, in no sense, national.

(c.) *Present Words.* The question here arising is—What is meant by present use? If we adopt the true division of First, Middle and Modern English, the question still is—Where does Modern English begin? For all practical purposes we may say—at the Elizabethan Age—in the writings of Bacon and Shakespeare. There is a sense in which poetry may be said to have a wider range and, at times, to seek quaintness for its own sake. Our reference is to prose. If we go back of this period, we must do so with a glossary in hand. Nor is it meant that we may not find in Bacon's day many words now obsolete or fast becoming so, but that the great body of them are still in use. Even in

the age of Milton and in that of Addison, words are found that are now discarded. Language is ever changing. In referring the writer, therefore, to the time of Elizabeth, we take for granted the presence in him of discretion and linguistic taste. Our language, then, is to be that of the age in which we live. It remains to be noted here that far too many words of doubtful propriety find currency among educated people. We must not, for such a reason, be led to endorse them, and the hope may be entertained that, as the people advance in taste and culture, these terms will be more and more fully eliminated.

EXAMPLES.

(a.) *Disreputable Words*—(Slang.)\*

(b.) *Words not National*—*Provincialisms*.

- "I reckon you will."
- "He is very clever."
- "Leave him do it."
- "I set no store by it."
- "I will take it kind of you."
- "He favors (resembles) his father."
- "He is a likely child."
- "He took him to do."
- "He has a heap on them."

*Words not Present*—*Obsolete*.†

Bihight—promised, (Chaucer.)	Mulierosity, (H. More.)
Chere—countenance, "	Confutement, (Milton.)
Clepen—to call, "	Populosity, (Browne.)
Dispitous—sharp, "	Traducement, (Shakespeare.)
Dreeched—troubled, "	Optable, (Cockeram.)
Enherte—to encourage, "	Oppressure, (Jonson.)
Forpynd—wasted away, "	Misdevotion, (Milton.)
Halwes—saints, "	Insulse, (Milton.)
Incertain, (Shakespeare.)	Luxurist, (Temple.)
Periculous, (Browne.)	

\* See "De Vere's Americanisms."

† "See Anglo-Saxon and Early English Dictionaries," (Bosworth and Stratmann).

An important principle to be borne in mind, here, is, that there is often a difference between the primitive or etymological meaning of a word and its present meaning. The derivation of a word, therefore, will not always give us its true sense. Archbishop Trench in his "Study of Words" and other similar manuals has adduced numerous examples illustrative of this principle. Some of these may be mentioned—

*Meat*, referring, formerly, to all kinds of food.

*Libel*, once, referring to any kind of book or writing.

*Apple*, fruit in general.

*Duke*, any leader.

*Voyage*, any kind of journey.

*Starving*, any kind of death.

*Baffled*, dishonored.

*Nephew*, a lineal descendant.

*Carriages*, baggage.

*Worship*, honor.

*Weeds*, clothing.

*Shrew*, applied to both sexes.

*Coquet*, applied to both sexes.

*Bombast*, cotton plant.

*Exonerate*, to unload.

*Gossip*, akin to God—a sponsor in baptism.

*Imp*, a royal scion.

*Brat*, one of a family.

*Shrewd*, wicked.

*Deer*, any wild animal.

*Maid*, one grown—applied often to males.

*Acre*, any portion of land.

*Admire*, to wonder at.

*Amusement*, occupation (varied.)

*Artist*, one versed in liberal arts.

*Artisan*, one skilled in fine arts.

*Bribery*, robbery.

*Buxom*, yielding, obedient.

*Cattle*, chattel, wealth.



*Corn*, grain in general.

*Chivalry*, cavalry, army.

*Civility*, performance of the duties of the citizen (civis).

*Comfort*, strength.

*Conceit*, conception.

*Copy*, abundance (copia.)

*Deadly*, mortal.

*Disease*, absence of ease, trouble.

*Egregious*, (ex-grex) distinguished, apart from the flock. Used in good and bad sense.

*Enormous*, (ex-norma) out of law or order, excessive.

*Effeminate*, womanly.

*Fbrlorn*, completely lost.

*Fbnd*, foolish.

*Gazette*, a piece of money.

*Handsome*, handy.

*Harlot*, applied to each sex.

*Livery*, food or clothing "delivered" to servants or others.

*Ostler*, the hosteller, innkeeper.

*Person*, (per-sona) the actor's mask.

*Puny*, (puis-ne) born after.

*Purchase*, to procure in any way.

*Sheer*, pure.

*Staple*, place or mart, a prop.

*Wretched*, exiled, miserable.

(For further examples, See Trench's "Select Glossary" and 'English, Past and Present.')

At this point lies one of the arguments for the study of derivation of etymology so that the student may have an intelligent idea of the precise difference between present and primitive meanings and be saved from unseemly error. It were well could many of the older meanings be revived. Strange to say, the loss of numbers of them is due to a moral decline in public sentiment. Where two senses have existed, the evil one has been retained.

### (3.) Suggestive Words.

"The marvel of Shakespeare's diction," writes Whipple, "is, the immense suggestiveness—his power of radiating through single expressions a life and meaning which they do not retain in their removal to dictionaries."

There is something more in these words than they themselves seem to include. They are *indicative*. When they are uttered, "more is meant than meets the ear." They have a large *relative* value. Intimating just enough to awaken inquiry, their main benefit, is, in the line of quickening research. They hint at further and deeper meanings. They act as media through which we come to the knowledge of truth. What is known as the suggestive style is marked by these words and should be commended with special emphasis to every student of composition.

### (4.) Comprehensive Words.

These contain in a small compass a large verbal treasure. They embody, in compact form, long processes of thought. They express results. Trench compares them to a bill of exchange, doing for the writer what that does for the tourist. They represent large values.

### (5.) Cogent Words.

In Saxon phrase, these might be termed—telling words. They count something toward the result. There is nothing weak or defective in them. They are always up to the full measure and might. Such terms may be said to carry a force with them quite

irrespective of the user. By whomsoever employed they produce good results, but when lodged in the minds of others by an earnest soul behind them, the effect is marvellous. These are the words which may be said to have a special fitness to oratorical discourse. They are calculated to produce an immediate and decided effect. When opposition to the truth is strong and the onset must be bold, these are the words to be sought.

Words that are positive rather than negative, declarative rather than interrogative come under this class. "Every word of Webster's," says one, "weighs a pound." Cogent words are mighty, significant. They have a body to them and a momentum.

#### (6.) Concise Words.

They might be termed—precise. They are cut down to their exactest form and sense. There is nothing superfluous. Much diversity of opinion may exist as to whether or not the English language is well adapted to such terms. Though it cannot be compared to the French in this regard, it is safe to say, that if the language is properly understood and used, precision is not difficult. This is chiefly so in its Anglo-Saxon and earlier forms, so marked by monosyllables and dissyllables. In later English, abbreviations are a marked feature. There is, indeed, danger lest this contracting process be carried too far and we do away with many initial and final syllables that should be retained.

*Concise Words are brief Words.* The Spartans so magnified this quality that any citizen was subject to a money fine who neglected it. The word *la-*

*conic* took its origin at that time. Addison tells us that he is especially thankful to Providence that he was born an Englishman, inheriting a language so wonderfully adapted to the sparing of words. These shorter words are what the French call—*trenchant*. They are sharp, terse and clean cut. They are seen in their best power in the pages of those writers who are called incisive. Careful readers of Thucydides, Tacitus, Bacon, Pope and the leading authors of French prose will appreciate the meaning of brevity in language. Their works abound in words whose “penetrative power is inversely as their mass.” Simplicity is one of their marks. Most writers use far too many and too lengthy words. The tendency in this wrong direction is so natural that the young writer cannot be too strongly warned against it.

*Concise Words are plain.* They indicate their meaning to us at once, and, thus, deny the assertion made by Talleyrand and Goldsmith—that words are used to conceal thought. In distinction from being vague, general or abstract, they are specific, revealing the processes through which results are reached. Though in no bad sense superficial, their purport lies upon their surface, legible to every eye. The old writers would quaintly call them *univocal*, as opposed to *equivocal*, words having but one sound or significance. It is for these plain expressions that Locke ably contends in his discussion upon the “Abuse of Words.” By their abuse, he means their double use. What is called the grandiose or bombastic style discards these homely terms and deals in what the Bible calls “big, swelling words.” Such writers are the verbal inflationists of every age.

“There are people,” says Landor, “who think they write finely merely because they have forgotten the language in which their fathers and mothers used to talk to them.” There is a something called profundity of which many writers boast, which means, to say a simple thing in an obscure way. Dr. Campbell refers to it in his four-fold division of Nonsense—the puerile, the marvellous, the learned and the profound. Profound or learned nonsense is the worst form of it. There is nothing more difficult or more important in Discourse than to tell a plain thing in a plain way.

(*Technical Terms.*) The question here arises as to the propriety of such words. We note that plainness is a *relative* term. What is not plain to one person or class may be to another. A plain diction is one that is understood by those to whom it is addressed. When, therefore, terms that are technical or professional are understood, they are plain and hence proper. In the sphere in which they are used they are clear. The special danger is, that those accustomed to them are apt to use them too freely outside of professional circles. When thus used, they are violations of plainness and are to be discarded. The use of such terms, depends, therefore, upon the character of the mind addressed. The discretion of the writer is, thus, needed to determine as to such ability. Language is useless to us save as a medium through which we may make ourselves understood.

### (7.) Words of uniform meaning.

In Discourse, the same term or terms are to be used throughout any given production in the same sense. The violation of this principle is common and most

injurious. "Everything can be maintained," says Goethe, "when one permits himself to use words vaguely." It is only for the purposes of burlesque that this principle can be broken with impunity. There is a moral element involved here which forbids frequent change of meaning. Starting out with a given word in a given sense, we are in honor committed to its use in that sense.

Much of the present ambiguity in Discourse and literature arises from neglect at this point. Such words as *Idea*, *Style*, *Law* and others have so many meanings that they have no meaning.

#### (8.) *Appropriate Words.*

Words in the right place, fitting to the thought and the surroundings. They fit to the idea as a picture to its frame or the gem to its setting. The theory here involved is, that each of our ideas has its corresponding word. The theory, of course, cannot be fully applied. Words are less numerous than mental notions. The principle, however, is, that among various words that might be chosen, there is some one best word to express the specific idea. Careful writers will seek until they find it. In reading the personal history of some of our English authors one is amazed at the care exhibited in this regard, seeming to amount, at times, to a scrupulous nicety. Words should be pertinent to the subject and to each phase of it as it appears. Such words cannot be found in verbal manuals. They must be suggested by the very ideas they are to express. We have in the poetry of Tennyson a marked example of verbal aptness. The effect is in the line of grace. In prose

Discourse, the element of clearness would also be thus secured. "Propriety of words," says D'Alembert, "is the distinguishing mark of great writers."

What may be termed violations of propriety are so common that special care is needed, viz.—

Lay .....	lie.
Sit .....	set.
Teach .....	learn.
Ingenuous .....	ingenious.
Observance .....	observation.
Vocation .....	avocation.
Respectively .....	respectfully.
Lose ....	loose.
Like .....	as.
Church .....	congregation.
Page .....	sheet.
Book .....	volume.
Discompose .....	decompose.
Except .....	unless.
Mutual .....	common.
Bring .....	fetch.
Two .....	couple.
Sewerage .....	sewage.
Into .....	in.
Neither .....	no one.
Humanitarian .....	humane.
Choice .....	alternative.

### (9.) Descriptive Words.

These words are picturesque and graphic in effect. Though especially adapted to poetry, they have an important function in prose. They reveal the close relations of prose to poetry and may be freely used in what is called—poetical prose. It is thus that Addison discusses words under the head of Imagination. They are the imaging agents. It is thus that epic and dramatic poetry express high forms of verbal

power. If, as the Greeks taught, the main element in clearness is vividness, then, this kind of diction is essential to us. We must depict, represent or outline the thought. Fenelon, in his "Dialogues on Eloquence," tells us that to paint (*peindre*) or describe is one of the three leading offices of style. The writer must know how to delineate—to draw the lines and make visible the idea.

### (10.) Euphonic Words.

Though this quality of diction is not so high in character as some of the others, it has its place in all true style and cannot be neglected with impunity. Our words should be, as far as possible, agreeable to the ear and the æsthetic taste. The excessive use of the harsher consonants and improper relation of accented to unaccented syllables should be avoided. The power of words, as mere sounds, is to be regarded and applied.

In our diction as euphonic, two things are of importance,

(a.) Sounds as pleasant in *themselves*. There is, here, a proper adjustment of vowels and liquids and consonants. Ease of pronunciation is studied. This is Euphony Proper.

(b.) Sounds as pleasant in their relation to the *sense*. Even though unpleasant in themselves, they are agreeable in their relations. They express the higher harmony between the idea and the word. "The sound," writes Pope, "is made an echo to the sense." Pope himself was an illustrious example of this. Though this principle of euphony applies more fully to poetry, it has its place in prose.



*Examples—*

(a.)	(b.)
Cheerily.	Shrieking.
Æolian.	Crashing.
Merrily.	Whistling.
Lovely.	Buzzing.
Silvery.	Thundering.
Claribel.	Ponderous.
Jollity.	

(11.) Words of correct Formation.

The law is, that the constituent parts of the word should be from the same language. *Examples—*

<i>Correct Formation.</i>	<i>Incorrect Formation.</i>
Witness.	Laity.
Equity.	Polity.
Faculty.	Dynasty.
Oddness.	Politeness.
Rhetoric.	Christendom.
Despotic.	Christianity.
Historic.	Profaneness.
Chronic.	Atonement.
-----	Bondage.
	Readable.
	Falsehood.
Dramatic.	Christmastide.
Tension.	Dukedom.
Policy.	Manhood.
Oneness.	Priestcraft.
Unity.	Popedom.
Trinity.	Uncivil.
Oblation.	

Though this law has many exceptions, it is a helpful one both in Language and Discourse. The unity and force of the word is secured. Violations are known as Hybrid Formations.

Cases are frequent in which from the same stem two words may be formed, the one observing and the

other violating the principle of formation, and yet either may be used at the option of the writer.

*Purity or Pureness,*  
*Oddity or Oddness,*  
*Plausibility or Plausibleness,*  
*Utility or Usefulness.*

This law as to formation may be best exhibited in the use of Affixes (Prefixes and Suffixes) as related to roots and stems. As many of these, so far as English is concerned, were in First English separate words with separate meaning and use, their present value in modifying meanings is greater than we are wont to suppose and they are, thus, worthy of the special attention of the student. A list of some of these Affixes from the Latin-French, the Greek and the English, will be of service to the student for personal practice in formation.

*Suffixes.*

<i>L.-F.</i>	<i>G.</i>	<i>Eng.</i>
ity, ty.	ic (k).	ness.
ment.	isc (k).	dom.
ance.	ac.	ship.
age.	asm.	wise.
ry.	ism.	ward.
ess.	ad.	fast.
able.	log (y).	craft.
ous.	ist.	less.
tude.	ine.	fold.
tion.	itis.	hood.
let.		ric (k).
ative.		(l) ing.
tor.		tide.
ell.		kin (d).
ate.		like (ly).
al.		ful (l).
ed.		some.
ue.		ed.

*Prefixes.*

<i>L.-F.</i>	<i>G.</i>	<i>Eng.</i>
de.	au (a).	under.
dis (f).	apo.	over.
con (l).	auto.	for (e).
re.	cata.	after.
E (x) (f).	syn (m) (l).	
ab (d) (n).	dys.	up.
ant (e) (i).	epi.	un.
In (ter).	meta.	be.
contra.	en.	with.
port.		on.
retro.		ful.
trans.		mis.
ob.		a.
sub (f).		to.
super.		
pre.		

For a satisfactory discussion of Affixes, see Haldeman's "Affixes to English Words" and Morris' "Outlines of English Accidence."

## (12.) Synonymous Words.

*Definition.* They are words whose meaning, in the main, is the same but with incidental differences, these differences lying, at times, in the original nature of the words or acquired at later periods. The word *synonym* is, thus, used figuratively, indicating essential but not absolute likeness.

*Uses. (a.)* They serve, in so far as they are genuine, to *enrich* a language. They widen its scope and function and answer much the same purpose as figures, enabling us to express the same idea in varied forms.

*(b.)* They reveal the *connections* of languages, especially those of the same family, for synonyms are not confined to any one language. They serve as media between our own and other tongues. Even

in the same language they serve to make the unity more vital, inasmuch as the idea, though expressed in various forms, is the one idea throughout.

(c.) The *historical value* of these words is not to be forgotten. In them we have the evidence, often, of the original separation of tribes and peoples and their subsequent union. Their words are brought together to form a common stock and the same idea is expressed in slightly modified form by each of the peoples represented in the union. The early relations of an invading and victorious nation to the nation conquered, as of the Normans to the Saxons, is thus clearly shown, especially when, as in that case, the people were conquered, but not the speech. As an immediate result, modifications of meanings in the respective languages arise, mutual concessions are made—synonyms exist.

(d.) They serve to connect more or less closely *present* with *derivative* meanings, and thus keep intact the *historic* character of the language. Trench severely and rightly condemns Whately's book on synonyms for its neglect of this principle and calls attention to the good work that has been done by Milton and Taylor and Barrow in enforcing it.

(e.) There is a distinctive *mental* and *moral* benefit in this class of words in that they cultivate absolute *precision* of statement. Distinctions are sharply and conscientiously drawn in accordance with the exact truth. Quite apart from the needs of Discourse, there is a habit of accuracy thus formed which is of high value.

(f.) Their importance in our work as *writers* is to be noted. They afford us the opportunity of finding

the best word by which to express our ideas and show the vital relation of word to thought.

Reference should be made, in speaking of synonyms, to a *counter process* going on as a language matures. It is called Desynonymizing,—expressing an idea by one word and one only, whenever it can be done. This is demanded by the rapid increase of ideas to be expressed. Economy is necessary. Such words as were formerly indiscriminately used become thus separated in usage and each expresses its own idea. Special gratitude is due to such authors as Coleridge and Wordsworth for the work which they have done for language at this point.

This process is especially needed inasmuch as the demand for new synonyms becomes increasingly urgent as language enlarges its scope. This process is illustrated in the distinctions made by Coleridge and others between—

*Fanaticism and Enthusiasm.*

*Keeness and Subtlety.*

*Poetry and Poesy.*

*Analogy and Metaphor.*

*Reason and Understanding.*

*Fancy and Imagination.*

#### EXAMPLES OF SYNONYMS IN LATIN-FRENCH AND ENGLISH.

Cordial.....	hearty.
Amiable.....	friendly.
Labor.....	work.
Sentiment.....	feeling.
Affectionate.....	loving.
Gentle.....	mild.
Terror.....	dread.
Relatives.....	kindred.
Mortal.....	deadly.
Penitence.....	sorrow.

Benediction.....	blessing.
Firmament .....	heaven.
Provisions .....	food.
Vessel .....	ship.
County .....	shire.

*Miscellaneous Examples.*

Abdicate.....	resign.
Abuse .....	invective.
Acknowledge ...	recognize.
Acquaintance....	familiarity.
Affront .....	insult.
Animosity .....	enmity.
Avaricious .....	covetous.
Theory.....	hypothesis.
Benevolent... ..	beneficent.
Chasten.....	punish.
Exceed .....	excel.
Expect.....	hope.
Sensuous.....	sensual.
Notable .....	notorious.
Emigration. ....	immigration.
Temperance ....	abstinence.
Retrospect .....	review.
Only.....	alone.
Discover .....	invent.
Contagious .....	infectious.
Between .....	among.
Convince .....	persuade.
Powerful.....	potential.
Ability... ..	capacity.
Genius .....	talent.
Begin.....	commence.
Feminine .....	effeminate.
Effect.....	consequence.
Cause.....	occasion.
Wisdom .....	knowledge.

The figure called *Synonymia*, is one in which two or more words by similar meaning constitute the sentence, viz.: "Stablished, strengthened, settled." "He

was courteous, affable, genial." It is what may be termed a pardonable tautology, for the sake of variety and force.

In connection with this subject there are one or two words that need explanation.

(a.) *Homonyms*—words which are spelled or pronounced alike, but whose origin and meaning are different, *e. g.*—

Page (boy).....	page (leaf).
Sound .....	sound.
Saw .....	saw.
Ear .....	ear.
School .....	school.
Host .....	host.
Mast .....	mast.
Lime .....	lime.
Port .....	port.
Demean .....	demean.
Pike .....	pike.
Helm .....	helm.
Spell .....	spell.

(b.) *Paronyms*—words which have a common origin, *e. g.*—

Stand,	understand,	standard.
Science,	nescience,	conscience.
Prelude,	interlude,	delude.

These are often called *conjugate* words.

Other classes include such words as—

all.....	awl.
nay.....	neigh.
air.....	heir.

Though pronounced alike, they are spelled differently, and, thus, differ from Homonyms. They differ, also, from Paronyms in that their origin is not the same.

### SOURCES OF WORDS.

It may be noted, at the outset, that there would seem to be such a thing as a natural diction. Some men seem to be verbally opulent apart from any special effort. The power of expression is inborn. The words come to them when they are needed. The reference here is not to those who use words only—verbose, loquacious men, whose wealth of language is in proportion to their poverty of thought, but to intelligent and thoughtful men having something to say as well as the power of saying it. With the vast majority, however, a copious and forcible diction is to be secured, as other valuable things are secured, by dint of hard labor, by what Quintilian terms—"obstinate application." What, then, are the sources?

#### (1.) The Study of Language.

We are wont to speak of the study of language as conferring upon the student two distinct benefits—the mental discipline involved, and the knowledge of words. These two work in and with each other. The mental culture itself gives us facility in the discovery and use of words. The Philological taste is developed. It is, however, to the gathering of a vocabulary that special reference is here made. We thus secure new words and old words with new meanings. The interesting and invaluable study of etymology is here involved, opening up to the student a wide variety of derivative meanings from a common root. Even though the present meaning and use of the word may be different from its primitive radical one, still, there is a benefit in knowing that there is such a difference



and the reason of it. It is possible, indeed, for the discourser to prosecute his work without any knowledge of the root meanings of words, but not so successfully, we hold, as if such knowledge were in possession. If language is a mere collection of conventional signs, then, any inquiry into the antecedents of words is needless. If, however, it is a growth, the successive stages of the growth are to be noted as helping us the better to understand present forms. If we are told that many of our best writers have made no special study of words, we answer—That they may have been possessed of a natural diction, or that, as well as they write, they might have written more effectively had they pursued such a study, or that, as exceptions, they simply confirm the principle. The special need of such study on the part of the English student arises from the composite character of the language. If the Greeks, who were masters of style, knew no language but their own, it must be remembered that the language, as the people, was independent. It is so with the German. The English is, however, so related as to be dependent, and the saying of Goethe is, here, literally true—"He who is acquainted with no foreign tongues knows nothing of his own."

In asking WHAT PARTICULAR TONGUES THE ENGLISH STUDENT SHOULD KNOW, we answer—

*The English itself.* He must be familiar with the leading historical periods of the language, with its structure, content and inner spirit. The study of First English or Anglo-Saxon is here of importance, both for its etymological value and its indirect influence upon style. Its vital relations to the English

that we speak to-day; its native vigor and good sense, and its marked simplicity and purity—all argue for its study. Though not absolutely indispensable to the writer, it is so desirable as to make it binding upon every student who is desirous of doing the best things in Discourse. So, it is helpful to follow the progress of the language through what is known as Early and Middle English *and its history* in the time of Chaucer on to Modern English Proper in the age of Bacon. The tendency that exists to decry the study of these earlier epochs is to be rebuked. A language to be studied properly must be viewed in its historical unity.

*Those languages, dead and living, which enter most largely into the structure of English.* Emphasis is here to be laid upon the Latin, French and German. The Greek may, also, be added. One-third of our diction is of Latin-French origin. We belong, as a race, to the same Teutonic stock to which the Germans belong. The Greek has its claims in the line of scientific diction and general influence. The study of these tongues, therefore, is not optional with the English writer, who desires to use the language most effectively. It may be argued here by some, as in the case of etymology, that these foreign words are now a part of the language, used by us as English words, and that a knowledge of their source is needless. This argument might be of force with those content to use anything offered them at second hand, but not with educated men desirous of knowing the reasons of things. With such, the question is, not how little will suffice but how much can be made conducive to the high ends which the discourser has in view. He must take advantage

of every help. With such principles before us, it is evident how foolish and harmful that discussion is which decries the study of what is called the dead languages, or insists, on the other hand, upon their exclusive study at the expense of the spoken tongues of Modern Europe or of English itself. Hence, we note, on the one hand, that these foreign languages are to be studied, and, on the other, to be studied by the English student only as instrumental. The end is—a better knowledge of English. Not the classics, nor the modern tongues, nor the English will be pursued aright by the English student until pursued as thus related. We are to understand our own tongue better than any other and to be able to use it better.

Before leaving this topic, it may be added, that the study of our own and other related tongues may be well combined in the way of translation. This is a practice sanctioned by the best writers. Chesterfield was constantly translating into French and English. There are few things which so directly tend to secure a rich and expressive diction.

## (2.) The Reading and Study of Literature.

The student is to put himself in constant contact with the best authors. We have here the best and fullest forms which language is capable of taking, and by familiarity with them the result, both directly and indirectly, is good. As Dr. Mathews observes—"In language, as in the fine arts, there is but one way to attain to excellence—by the study of the most faultless models." It is in view of this principle that Dr. Johnson makes his well-known statement in reference to the writings of Addison—"Whoever wishes to

attain an English style, familiar but not coarse, and elegant but not ostentatious, must give his days and nights to the volumes of Addison." By converse with such minds we not only discover the source of their diction but the reason of our own verbal poverty. How to make the best use of the resources thus opened to us is a question of practical moment. Some, as we know, are injured rather than aided by the very fullness of the treasure at hand and the freedom of their access to it. The imitation is slavish.

(a.) The chief guard against this is to be found in magnifying the *spirit* above the *letter*. We are to seek the inner mind of the author rather than the mere words through which it is expressed, or to study the words only as interpreting that mind. The source of the diction is to be traced back to the soul of the writer and there examined. We are to understand what is termed the genius of the author, and how he uses language to express it. His literary individuality must be found, that which makes him what he is and marks him from others. The vital relation of thought to expression is here involved. Diction is to be studied on the basis of the mind and the man behind it. Lexicons are to be studied, but this work is mechanical as compared with the study of authorship. Such a study makes servile imitation impossible. The personality of an author is not easily reproduced. Our diction should not be Addison's; it may be Addisonian.

(b.) The tendency to confine our reading to a *single author* or a *few authors* should be guarded. In such case, the student must be possessed of strong personal power if he does not fall into gross imita-

tion. We may, indeed, have our favorite authors. We should, however, be familiar with all the standard authors of our literature. The principle of variety is potent here. In order to breadth and symmetry and freedom of view, we should complete the circle of the best English authors. As in hearing but one orator or type of orator, mannerisms would follow, so, in written Discourse, the effect would be similarly harmful. It is to be added, that in the study of literature, as in all study, the benefit derived will be largely dependent upon the judgment and good taste which is brought to bear by the student.

### (3.) A thorough Mental Preparation of the Subject in Hand.

The other sources referred to are external. This is internal and brings to light a deeper principle. The excellence of the diction, other things being equal, will be measured by the character of the thought behind it. The close relation of word to idea is again seen. We think, to any practical effect, in words. "Impression and Expression are relative ideas." The *ratio* and the *oratio* are connected and the one shapes and colors the other. The boast of Roscius, the Roman actor, "That he could express a sentiment in a greater variety of ways by significant gesture than Cicero could by words," is no argument against the power of spoken language. The signs would have but little power with the spectators unless they had been before instructed in the meaning of all that language which the signs were designed to express. Such a representation is after all by words, inasmuch as every mo-

tion and gesture is translated into words at the time. In pantomime, the appropriate words are all mentally supplied both by actor and spectator. Our diction is the expression of our minds. "The words which a man of genius selects," says Mathews, "are as much his own as his thoughts." They are his own, we may add, just because his thoughts are his own. The thought is father to the word. Nothing, therefore, in Discourse can take the place of close, consecutive thinking. A writer's diction will be good up to the measure of his thought. Beyond this all is mere verbiage. It may astonish the rustic but cannot deceive the intelligent. Mere verbal power is one thing. Mental power transmitted through appropriate language is another. True expression is the expression of thought.

## MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES.

*Words.*

"*Censure me in your wisdom.*"

"*I prevented the dawning of the morning.*"

"*There was an holy chapel edified.*"

"*In man there is nothing admirable but his ignorance and weakness.*"

"*And David left his carriage in the hand of the keeper of the carriage.*"

"*A woman that had spent all her cattle on leeches.*"

"*Thy daughter is dead; why diseasest thou the master any further?*"

"*Mark, the gospeller, was the ghostly son of Peter in baptism.*"

He was *located* in Sixth Street.

It was the best *preventative* I have seen.

He is *well nigh* sixty, I *reckon*, and *six foot* tall.

He had a *powerful deal* of it.

I saw a *heap* on them.

The scene was *magnifique*.

The man is very *distingue*.

As I did not *approve* the cause, I could *donate* nothing to it.

He is a very rapid *walkist*.

This is the *alone* reason.

We cannot do it *without* we perjure ourselves.

I wish we could sing *like* you do.

I don't know *as* I desire it.

I *laid* there an hour.

The ship was *exonerated*.

He was a *painful* writer.

"But when ye pray, *babble* not much."

"Upon this *roocke* I wyll bylde my *congregacioun*."

"In the *shippe.dressynge* their *nettes*."

"Though that he lie *bedrede* till that he *sterve*."

"Absteyne you fro el *yvel spice*."

"*Polite* bodies, as looking-glasses."

"A sturdy *harlot* went hem ay behind."

"I'll be myself the *harbinger*."

"First, for your *garb*, it must be grave and serious."

"Bowe ye not to *astronomyers*."

"Blessed shall ye be when men shall *abandon* your name as evil."

"With a humble, lowly, penitent and obedient heart."

He was very *ingenuous* as a mechanic.

It is all *buncombe*.

He knew not how to *effectuate* it.

I could not *persuade* his judgment.

His *presence* was not desired, nor was it, in any sense, prepossessing.

*As to Formation.*

Obloquy.	Sinful.
correctness.	holy.
moonshine.	righteous.
formation.	southern.
soundness.	wedlock.
wonderment.	foolish.
enthused.	creative.
synonym.	parlance.
fondly.	teachable.
umbrage.	streamlet.
desultory.	triad.
withstand.	symbolic.
mistake.	underestimate.
epilogue.	suffrage.
prevail.	electoral.

## SENTENCES.

This subject is naturally connected with that of words. Sentences are words organized for effective use. The relation may, also, be expressed by saying that the character of the word will determine that of the sentence. The importance of this study is, as yet, scarcely appreciated. Nor do we mean by this a study merely of verbal structure, a formal and grammatical art, but the study of embodying ideas in the best forms. It was under this higher and proper view of the sentence that De Quincey ranked it as one of the two most important topics that could engage the attention of the writer. As to the definition of a sentence, Aristotle writes—"It is a significant sound (utterance) by which certain parts in themselves signify something." Referring to the Latin, *Sententia*, *sentio*,—we note, first of all, that the sentence contains a *conception*, an *idea*. It has *sense* in it. Further, a sentence is something *declarative*. It expresses truth in positive form. The judge gives his sentence or decision. There are, further, the ideas of *brevity* and *completeness* included. We speak, thus, of the *sententious* style. A sentence, therefore, is a verbal structure in which an *idea* is expressed in *positive*, *brief* and *completed* form. The long and the interrogative sentences are, really, departures from the normal type.

## KINDS OF SENTENCES.

(RHETORICAL CLASSIFICATION.)

## (1.) Periodic.

The name is derived from the Greek *περιόδος*, a circuit. The reference is to the bringing around to



the first part of the sentence all the qualifying or inferior clauses found at the close, so that the full force of the structure may come at the end. The test of the sentence may be said to consist in our inability to stop midway in the construction and make good sense. It may here be noted that there are some sentences, which though formally not periodic are practically so. In very brief sentences, it makes but little difference which clause precedes. Even in longer ones the main idea may be so clear and prominent as to make its mere position quite secondary. This is especially true in oral Discourse where inflection and emphasis may indicate the character of the various ideas. Still, the law is an important one, and, as a rule, care should be given to the formal structure.

The best examples of this structure are found in French classical prose—in Voltaire, Buffon, Pascal, Montesquieu, Mirabeau and the great preachers of the reign of Louis XIV. "Such a thing as a long, involved sentence could not be produced from French Literature," says De Quincey, "though a sultan were to offer his daughter in marriage to the man who should find it."

In English Literature the authors are not rare who illustrate this structure. Many of our best living American essayists give examples of it—as Lowell and Whipple.

#### *Advantages.*

(a.) It is a type of sentence compact in structure and stronger thereby. The unity of the sentence is thus well preserved and clearness secured. "Every effect," says Jebb, "to grasp and limit an idea finds expression in the periodic manner."

(b.) It is progressive in power. Clauses are disposed on the principle of relative strength. A climax is thus made.

(c.) It involves oratorical value. This is especially true in the longer forms of it, where the best effect of the climax is reached. It is thus used by Cicero, Macaulay and Webster. The diction of the structure should be simple and the clauses clearly arranged just in proportion to the length of the sentence.

(d.) It lends a general dignity to the style. This is secured by what has already been stated. Sublimity and majesty may be thus expressed. For the ordinary purposes of Discourse, the shorter form is the preferable one. "Wherever a literature exists," says Jebb, "it contains the germ of the periodic style."

#### (THE PERIOD.)

There are two forms of this—

(a.) A number of clauses closing with the periodic clause, *e. g.*—

To be told that this is allowable; that it is the part of wisdom; that it savors of gratitude; that it will be harmless in its influence—this is incredible.

(b.) A collection of periodic sentences, *e. g.*—

Our prayers have been unheeded; our needs neglected; our very persons insulted; our lives endangered—all this has been borne by us.

This second form, though a loose structure, has a practical, periodic force.

#### *Disadvantages.*

(a.) It tends to keep the reader too long in suspense as to the main idea. This has special reference,

of course, to the longer sentences. It requires the mind to hold before it all inferior, antecedent clauses until the final clause is reached. There is danger, here, lest the mind weary and lose the very heart of the sentence. This is one reason, undoubtedly, why the modified forms of the periodic structure are often used. For the same reason, the older writers restricted this structure to four members. "A Period," says Aristotle, "must be of a size to be taken in at a glance."

(b.) There is a strong tendency to obscurity arising from the difficulty of arranging the opening clauses in their due order of importance relative to each other, quite apart from their relation to the main idea at the close. The closing idea may be the proper one for the close and the sentence be thus periodic, and yet the preceding clauses may be so ill adjusted as to impair the value of the structure. The pages of Hooker and even of De Quincey are full of this error. In the German language, where the natural position of the verb makes the sentence more or less periodic, we yet find much complexity and vagueness arising from the confusion of the qualifying clauses. Hence, we note that although a sentence, if periodic, is less likely to be obscure than some other forms, it is not, for this reason, always clear. No writer's style can be saved by the adoption of this or that type of sentence. He must clearly conceive the idea and the relative value of clauses.

*Examples.*

Of all the varied styles of prose and poetry, English Literature gives abundant example.

However unwilling we may be to acknowledge it, the indebtedness of English to Latin and French is great.

With reference to the place of forms in Christian worship, the Ritualists and the Friends would seem to hold views directly opposite.

Although Richard Hooker and John Milton are properly classified among English prose authors, to accept either as a model of prose style would be unfortunate.

"So soon as he saw Mr. Great-heart and his friends at the mouth of his cave, with their weapons, he demanded what they wanted."—*Bunyan*.

"If the American publishers have any proposal to make and will write to me, I shall be anxious to meet them."—*Buckle*.

"As in the instances I have given, we have epitomized many of our particular words to the detriment of our tongue, so, on other occasions, we have drawn two words into one."—*Addison*.

In many important particulars, the biography of Buckle by Huth may earnestly be commended to the student.

Though Milton took an active part in the politics of his time, his tastes and talents were in the sphere of literature.

## (2.) Anti-Periodic or Loose Sentence.

This is the reverse structure. Here, the modifying clauses follow the clauses modified. Though in each of these sentences the fullest sense and effect include the combination of preceding and final clauses, still, in the Loose Sentence, the opening clauses may stand alone. When this structure can be brought to a close at a number of places along the line of it, it is shown to be very faulty and should be avoided. The short loose sentence avoids this error and is, generally, clear. Theoretically, the loose sentence is always faulty. Its looseness is its error. Practically, however, in its relation to other sentences, to the Discourse in general, and to the specific aim of the writer, it may be expedient to use it.

### *Advantages.*

(a.) It is a kind of sentence somewhat in keeping with the structure of our language. This being so, we would be less likely to use it in its objectionable forms.

(b.) It is often demanded for the sake of variety, as a relief from the more rigid character of the other forms. We thus find it frequently used by our ablest writers, by Swift and Addison. In the lighter forms of Discourse—in history and fiction and in social speech—its use is common and effective.

*Disadvantages.*

(a.) If the Periodic sentence is a virtual climax, this form is a reverse climax. It loses power as it goes on toward the end. This is a prominent fault and would make the general adoption of this structure impossible. Jebb, thus, speaks of it as “incompatible with the very idea of a literature.”

(b.) The loose sentence, when very long, is much more objectionable than the long periodic, in that the qualifying clauses when at the beginning may excite expectation and thus maintain interest. At the end, after the main statement, they afford no attraction. There is nothing yet to come as a recompense for our patience. There is nothing to be said as good as that already said.

(c.) There is, really, in this sentence no definite close or final statement. As we are at liberty to pause at any one of several places, it is often a matter of doubt which is the proper one. We are thus led on from clause to clause without apparent method and have the same experience as when listening to an orator who has several conclusions. There is an endless succession of after-thoughts. Its error is, its indefiniteness.

(d.) This type of sentence, thus, reverses the true order of things. It gives to the least important thought

the most important place. In fine, the loose sentence is to be used by way of variety, and then in its shorter forms. The discreet discourser may make it useful by the way in which he uses it. In oral Discourse, it may be used more freely. Here the modulations of the voice may do what the pen cannot.

*Examples.*

The culprit was detected, and, though every precaution was taken, he escaped from the prison, no trace of him ever having been found.

To say that the temptation was severe and crucial is very true, still, it is surprising that he yielded to it.

He will come soon, if he come at all.

*N. B.* In so short a sentence as the last, the order is not material.

The House discussed the subject at great length, prominent speakers took part, the vote was taken, and the decision quietly accepted by the minority.

In order to form a good English style we must be conversant with the best English authors, even though such familiarity requires time and labor.

Life, at its best, is a severe discipline, and he who thus views it obtains its largest benefits.

It would not be amiss if every age had its Luther and Cromwell, for every age is more or less marked by religious and civil despotism.

"The English delight in silence more than any other European nation, if the remarks which are made on us by foreigners are true."—*Addison*.

### (3.) Balanced Sentence.

This is a form that ranks with the periodic in importance. Its clauses are, generally, periodic. The term *balanced* refers to the formal structure of the sentence. Clause is set over against clause. They offset and support each other as the scales of a balance. The peculiarity is, further, seen in that the clauses thus similar or balanced in form are dissimilar in meaning. The principle of contrast enters.

In this respect, the sentence is a virtual Antithesis. It corresponds to Epigram as a figure and, in logic, to the Argument from Contraries. What is called the Dilemma is balanced.

*Forms.*

(a.) Where the contrast is sharp and the words used express direct opposition, *e. g.*, Light gladdens; darkness saddens.

(b.) Where there is a modified or subdued expression of difference rather than direct opposition, a contrast of idea rather than of words, *e. g.*, He may be innocent, but I am inclined to think that he is not.

*Advantages.*

(a.) Clearness and force. Its peculiar form secures this. It would require an effort on the part of the writer to make this structure obscure. Bacon, in Prose, and Pope, in Poetry, are good examples of its efficient use.

(b.) It aids the memory in retaining and recalling the idea embodied. On the principle of contrast, the one clause suggests the other. Hence, proverbs, maxims and apothegms are often expressed in this form.

(c.) It serves to awaken and hold attention. There is just enough of novelty in the structure to make it attractive.

Hence, we note the special adaptation of this sentence to certain forms of Discourse. The home thrusts of the orator in argument and appeal and in sarcastic allusion are often given in this form. In the protraiture of character it is freely used.

Dr. Campbell goes so far as to say—"We scarcely meet with a character in prose or verse that is not wholly delineated in antithesis." This statement is extreme but has much truth in it. It is the quality of vividness that is secured by it. The features of character are projected on canvas.

It is all important, further, to note that the condition of the successful use of this form is, that it be the natural form which the thought assumes. Antithesis that is purely verbal and external cannot be too strongly condemned. The contrast must lie in ideas beneath the words.

### *Disadvantages.*

(a.) Tendency to Mechanism and Formalism. From the fact that in this form the external structure of the clauses is prominent, the transition from true art to mere artifice is an easy one. Hence, what is called The Pointed Style, is a style burdened with antithesis. It is *too* pointed. Thus, we find that in the declining periods of a nation's literature this is the type of sentence whose abuse is manifest. It is used because it is so formal. The structure is made superior to the subject-matter and the balance of clauses is the main ambition of the writer. The best example of this in English Literature is in what is known as Euphuism—a style of composition in which verbal conceit takes the place of ideas. What is known as The Metaphysical School in our literature, represented by such authors as Donne and Cowley, illustrates the same error.

(b.) This type of sentence is not adapted to the expression of genuine and sympathetic feeling. It



is too formal. The cast of the sentence is too rigid to admit of that freedom which fervent emotion demands.

*Examples.*

“Open rebuke is better than secret love.”

To be poor and upright is better than to be rich and base.

Gladstone is the greater statesman; Disraeli the shrewder politician.

“Words are the counters of wise men and the money of fools.”—

*Hobbes.*

“Not that I loved Cæsar less, but that I loved Rome more.”—

*Shakespeare.*

“There is more dignity in the knowledge of Dryden and more certainty in that of Pope.”—*Johnson.*

If England has the better navy, Germany has the better army.

“Crafty men condemn studies; simple men admire them; wise men use them.”—*Bacon.*

#### (4.) The Long and Short Sentences.

These scarcely constitute a separate class. They are simply the forms which any one of the three preceding sentences may assume, the short sentence, naturally, being far more frequent and useful. It lends clearness, animation and directness to the style. The long sentence, if clear, gives dignity and oratorical force. Special caution is to be exercised lest the short sentence tend to abruptness, and the long, to heaviness and obscurity.

As to how long or short these sentences, respectively, should be, and as to what should be their relative proportion in our writing, this must be left to the good taste of the composer.

It may be added, here, that a full statement of our idea in a long sentence, followed by a condensed statement of it in a short sentence, often gives us the best effect of each form and illustrates their unity.

We have in Macaulay and others marked examples of its value—

“Although the argument was well-constructed and the arrangement clear; although the diction was appropriate and the general style pleasing, still, the discourse was comparatively lifeless. It lacked force.”

“An eloquent mind is a mind moving forward, under the influence of clear knowledge and deep feeling, with constantly-increasing momentum, to a final end. Eloquence is a flood.”—*Shedd*.

### The Paragraph.

This is a collection of sentences unified by some common idea. It sustains the same relation to the sentence which this does to the clause or member. It is a structure of which completeness is a mark—completeness of form and discussion.

As there is a more distinct division of paragraphs than sentences, special care is to be taken that the transitions from one to another be natural. The difficulty and the excellence of Discourse in this particular is seen in that each paragraph is to begin, discuss and complete its own idea, and yet all the paragraphs of a discourse are to be connected by a pervading unity. Otherwise, we have a series of distinct discussions. There is to be unity within unity—one governing idea over all the several ideas which are governing in their respective paragraphs.

### Structure of Paragraph.

There are certain principles which may be followed:—

(a.) Similarity of construction. This is well illustrated in what are termed the Parallelisms of Scripture.

(b.) The topic of the paragraph is to be stated at

the outset, as if it were a theme for separate discussion. In this respect, the paragraph is a kind of essay in itself. As Aristotle would express it, it has a "beginning, middle, and end."

(c.) As indicated, it should possess unity and connection. This lies in its very nature as a form of expression. It is its unity that makes it what it is. Just in proportion as there is want of connection, digression or needless statement, its beauty and effect are impaired. The paragraph is to be built up with all the carefulness of a work of art. Unity and symmetry will be best secured by the presence and dominance of the central idea. With that in place, all else gravitates into order.

(d.) The principle of climax is here involved. The order of idea should be progressive, periodic. If, as has been said, it is a kind of miniature discourse in itself, the law of Discourse as to strength of conclusion is in force.

(e.) What is called by Bain and others Explicit Reference is in place here. It may be said to be involved in the principles already stated. It means that, in the regular succession of the sentences, the bearing of each one upon the one preceding should be clear beyond question. It means, continuity of structure. In the application of this law, special care is needed as to the use of conjunctions and those various words and phrases in common use by which the reference to the idea intended is indicated.

Many of our best English Essayists, such as Macaulay and De Quincey, are noted for their skill in the paragraph, *e. g.*, in Macaulay's Essay on Milton we read—

"The spirits of Milton are unlike those of almost all other writers. His fiends, in particular, are wonderful creations. They are not metaphysical abstractions. They are not wicked men. They are not ugly beasts. They have just enough in common with human nature to be intelligible to human beings. Their characters, like their forms, are marked by a certain dim resemblance to those of men, but exaggerated to gigantic dimensions and veiled in mysterious gloom."

In this selection all the important principles of paragraph structure are exhibited.

The same is true of the following paragraph from his Essay on Addison—

"The piety of Addison was, in truth, of a singularly cheerful character. The feeling which predominates in all his devotional writings is gratitude. God was to him the all-wise and all-powerful friend who had watched over his cradle with more than maternal tenderness; who had listened to his cries before they could form themselves in prayer; who had preserved his youth from the snares of vice; who had made his cup run over with worldly blessings and who had doubled the value of those blessings, by bestowing a thankful heart to enjoy them, and dear friends to partake them."

### Structure of Sentences.

The work of the student as to sentences is largely constructive. It presupposes a thorough knowledge of grammatical forms and principles. There is an important difference, however, between grammatical and rhetorical structure. The one is purely external, indicating the order of subject, predicate and object as matters of syntax. The other is logical, and brings into prominence the idea involved. Quintilian tells us that our sentences must be "correct, well placed and animated." Aristotle dwells at length upon them. He discusses the means of giving them dignity, of adapting them to the subject, of constructing them

to please the ear, their elegancies, and as addressed to the intellect. It is this last feature which is first in importance—without which all others are of no avail.

# LAWS OF STRUCTURE.\*

1. *The Order of Clauses is determined by the Order of Thought*—the natural or logical order of the dependence of the lower upon the higher. Discourse and Logic here combine. This law, if interpreted, means:

(a.) That all inferior clauses precede the more important. This is the law of the periodic structure and marks it as the model.

(b.) Clauses most closely related in meaning are to be so in arrangement.

(c.) Leading clauses are to occupy leading places.

If, as Aristotle tells us, a sentence will always have some part “significant,” then, this is to have a significant place. With this law before us, and what it includes, there is, still, room for a wide variety as to the form.

A—If the form is determined by the main idea, much diversity of view may exist as to what this is.

B—If, moreover, the main idea is to have the leading position, that may be either at the beginning or close of the sentence.

C—Further, the influence of other languages upon the English may modify the natural order.

It will, also, be evident as to the relation of adjective to substantive, adverb to verb, verb to object, and particles to more important words, that this must be determined by a variety of circumstances. In all diversity, however, the order of the thought is more or less supreme. Here, again, the mental aspect of

Discourse is prominent. Even in so formal a thing as the sentence, the idea rules. He who believes that their structure is mechanical only, or even grammatical only, will come far short of securing through them the results of which they are capable.

2. *Simplicity or Naturalness.* This is mainly secured by care as to the position of particles, auxiliaries and connectives. The difficulty of this adjustment is, that they cannot always be controlled by the main idea. If out of place, however, they do much to impair the force of the sentence. Having no particular value in themselves, everything depends upon their position.

Simplicity is one of the latest results of practice. It makes a style readable and attractive, giving it all the freedom and grace of a natural product.

3. *Brevity. (Methods of Observance.)*

(a.) By the use of concise words as already discussed.

(b.) By the use of the short periodic and the balanced sentence.

(c.) By the use of figurative terms and phrases.

(d.) By the use of certain compact grammatical forms, as participial phrases, appositive phrases, all proper contractions, and the interchange of the various parts of speech.

#### *Violations of Brevity.*

(a.) *Tautology.* The repetition of the same idea in apparently different but substantially similar words, e. g., "It was the universal opinion of all men."

#### *Exceptions.*

A—The use of synonyms. One word, though very similar, may often explain another, e. g., "His action was kindly and considerate."

B—Demanded, at times, for the sake of completeness and variety of view. The subject must be held up in all its aspects. The al-

lusion to "vain repetitions" would seem to argue the presence of true ones. Many of these have, thus, become sanctioned in the current speech, as—intents and purposes; ways and means; end and aim; might and main: way, shape and manner, etc.

C—Demanded, often, by emphasis and deep feeling. "The reiteration of words," says Cicero, "has, sometimes, a peculiar force." The repetition of adjectives expressing one idea in varied form is thus justified. The feelings demand it. In the effort to rise higher and higher, we recur to expressions already used. In Scripture and secular oratory we have much of it. The *I repeat* of the orator intimates the frequency of it.

(b.) *Redundancy* (Pleonasm). In this case, although the ideas need not be the same, they are unnecessary. The main error is, that of irrelevancy. The additions are not essential to the sense. They may be good in themselves but are out of place. Not only is no force added but what exists is diminished. It is often combined with Tautology, *e. g.*, "Let us cast back a glance over the retrospect of the past and see the causes of this evil; for the study of causes is important, and Aristotle calls attention to various kinds of causes."

Such a paragraph is burdened by unessential material.

It may be said that Redundancy, in the strict sense, is always wrong. It has no exceptions.

(c.) *Circumlocution*. This is the method of indirectness. It speaks around the subject. In its extreme form, it includes each of the other errors, and, as such, is to be avoided.

#### *Exceptions.*

A—In *Periphrasis* or *Paraphrase*, giving another's thoughts in one's own language and in somewhat fuller form. It is opposed to *Metaphrase*, as referring to a literal changing of verse to prose.

The paraphrase of a passage of Scripture would, thus, be a brief exposition of its essential meaning, often demanded for clearness.

*B—Poetic License*, as justified by feeling, imagination and the claims of metre. Liberty is here conceded to the poet to beautify the structure. The rising of the sun is thus expressed by Thomson—

“Yonder comes the powerful King of day,  
Rejoicing in the East.”

*C—Euphemism*—a form demanded by courtesy and refinement. For “He is dead,” we say “He has gone to his long home.” For “He is a liar,” we say “He is economical of the truth.” Here, irony is involved.

(*d.*) *The Condensed Sentence*. This is a type of sentence in which brevity is pressed to a fault, and the expression becomes enigmatic, *e. g.*, “The King,” says Carlyle, “is the man who can.” The sentence needs interpretation. It needs a fuller form. The word *can* being used in its Anglo-Saxon meaning (*cunnan*—to know) Carlyle would say—The king is the wise man.

4. *Agreeableness*. As far as possible, the sentence should be made to please the ear and taste. As the idea determines the structure, this result is not always possible. The higher law of harmony, however, in which the sound answers to the sense, will largely secure this. Euphony is internal as well as external. Rhythm, both in prose and poetry, is not confined to the audible utterance of sounds. There is a rhythm within. The different measures, Iambic and others, are but the open expression of the different movements of the soul within, as grave or gay, as slow or rapid.

In order to the full application of this principle, the student must be versed in the true value of the



elementary sounds of the language, in the science of Phonetics. He must know the force, respectively, of vowels, liquids and consonants; the relation of accented to unaccented syllables as to ease of pronunciation; the law of accent; the force of syllabic contractions; the principles of pause and emphasis; and have a general appreciation of the sonorous and melodious elements of language. It is not essential that the composer should be a musician or a poet. His ear, however, should be cultivated. He should know something of sounds as sounds, be more or less sensitive to their impressions in Discourse, and thus be enabled to give them their appropriate place. In such authors as Lamb and Irving we may learn what is meant by agreeable prose.

5. *Variety.* Though the writer may have a favorite type of sentence, this should not lead him into fixed uniformity. There is to be no rigid mould into which every idea is run. From the very fact that sentences involve much of the mechanism of Discourse, this law of freedom is all the more important.

### Violations of Structure.

1. *The wrong Position of the less important Parts of Speech*—Adverbs, Pronouns and Prepositions—and of their corresponding clauses. As this involves a violation of the most important law of structure—the mental law—it becomes a matter of serious moment.

The general law with reference to position is, that these modifying words and clauses shall be placed as near as possible to the words which they modify or in any way affect—

*Examples.*

Bravery not only secures the respect but the loyal devotion of men.

The Prussians nearly lost one-half of their troops.

If Christianity only made men faithful to their country it would be desirable, but it also makes them faithful to their God.

"Theism can only be opposed to Polytheism or Atheism."

I cannot bring my mind to depart without pain.

"Are these designs which any man who is born a Briton, in any circumstances, ought to be afraid to avow?"

A young man desires a room fronting the South, of studious and quiet habits.

The fruit was sent in boxes which we ate with great relish.

I believe that if he should leave his father he would die.

2. *The breaking of the Unity of the Sentence.* This is done in various ways—

(a.) By an abrupt and frequent change of subject,  
*e. g.*—

Coming to land, they greeted us with a cordiality with which I was pleased.

(b.) By the use of irrelevant ideas, *e. g.*—

The wealthiest men of Europe are Jews who are a race persecuted by all peoples and even in the time of Christ were reviled. The apostles were Jews. They were twelve in number.

Having sold his property he vacated it in March which is in this climate an unpleasant month.

Redundant clauses are thus improper.

(c.) By extreme Parenthesis. There is a kind of parenthesis, more or less closely connected with the main thought. The occasional use of this is not improper. That form, however, which has no such relation is not needed and mars the unity. Even when properly used, they should be short. Examples are sufficiently plain.

3. *Improper Conclusion.* The law of emphasis as to

the close of a Discourse applies even to the sentence. It should not end with the weaker words, *e. g.*—

It was this that he lived—by.

I knew that it was something that he was very proud—of.

*N. B.* Where the smaller word is vitally united to the verb, this principle does not apply, *e. g.*, To bring about, to laugh at.

#### 4. *Faulty Antithesis, e. g.*—

Praise begets friends, but enemies are apt to be made by rebuke.

The younger brother was the better scholar, but the older could write and speak better.

5. *Want of Euphony.* This is effected by the extreme use of unaccented syllables near each other or allowing syllables of like sound to follow each other—meteorological, lowlily, his history, etc.

This error is also made by improper position of accent, the law being, that this should be near the close rather than the opening of the sentence.

6. *The Separation of the Noun from the Preposition, e. g.*—

He did everything for and received nothing from him.

### Sentences, how obtained.

1. *By Acquaintance with the best Literature.*

2. *By careful Exercise in their Formation.* This is to be done by the student for the sake of the drill itself. So important is this duty, that some of the maturest writers have not deemed it unworthy of their study. In the work of revision of manuscript, this is one of the main objects of study. Virgil, after spending eleven years upon his *Æneid*, regarded it as incomplete. Pascal spent several days in the composition of some of his "Provincial Letters," and was

rewarded by the eulogium of Voltaire, "that it was one of the best books ever published in France." "It was a valuable lesson," says Miss Shirreff of Mr. Buckle, "to hear him dissect an ill-constructed sentence, and point out how the meaning could have been brought out with full clearness by such and such changes." "And the result of all this," adds his biographer, "was, that he formed a style so perfectly clear and flowing that the reader is irresistibly carried along with the writer."

Tasso and Malherbe, Milton and Addison, Pope and Macaulay, are all examples of careful authors. They aimed to exclude every incorrect and inelegant sentence. Faultless sentences are rare. Froude says of the learned Elizabeth—"She could not write an English sentence correctly." This error is not confined to queens.

3. *By a careful mental Preparation of the Subject.* Here, as in diction, the form of the expression takes its character from the idea. Clear and cogent thinking will naturally select a form suited to its own intrinsic excellence. It will tolerate no other.

Every sentence has thus the mechanical and the mental element. The object is to subordinate the former to the latter. If we are to "hold fast the form of sound words," we must magnify the thought which gives them their soundness. No man can become a Peter Lombard—a master of sentences—who regards them as mere forms separate from the thought. Clear thinking is constructive. It tends to embody its product in the most fitting forms.

The example of Mr. Buckle, already referred to, is one of the most conspicuous in literature, as showing

the pains taken by a mature mind and able writer in the structure of sentences, and in what might be called the mechanism of Discourse.

*Miscellaneous Examples.*

The plan was a wise one, whatever people may say of it.

To the best of my knowledge and belief the man acted from the purest motives.

Blameless as to what he did, he was at fault as to what he omitted to do.

“Though the earth were to be burned up, though the trumpet of its dissolution were sounded, though yon sky were to pass away as a scroll, and every visible glory which the finger of Divinity has inscribed on it were extinguished forever; an event so awful to us and to every world in our vicinity, by which so many suns would be extinguished and so many varied scenes of life and population would rush into forgetfulness—what is it in the high scale of the Almighty’s workmanship?”—*Chalmers*.

The question was carefully chosen. It was presented to the Assembly for discussion. Arguments for and against it were advanced and forcibly maintained. The Affirmative side was regarded as the safer, and yet the Negative was, finally, victorious.

He entered college entirely too young, so I thought, at least.

He had no friends to resort to.

Philadelphia is the quieter city, but New York is the centre of a larger trade.

After all his losses, he would, still, have succeeded, had he been careful.

“A soft answer turneth away wrath, but grievous words stir up anger.”

I only suggest these three particulars.

The transitions must not be abrupt which are made in the progress of a discourse.

The house which I showed you which fronts the street which is so angular was not painted in taste.

Samuel promised his father that he would perform his part of the work.

He took that animal to the fair which I gave him.

He was a man of wealth (an element of power in the community as it seems to me, far greater than it ought to be) and of moral integrity.

That is a sin which many are guilty of and which they tamper with.

He was in conscience bound and morally obliged to do it.

As he had received much from, he was greatly indebted to him.

The national English spirit is more thoroughly aroused: the style is purified, enriched and strengthened; the primitive forms of the language are better understood; the relations of the English to other tongues are more clearly seen—all this results from the study of Anglo-Saxon.

The relation of thought to expression is vital, despite the opinion of many that it is simply conventional.

"He aspired to be the highest; above the people; above the authorities; above his country."

It is best that a committee be appointed to report what improvements are needed to the next State Convention.

That "chronic diseases must have chronic cures" is as true in the mental and moral spheres as in the physical.

The man whom I saw and who as I believe did the act which has caused the misery which you notice and which all who are discerning, notice, has been arrested.

"The Danes appeared next year off the eastern coast, in hopes of subduing a people, who defended themselves by their money, which invited assailants, instead of their arms, which repelled them."

"On the other hand, to extract the philosophy of history; to direct our judgment of events and men; to trace the connection of causes and effects, and to draw from the occurrences of former times general lessons of moral and political wisdom, has become the business of a distinct class of writers."—*Macaulay*.

The man promised him that he would cancel all his indebtedness.

To each and every one he gave something.

Bunyan has and will be loved by thousands of the common people.

"We knew him (Coleridge) as a theologian and his views, and the difficulty, of course, in such a lecture as this, which keeps strictly to the theology in his poetry is to prevent one from slipping into discussion of his philosophic prose, and to think and speak of him only as a poet."—*Brooke*.

"Wealth maketh many friends; but the poor is separated from his neighbor."

"To make the past present; to bring the distant near; . . . to invest with the reality of human flesh and blood beings whom we are

too much inclined to consider as personified qualities in an allegory; to call up our ancestors before us with all their peculiarities of language, manners, and garb . . . . these parts of the duty which properly belongs to the historian have been appropriated by the historical novelist."—*Macaulay*.

"Men walk as prophecies of the next age."—*Emerson*.

His thoughts and sentiments and ideas were expressed and stated too fully.

Happy is he whose desires are few.

The Prussians nearly lost ten thousand men.

To discipline the mind; to give valuable information; to purify the style and to impart personal pleasure—these are the varied objects of reading.

## FIGURES.

### INTRODUCTION.

#### (1.) General Principles.

(a.) Figurative language, as well as literal, has its well-defined laws and methods. "It is in the nature of a word," writes Whitney, "to have its figurative as well as its literal uses."

(b.) They may be said to be founded upon the laws of relation or association; upon the natural mental tendency to institute resemblances and differences, and on the possibility of explaining the unknown by the known.

(c.) They are a mode of expression universal among men. Cicero calls attention to the fact that "even the countrymen" use them. Most abundant among the Southern and Eastern nations, they are numerous everywhere. Largely used by children and by savage peoples, they are modified by age and culture. They decrease in number and increase in purity and power as civilization goes on.

(d.) In their structure and uses, the Imagination

plays an important part. Here is the function of what is called the Poetic Imagination. All the great poets have abounded in these forms. In poetical prose they are frequent. Longinus treats them as one of the sources of the sublime in prose and poetry.

(e.) They should be the natural form which the thought tends to assume. One of the best tests of figures is at this point. They are not to be attached from without but evolved from within. A figure may be so natural as scarcely to be noticed as a figure.

(f.) Figures seem, at times, to lose their peculiar figurative character and sense and to return to their original and ordinary use. One reason of this is given in the statement of Macaulay—"that language is becoming less and less poetic." Another is, that in all living languages this loss of terms is taking place. There is, however, a reverse and balancing process, in the appearance of new figurative words. In fact, the figurative meaning seems at times to usurp the place of the literal, as in the word *edify*. This is true of most of those words whose root meaning has changed. The primitive, etymological sense has quite disappeared.

(g.) Figurative language may be used, if necessary, to conceal the meaning. This use is exceptional and for special ends, their prime office being to reveal the truth. It was thus that the Saviour Himself often used them (Matt. xiii. 10) as a punishment to those who did not desire to see the truth. As will be seen hereafter, there are some of the figures in which this element of obscurity is emphatic.

(h.) Though a figure is not a proof, it has often the practical force of one. They are helps and supplements. They have a negative value. They may



silence objection. Dr. Campbell goes so far as to say, "They are not mere illustrations of a particular sentiment, but are arguments from analogy." This is true if we bear in mind that proofs from analogy are simply probable and not conclusive in force.

(i.) Figurative language is often used as synonymous with poetic, pictorial or illustrative language. This usage is not strictly correct. If allowed, however, such language may often be used apart from the use of any special figure. The coloring has the figurative cast.

(j.) The figurative terms of one language cannot always be transferred in synonyms to another. Even in the same language it cannot always be done. A weighty speech is quite different from a heavy one.

(k.) Special attention is to be called to the abundance of figures in Discourse. "It is in and through symbols that man," says Carlyle, "lives and works." "By far the most important source," says Hope, "of the contributions made to style." So abundant are they in style and common speech that they would almost seem to be the original, normal type, and literary language a departure therefrom. They are a literary staple.

## (2.) Definition.

We have from the Latin the words *figo* and *finjo* (*figura*), meaning to fix, to shape, to adorn, and from the Celtic a verb—*fugiaw*—to disguise or represent. Combining these ideas, we have the original sense of the word—an established form by which truth is represented in an attractive manner.

Apart from Discourse, the word has a wide variety

of usage, as in art, mathematics, logic, trade and elsewhere. As synonymous with the word *figure* in popular speech we have such words as *symbol*, *image*, *emblem*, *illustration* and so on. As before intimated, these should be more carefully discriminated. A figure proper is different from any one of them. As to more specific definitions, we note—They may be defined with Quintilian as “A change of a word or sentence,” or with Hill as “An expression in which one thing is said in the form of another related to it,” or, A deviation from the ordinary mode of speech with a view to increasing clearness, force and beauty of style.

### (3.) Classification.

The large diversity of view which exists at this point both among ancients and moderns reveals the difficulty involved. A detailed account of these divisions would be of no essential value. Allusion may be made to a common three-fold classification.

(A.) *Figures of Orthography or Etymology*—changes in the ordinary forms of words, such as Aphaeresis.

(B.) *Figures of Syntax*—changes in the ordinary construction of sentences, such as Ellipsis.

(C.) *Rhetorical Figures*. For an exhaustive study of this subject such a plan might be adopted. For the student of Discourse, however, the first and second of these divisions are quite useless. They belong to the province of grammar and the knowledge of them is assumed. Dr. Campbell is right in affirming “that the grammarian and the rhetorician try figurative words by very different tests.”

Cicero is condemned by Quintilian, as also are the

Greeks, for so multiplying them. "I cannot," he says, "agree in thinking them so very numerous." It is laughable enough that a treatise by Holmes (1755), which contains two hundred and fifty distinct figures, bears the title—"Rhetoric made Easy."

Some authors of our own country have made a similar error.

We have to do, therefore, with Rhetorical Figures only. These are fourteen in number and might be presented and discussed under two distinct classifications.

*First Classification.*

*A—FIGURES OF RESEMBLANCE.*

Simile,  
Metaphor,  
Allegory.

*B—OF CONTRAST.*

Antithesis,  
Epigram,  
Irony.

*C—OF CONTIGUITY.*

Metonymy,  
Synecdoche.

*D—MIXED FIGURES.*

Interrogation,  
Exclamation,  
Apostrophe,  
Hyperbole.  
Personification,  
Climax.

*Second Classification.*

The basis of this order is, the relation of the figures to the sentence.

*A—PRIMARY.*

Simile,  
Metaphor,  
Allegory,  
Epigram,  
Metonymy,  
Synecdoche,  
Hyperbole,  
Irony,  
Personification,  
Apostrophe.

## B—SECONDARY.

Interrogation,  
Exclamation,  
Climax,  
Antithesis.

If any order were to be followed in the discussion, either of these two, and, more especially the second, would be a good one. We shall not, however, confine ourselves to either.

### Discussion of Special Figures.

#### (1.) SIMILE.

(a.) The common characteristic of this figure is, that it is based on the principle of resemblance (*similis*). Its special feature is, that this resemblance is *formally* expressed.

(b.) There is an element of difference between simile as a figure and comparison as a process of Discourse. In the one, we have a likeness between objects of different classes or natures, as between man and animal. In the other, it is between objects of the same class, as man and man.

(c.) In most Similes, the resemblance is clear on the surface. The figure interprets itself. In some, interpretation is needed to show how the figure applies. The point on which the comparison turns is obscure. Similes that are purely verbal and that are based on the perversion of words, as in wit, are of this character.

Compound Similes are such as contain more than one in the same grammatical clause or structure. (Prov. xxvi. 1, and elsewhere.)

(d.) The principle of resemblance at the basis of the Simile lies at the basis of all classification. Objects

are grouped in classes in that they possess common qualities, *e. g.*, The Vegetable Kingdom.

(*e.*) This same principle is exhibited in our reasoning. We see it in the axioms of mathematics. Analogical reasoning is especially of this character.

(*f.*) We note a wide and minute system of resemblances between the material and spiritual worlds. "For every mental state, act or affection which we can express in words," says Dr. Hopkins, "there must be some analogous one in the physical world."

"Figures of Resemblance," says Bain, "are co-extensive with human knowledge." The intimate relation of mind and matter is thus seen and our diction is greatly enriched. Addison, in one of his papers on "Pleasures of the Imagination," devotes considerable space to this idea.

(*g.*) The Simile may be regarded as the simplest and most beautiful of the figures. Its formal character tends to simplify.

### *Rules as to Simile.*

(*a.*) The Simile should not be drawn from objects in which the likeness is too near or too remote, *e. g.*—

Napoleon is like Cæsar.

"Thy teeth are like a flock of sheep."

(*b.*) It should be in keeping with the intelligence of the mind addressed and with the character of the discourse as serious or comic. Thus, the Similes in "Paradise Lost" are best appreciated by the educated and are marked by sublimity. Many in Butler's *Hudibras* are properly of the serio-comic or burlesque order.

(c.) The Simile is best adapted to the milder, unimpassioned forms of Discourse. It is the figure of the essayist rather than of the orator. History and Poetry are full of it.

*Examples of Simile.*

The men stood as firm as a rock.

"Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him."

It moved as rapidly as the lightning.

"The noble sister of Poplicola. The moon of Rome; chaste as an icicle."

"I have ventured like little wanton boys that swim on bladders."

Webster was very much such a statesman in his foresight as Gladstone is. He had an eye like to that of an eagle.

"As the bird by wandering, as the swallow by flying, so the curse causeless shall not come."

Public Opinion, as the tide, rises and falls at regular intervals.

## (2.) METAPHOR.

(a.) The word is derived from *μεταφέρω*, to transfer, to bring one thing alongside of another for purposes of comparison. Its common characteristic is, resemblance; its special, that the resemblance is *implied* and not formal. Cicero defines it—"A comparison reduced to a single word," a Trope.

(b.) In Metaphor, the force of the figure lies in the more important parts of speech, the noun and the verb, and not, as with the Simile, in mere adjuncts or expletives. Thus, Aristotle calls it—"The transposition of a noun from its proper signification."

(c.) It is a figure marked by strength and boldness. This follows from its brevity, from the fact already stated as to the noun and verb, and in that the figure, though expressing less than identity, expresses more

than mere likeness. According to Longinus—"It constitutes the sublime." Hence, it is a figure applicable to oratory and impassioned discourse. The orations of Demosthenes, so devoid of simile, abound in metaphor.

(d.) Its relation to the other figures is close. The union of it with Personification is so common that we note what are termed Personifying Metaphors. It is also frequently joined with Metonymy and Antithesis.

(e.) The test of Metaphors, according to Addison, is the ability "to form a picture on them." Just as from a good outline of an historical painting we would be able to fill out the scene, so from the metaphorical terms used we should be able clearly and vividly to see the truth. It is thus that Lowell remarks—"A Metaphor, if the correspondence be perfect in all its parts, is one of the safest guides through the labyrinth of truth." Its object is, clearness.

(f.) Its frequent use is noteworthy. Many have regarded it as the most common figure. "If you except some few primitive elements," says Carlyle, "what is language but Metaphors. They are its muscles and tissues."

A—This is seen from the fact that in the Metaphor, as the Simile, we note the same minute system of relations between the material and spiritual worlds.

B—Moreover, the original or root meanings of words are largely metaphorical. This is especially true in such a pictorial language as the Hebrew, but more or less so in English and other tongues. Such words as *salient*, *character*, *detect*, *insult*, *cathedral*, *consideration*, *attention*, *retract*, *property*, *fee*, *fine*, and *ambition*, illustrate this. In such cases, pleasure and profit are united. Moreover, not only is the meaning secured but it is prescribed in the mind by the picture. In this respect, a careful study of etymologies will involve very much practical instruction in figurative speech.

*Rules as to Metaphor.*

(a.) The metaphorical should be kept distinct from the literal, *e. g.*—

He was cured of his pride and his leprosy.

He took the physician's advice and his medicine.

The orator drew forth their sympathy and their purses.

(b.) Different metaphors should not be used in the same connection or clause. Such an error is called Mixed Metaphor, *e. g.*—

"Her voice is but the shadow of a sound."

"Feed on the vocal silence of his eye."

The seeds of discord were kindled.

Many hands and hearts stepped forth to the rescue.

*Examples of Metaphor.*

Teachers are the parents of the mind.

"Athens, the eye of Greece, Mother of arts and eloquence."

"Petrarch relighted the torch of ancient learning."

"But yonder comes the powerful king of day,  
Rejoicing in the East."

"Canst thou minister unto a mind diseased,  
Pluck from the heart a rooted sorrow?"

In boldness he is a lion; in cunning, a fox.

The raging plague is doing its deadly work.

"That motionless shaft will be the most powerful of speakers."

"I never will be satisfied so long as the meanest cottager in Ireland has a link of the British chain clanking to his rags."

"Let loose the dogs of war."

"Ye are the salt of the earth."

Such an argument is called Reasoning in a Circle.

His passion had risen to white heat.

He was the mouth-piece of the assembly.

## (3.) ALLEGORY.

(a.) The word is derived from the Greek *Ἀλληγορία*. One thing is spoken of in terms of another. One thing is expressed and another understood. Agents or ob-



jects in one sphere are used to represent those in another. "An Allegory," says Kames, "is a hieroglyphical painting, only words are used instead of colors."

(b.) As related to the other figures already studied, it may be said—In the Simile and Metaphor we have resemblance. In Allegory we have in addition the principle of substitution or representation. We note, moreover, that the allegory is complete, as the correspondence is complete, between the representative language and the truth to be set forth.

(c.) There is a kind of obscurity essentially involved in this figure, in that the main idea is concealed under the terms used. This obscurity, however, is not in the line of deception. It is understood both by writer and reader, is temporary only, and has reference to the final revelation of the truth.

(d.) This figure assumes two forms—

A—*Pure Allegory*. In this, the figure is given as such and the explanation afterward.

B—*Mixed*. Here, a partial interpretation is given as the allegory goes on. Just enough is given to awaken and maintain interest.

(e.) The element of concealment in the allegory leads to various forms of its application.

A—*In Comic Discourse*, as in "Gulliver's Travels," "The Tale of the Tub." Irony is often mixed with the burlesque.

B—*In Poetry*. Large scope is given here for the play of fancy. Such a work as "Hudibras" and much of Pope's poetry illustrates this. The comic and poetic elements are here combined.

C—*In Mythology*. The gods and goddesses are made to represent certain qualities. Most of the allegory found in this sphere is unnatural.

(f.) The final purpose or use of this figure is, to make clear. It is so used in Scripture. The prophecies are full of it. The types and rites of the old

economy embody it. Its abuse is also easy and frequent. The plainest truth is thus made perplexing. The Allegorists, so called, thus pervert the Scriptures until no basis is left for faith.

(g.) It is a figure whose correct use is difficult. Such writers as Cicero, Addison and Young have failed in it. It is advisable, therefore, that the young composer should confine himself to the simpler figures. When it is used, the shorter forms should be chosen.

(h.) It is a figure seen both directly and indirectly in literature. Some works are allegories throughout. Such are "The Faerie Queen," "Oberon," "House of Fame," "Castle of Indolence." In others, the allegorical element has a more or less prominent place, as in "Midsummer Night's Dream," "The Scarlet Letter," and some of the papers in the Spectator.

#### *Examples.*

"Take us the foxes, the little foxes, that spoil the vines; for our vines have tender grapes."

"My well-beloved hath a vineyard in a very fruitful hill."

Further examples are found in Judges ix. 8-15, 2 Kings xiv. 9, Galatians iv. 24.

"To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow,  
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day,  
To the last syllable of recorded time;  
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools  
The way to dusty death."—*Macbeth*.

"From the Delectable Mountain, the way lies through the fogs and briers of the Enchanted Ground, with here and there a bed of soft cushions spread under a green arbor. And beyond is the land of Beulah, where the flowers, the grapes and the songs of birds never cease, and where the sun shines, night and day. Thence are plainly seen the golden pavements and streets of pearl, on the other side of that black and cold river over which there is no bridge."—*Bunyan*.

(4.) ANTITHESIS (EPIGRAM).

(a.) *αντιτιθημι*, to place over against. This is directly opposed to the figures of resemblance. The force of the figure lies in the contrast.

(b.) It is based on the law of mental association. In thinking of one thing, or class of things, we think of others similar to them, but also of others different from them. Like suggests not only like but unlike.

(c.) It is a figure which abounds in literature—prose and poetry. We see it in Johnson, Pope, Bacon, and in Scripture.

(d.) The Epigram (*Επιγραφή*) is akin to it in that it involves contrast. It differs from it, in that there is a difference between the real and apparent meaning of the words. It is less closely related to the sentence than Antithesis; it is more of a figure.

(e.) The Epigram is expressed in various ways.

A—*In the Epigrammatic style.* Meaning, at first, a style full of epigrams, it now refers to a style marked by point and brevity. It does not necessarily involve contrast.

B—*Emphatic Assertion.* “What I have written, I have written.”

C—*Indirect or concealed statement*—a kind of mingling of literal and figurative. “Lapland is too cold a country for sonnets.”

D—*Punning.* Words are perverted or used in double meanings.

E—*Paradox*—apparent contradiction for increased effect. “When I am weak, then am I strong.”

(f.) In these two figures, viewed as one, the formal element is especially prominent. Special danger lies at this point. As in the case of the balanced sentence, we are to see that the mental rules the mechanical. Otherwise, we have what the old writers call, the frigid (lifeless) style.

(g.) The benefits of this figure are in the line of

brevity, pointedness and vigor. It is difficult to mistake the meaning. Variety of structure, also, demands it.

(*h.*) The antithetical form, as a negative one, is often the only one admissible. Some subjects are best defined and explained by their opposites. Though the positive method is preferable, the negative one has its place and use.

*Examples.*

“Man proposes, God disposes.”

“Penny wise, pound foolish.”

Macaulay is the more brilliant historian; Motley, the more reliable.

“Where ignorance is bliss,  
'tis folly to be wise.”

“Every sweet has its sour, every evil its good.”

“When you have nothing to say, say it.”

“By indignities men come to dignities.”

He is a wise man who knows his own ignorance.

“Summer has set in with its usual severity.”

“The foolishness of God is wiser than men.”

A criminal is like to necessity in that he knows no law.

It took him three hours to say nothing.

We should not hang even a dog in his absence.

(5.) APOSTROPHE.

(*a.*) ἀποστρέφω, to turn from, a change of attitude and address. It is sometimes called *vision*. It is the office of this figure to bring the distant near.

(*b.*) It is closely related to Personification in that the final end in each is the same,—to make the unreal real. They differ as to method only. When combined, the effect is doubly strong. In the act of prayer we have a good example of their union.

(*c.*) It is a figure marked by dignity and sublimity. Hence, it is to be used with discretion. Its use in

worship lends to it sanctity. It finds illustration in the highest forms of poetry and prose, and is based on true emotion.

(d.) That grammatical principle by which past events are described in the present tense is involved here. Historical narration is thus an example of it. Scenes and events are presented as if before us. Hence, the name *present occurrence* is sometimes used.

(e.) The principle involved in this figure has a vital application to oratorical discourse. In the preparation of matter for oral delivery, the writer must conceive of the audience as before him. Other things being equal, his success in the oration will depend upon his ability in this direction. The indirect effect of such a conception upon the style in the way of vigor and lifelikeness is a marked one.

Of this figure, David's lament over Absalom, and Byron's Apostrophe to the Ocean, are good examples.

#### (6.) PERSONIFICATION.

(a.) *Persona-facio*—to impersonate, to make personal. This is a figure deep-seated in human nature. The tendency is so strong that things not possessed of personality are invested with it. The earth and air and sea are peopled by the imagination.

(b.) This figure is akin to that form of Metonymy by which the abstract is made concrete, *e. g.*, "Each man has something of Adam (Sin) in him." The terms "new man" and "old man" are thus used, in the Bible, for holiness and sinfulness, respectively.

(c.) The function of this figure in Discourse is, to make vivid. There is no deceit involved in that the

personification is understood to be apparent only and transient. Its boldness is similar to that which belongs to Apostrophe and Hyperbole.

(d.) There is a figure known as *reverse personification*. It deprives of personality those already possessing it. The object is, increased effect. Thus, the people are spoken of as "the masses," the "many-headed beast," the "swinish multitude," the "crowd," and so on. Thus, we read in Shakespeare—

"You blocks, you stones, you worse than senseless things."

Aristotle addresses the Deity—"O Thing of Things." The boldness, novelty and abruptness of the language give it effect.

(e.) The wide use of this figure indicates our preference for the specific and personal. It is the essential thing in order to the understanding of a subject or its explanation to others. It is to be made concrete and real.

(f.) The application of this principle in the religious sphere is important. No system of religion can beget and maintain spiritual life apart from the idea of a personal God. Hence, the evil and failure of modern skeptical systems. They present no personal object of worship, no object to elicit moral affection and service. Hence, the power of Mohammedanism. With all its evils, this cardinal doctrine has preserved and propagated it. In Judaism and Christianity the doctrine is held in its purity and its effect upon spiritual life is evident.

(g.) The most common forms of this figure are expressed by the use of the adjective denoting quality, (*cruel disaster*), and of the verb denoting action, (the

*sea roared*). It may be added, that the specific use of gender and pronoun in English contributes to the successful application of this figure.

*Examples.*

The ship was very obedient to her helm.

The city befriended the refugee.

The Church is advancing. She is yet to possess the earth.

"Lands intersected by a narrow frith abhor each other."

Our country cries for our help.

"Hail! holy Light, offspring of heaven, first-born."

[In this last example we note a combination of Personification with Apostrophe—called, sometimes, Prosopopæia.]

Nature knows those who love her and will reciprecate their love.

"Time and tide wait for no man."

The thought which has escaped me I may be able to recover.

(7.) METONYMY (SYNECDOCHE).

(a.) *μετονομασία*, the giving of the name of one object to another related to it. *Συνενδέχομαι*, to embrace or comprehend—the including of the whole (figuratively) in a part, or the part in the whole.

(b.) These are figures of relation or contiguity involving, also, the element of resemblance. The general principle of association is here present. Where two things are supposed to be found together, as a purse and the money in it, the name of the one may be given to the other.

(c.) They enter freely into combination with other figures. Metonymy, Metaphor and Personification are often joined, as in the expressions, "*The lazy couch*," "*The smiling year*." In Synecdoche, there is a sense in which Hyperbole is involved. We use a name expressing something more or less than is real.

(d.) Metonymy has various forms.

A—*The Place of Production for the Thing produced.*

I prefer Brussels.

B—*The Material of which a Thing is made for the Thing itself.*

He ran the iron through him.

C—*Abstract for Concrete and Reverse.*

The beauty of the town was present.

John Howard is among us.

[What is called Numerical Metonymy is of this type].

Nine-tenths of our mercies are undeserved.

D—*Cause for Effect and Effect for Cause; e. g.—*

His pen was always on the side of truth.

Gray hairs should be respected.

Irving is always smooth, and Carlyle pungent.

E—*Sign for the Thing signified.*

He wields the sceptre well.

“The pen is mightier than the sword.”

F—*Container for Thing contained.*

He drank the cup to the dregs.

He sets a good table.

You are disturbing the House.

#### *Examples.*

Every woman is not a Jezebel.

“Give us this day our daily bread.”

All the father in him was aroused.

“A second Daniel come to judgment!”

There is a great deal of red tape in the church.

England was unwilling.

She has seen twelve summers.

Every Cæsar should have his Brutus.

From the cradle to the grave, life is a discipline.

They paid their tribute to Neptune.

I trust that you may have a good voyage and that the season may prove a good one for your business.

“Though she had seen but fourteen winters, she had read Dickens and Prescott thoroughly.”

“By the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread.”

“Who steals my purse, steals trash.”

One half of our so-called faults are misfortunes only.



(8.) HYPERBOLE.

(a.) *υπερβαλλω*, to throw beyond. There is a natural tendency in human nature to go to extremes, unduly to exalt or depreciate. We note its illustration as follows: Atheism—Polytheism; Chance—Fate; Optimism—Pessimism; Ecstasy—Despair.

(b.) Its form, and the frequency of its use, depend largely upon personal character and temperament. Some are always unduly hopeful; others, unduly depressed, in the study of themselves and others. In the earlier periods of life this figure abounds. Age is more moderate and cautious. As to the relation of the two forms Cicero remarks—"Although there is a measure to everything, excess offends more than defects." The feeling of pride is here excited—a desire to surpass others in statement.

(c.) There is no deceit involved in the figure. It is an understood departure from fact that the truth may be made more effective. It arises from the difficulty of conveying to others our full meaning of any common statement. Such statement ought in itself to be sufficient, but by reason of its commonness it is not. It falls powerless upon the ear. A statement is, therefore, made quite above or below the ordinary use, not that the reader is expected to rest there but by means of it to reach the desired level.

We seem to attempt more than we hope to attain. We are seeking, however, only to give to ordinary truth its full force by an extraordinary method.

(d.) The Hyperbole is based on intensity of feeling and is to be used only when thus prompted.

When used for any other reason, it can readily be detected. If somewhat extended, it should form a kind of climax.

(e.) This figure is largely illustrated in literature. We see it in "Don Quixote," "The Arabian Nights," "Fairy Tales." It is used much in burlesque. In its best forms, it is adapted to oratory and impassioned writing. We note its use in correspondence—personal and official.

(f.) Two special forms are noticeable—

A—*Lessening* (Litotes). This is to add emphasis and soften the expression, e. g.—"There were not a few." "A citizen of no mean city."

B—*Heightening*. This is known as Extreme Case, e. g.—"Suppose every statesman were venal."

*Extreme adulation*, as we find among the authors of Elizabeth's reign, is in the line of hyperbole.

#### *Examples.*

Ps. lxxxiv. 10,—"*A day in thy courts is better than a thousand.*"

"*I saw their chief tall as a rock of ice; his spear, the blasted fir; his shield, the rising sun.*"

"*All Heaven and earth are still.*"

*His voice was as the thunder.*

"*There was such silence through the host, as when  
An earthquake, trampling on some populous town,  
Has crushed ten thousand with one tread and men  
Expect the second.*"

#### (9.) IRONY.

(a.) *Εἰρωνεία*, a dissembling. The truth is given in disguise, under cover of its opposite. Puttenham, in his "Art of Poesie," calls it—"Dry mock." Cicero speaks of it as that "bewitching figure." The assertion that is made is so false that the one addressed is

driven directly over to the opposite meaning. This is the object sought and the method of securing it.

### Forms.

A—*Sarcasm*, σαρκάζω, to flay. This is the strongest form of irony. Any bitter saying is, thus, termed sarcastic. It is one of the most common forms. In Job xii. 2 we have an example.

B—*Innuendo*—In-nuo, to nod—to yield agreement. It is pretended assent. It is the courteous form of irony, and yet effective. It is, thus, used in argument. It prevents refutation by its acquiescence. The speech of Antony in Julius Cæsar will illustrate it.

C—*Anti-Irony*. Here is pretended blame for real praise. It is compliment in disguise. It sustains the same relation to Irony Proper that Reverse Personification does to that figure. To the industrious man found at his work we say—"Idle as usual!"

D—*The Mock-Heroic or Serio-Comic*. It is the union of these two things so discordant that gives basis for burlesque and irony. Pope's "Rape of the Lock" has no equal in this respect.

E—*Antithetical Irony*. In this, terms are used which are really exclusive of each other. "He had all the morals of the heathen among whom he had lived." "His courtesy was the result of his life among the rustics."

F—*The Irony of Reverse Climax*. In this form, the meaning decreases in force as it advances. It involves, thereby, the humorous. De Quincey's essay on "Murder as one of the Fine Arts," illustrates it.

G—*Satire*, (satura). The word means, a dish made up of a mixture of various kinds of food. It here means, an assault on men and things in general. It is more open than irony. It is, however, mainly ironical.

We may further note that Irony is a pleasing figure in that the truth is disguised and the mind is quickened to discover it. It combines especially with Interrogation, Exclamation, Climax and Hyperbole.

### Examples.

"He did his party all the harm in his power. He spoke for it and voted against it."

I have but one objection to the gentleman's statement—It is untrue.

We trust that the Committee will report before the close of the next decade.

“The devil can cite Scripture for his purpose.”

“He went to his imagination for his facts and to his memory for his figures.”

“This day, black Omens threat the brightest Fair  
That e'er deserved a watchful Spirit's care  
Soms dire disaster, or by force, or slight;  
But what, or where, the Fates have wrapped in night,  
Whether the nymph shall break Diana's law  
Or some frail china jar receive a flaw  
Or stain her honor or her new brocade;  
Forget her prayers, or miss a masquerade.”—*Pope*.

#### (10.) EXCLAMATION.

This figure comprises three elements—*surprise*, *emotion* and *irony*. It is used as prompted by feeling and is adapted to the more vigorous forms of Discourse.

#### (11.) INTERROGATION.

The main thing to be ruled in reference to this figure is, its distinction from Interrogation in Punctuation. As a figure it has no reference to inquiry for information, but simply to a more forcible expression of the idea.

It has two forms—

(a.) The affirmative question demanding a negative answer.

(b.) The negative question, demanding a positive answer, *e. g.*—

“Who by searching can find out God?”

“Am I not an apostle?”

#### (12.) CLIMAX.

(a.) *Κλίμαξ*, a ladder or scale. This figure is founded on the principle that one step or stimulus

demands another. The theory is, that each clause begins, as to force, where the preceding clause ends, and the last is the strongest. It illustrates the law that all true Discourse is a growth. It develops to full maturity.

*Violations.*

A—*Reverse Climax.* In this, the clauses decrease in power as the sentence progresses *e. g.*, “He was guilty of murder, intemperance, theft and dishonesty.”

B—*Anti-Climax.* In this, the gradation of force is broken at some point or points along the line, *e. g.*, “He lost reputation, property and friends.” The Climax is somewhat difficult in that it takes for granted an orderly movement of the mind from weaker to stronger. It argues mental vigor.

*Miscellaneous Examples.*

“His arm soon cleared the field.”

His voice was as clear as a bell.

Franklin was the country’s mouth.

The whole town was present.

“And when he came to himself, he said.”

“Weariness can snore upon the flint.”

“The schoolmaster is abroad.”

“None but the brave deserve the fair.”

“Life’s but a walking shadow; a poor player  
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage  
And then is heard no more: it is a tale  
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury  
Signifying nothing.”

Galileo was the Columbus of the heavens.

“Men may come and men may go,  
But I go on forever.”

All France is in the field.

The sage of Concord was present.

He called the house to order.

He poured out his heart in sorrow.

It was said, that he surpassed himself.

Courtesy costs nothing.

“For contemplation he and valor formed,  
 For softness she and sweet attractive grace:  
 He for God only, she for God in him.”

“Far along,  
 From peak to peak, the rattling crags among  
 Leaps the live thunder.”

“Steam has married the continents.”  
 How many ministers preach themselves !

“Sweet are the uses of adversity,  
 Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous,  
 Wears yet a precious jewel in his head.”

“O Cassius, you are yokéd with a lamb  
 That carries anger as the flint bears fire;  
 Who much enforced, shows a hasty spark  
 And straight is cold again.”

“O! what a goodly outside Falsehood hath !”  
 Have I not said it repeatedly?  
 Am I to be treated with contempt?  
 Through youth and manhood and old age the passion grew.

“O pardon me, thou bleeding piece of earth,  
 That I am meek and gentle with these butchers !  
 Thou art the ruins of the noblest man  
 That ever lived in the tide of time.”

“He stood upon the giddy brink.  
 He took up his coward sword.”

“Oh! had I died before that well-fought wall.”

“He cannot buckle his distempered cause  
 Withiu the belt of rule.”

Play the man, my son !

“On such a full sea are we now afloat,  
 And we must take the current while it serves,  
 Or lose our ventures.”

“Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.”  
 The smiling year is at hand.

“Will you again unknit  
 This churlish knot of all abhorred war,  
 And move in that obedient role again,  
 Where you did give a fair and natural light?”

"Write, my Queen,  
 And with mine eyes I'll drink the words you send  
 Though ink be made of gall."  
 "The breezy call of incense-breathing morn."  
 He went the way of all flesh.  
 The live-long day, he tarried.  
 "Truth, crushed to earth, shall rise again."  
 We should take time by the forelock.  
 "Love is the fulfilling of the law."  
 "How oft when Paul has served us with a text,  
 Has Plato, Tully, Epictetus preached!"  
 "For me to live, is Christ."  
 "An allegory should not go on all fours."  
 Ireland is in need of bread.  
 Every man is not a Jefferson.  
 The last spark of life is ebbing.  
 The fires of envy will root out all happiness.  
 The temple of Janus is closed.  
 They buckled on their armor against the wars of adversity.  
 "A million of money for an inch of time!"  
 The ball must be kept rolling until it drowns all opposition.  
 The rabble was routed.  
 He was not a little vexed.  
 "Better be with the dead  
 Whom we, to gain our place, have sent to peace,  
 Than on the torture of the mind to lie  
 In restless ecstasy. Duncan is in his grave.  
 After life's fitful fever, he sleeps well;  
 Treason has done her worst; nor steel, nor prison,  
 Malice domestic, foreign levy, nothing  
 Can touch him further!"

#### INFERENCES.

1. As to the *Origin of Figures*. This has been seen to be natural and not, in any sense, arbitrary. They are, in one sense, the ordinary mode of expression.
2. As to their *Relations and Applications*. They are appropriate to all forms of discourse and states

of mind. They are used largely to set forth abstract, spiritual truth.

3. As to their *Sanctions*. They are found in the best writers of every age. Scripture is full of them. Goethe speaks of being improved by them as there found. The words of Christ and Solomon partake largely of this element.

4. As to the *Conditions of their use*. "Figures," says Cicero, "are the principal ornaments of an able speaker. I mean those which contribute not so much to embellish our language as to give lustre to our sentiments." Their excellence depends on the subject-matter. "Embellishment," says Quintilian, "should be manly." Even the best of them are to be used with discretion. As they are liable to abuse in the line of the fanciful or absurd, special care should be taken.

5. As to their *Object*. This may be said to be to awaken attention, to excite feeling, to give clearness, force and beauty to style. The current theory that the final object of figures is ornament is a false one. Their first object is, to make the truth more clear and forcible. In figurative language, as in all parts of Discourse, the mental element is the supreme one.

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## CHAPTER IV.

### PROCESSES OF DISCOURSE.

#### (1.) Narration.

(a.) The chief element in this process is,—Time, in which events are supposed successively to occur. It brings a subject before the mind as it appears in the progressive stages of its historic development.

(b.) It may be regarded as the simplest and most natural form of connected human speech, common to young and old; to educated and illiterate. It is a speaking “right on.” As such, it has a prominent place in the most perfected Discourse.

(c.) As to how fully the details of the narrative shall be given, this will depend upon the character of the events and must be left to the judgment of the writer. Enough, however, must be given to enable the ordinary mind to complete the history. There is to be no gap left which cannot be filled. It may be added that in proportion to the number of minor particulars, will be the need and difficulty of preserving unity.

(d.) Its forms are two—

A—*Simple Narration.* Events are here given in their external character, as visible to the eye. It is the object of the writer simply to give the facts as they are in the order of their occurrence.

The events in the life of any historical character might be thus given.

B—*Abstract Narration*. Here, the object is a higher one. The sphere is internal. The events, though invisible, are conceived of as transpiring in regular order. This form would be exhibited in such subjects as—The Progress of Taste, The Growth of Avarice in the Soul, The Causes and Effects of the French Revolution. In this last subject, we note the highest kind of abstract narration.

These two forms are well illustrated in the two similar methods of writing history.

A—*The Chronological Method*,—the one adopted by the Annalist. Here, the order of time is strictly followed, quite irrespective of the relations of the events to each other.

B—*The Logical or Philosophical*. Here, the events are given as connected with great social and moral movements. There is a weighing of ideas and causes, quite apart from the strict order of the events. This is called, the Philosophy of History—the method adopted by all the prominent historians of modern times. The respective relation of the two forms of Narration to these methods is, at once, apparent. Simple corresponds to the first, and Abstract, to the last. It is to be noted that the first form is the basis of the second and is ever tending to become more and more identified with it. As soon as a thoughtful man has gathered facts, he is inclined to reason from them—to use them as helps to new conclusions.

(e.) Narration is, thus, purely *historical*. It has reference to events of the past. It is, thus, the ancients argued, that it could not be used in deliberative discourse where the results were yet to be reached. There is no room, here, for the imaginative. What is called The Metrical Chronicle is exceptional. It is not meant to take the place or do the work of history.

(f.) The province covered by this process is a wide one. Annals, History Proper, Biography, Travels, illustrate its use. Poetry has much of it. Fiction abounds in it.

(g.) It has a double interest.

A—It deals with the past and brings it up before us in the present. It has all the romance of history.

B—Its special interest lies in the personal element involved. The persons behind the events are more important than the events themselves. Our deepest sympathies are enlisted. Such writings as *The Historical Plays of Shakespeare* reveal this interest. It is because fiction has so much of this personal element that it is so readable and so prevalent in literature.

There is no safer process of Discourse for the young writer than this. It imparts to style that facility and naturalness which are so essential to excellence. So true is this that even mature writers are glad to refresh their style by exercise in it. It begets simplicity.

## (2.) Description.

(a.) The chief element in this process is, space. Instead of events occurring in time, we note objects located in space.

(b.) There are two forms.

A—*Simple Description*. In this, some external or visible object is described, as a landscape or a building.

B—*Abstract*. This refers to some internal object conceived of as located within, *e. g.*, the description of a nation's institutions or of a person's feelings.

As in Narration, these two forms may be combined. We may describe a battle in its external aspects—the field, the troops, the implements of war, or in its more abstract phases—the courage of the soldiery, the reputation of the generals. The union is not as intimate as in Narration, inasmuch as time is progressive but space is fixed. The transitions, therefore, in the latter are more difficult.

(c.) The most essential thing in this process is, to obtain the proper *point of view* from which to describe the object. Everything depends upon this. In most cases, the one point of view is sufficient. If necessary, however, as in the description of a city, or a character, other points may be chosen in order that the view may be comprehensive and sufficiently minute.

(d.) The description may be complete without a detailed statement of all minor matters. It is safer, here, to err upon the side of brevity than upon that of length. Much even of our best fiction is faulty in this particular. We read scores of pages that could have been supplied by ourselves. The law here is, that we are to give only the grand, salient features, what we term *the striking points*, leaving to the mind addressed the filling up of the outline. The principle applicable is, that nothing is to be given to the reader which he may readily supply. It is the higher method both for writer and reader. "To tell the whole," says Quintilian, "is not the same as to tell everything."

(e.) In this process, the quality of the diction is especially important. The terms should be, as far as possible, specific, inasmuch as the mind can thus the more readily form the image. There is what might be termed a descriptive diction. What is known as *word painting*, in its best use, takes advantage of this class of words. This is the language used by such a novelist as Victor Hugo, by such historians as Prescott, Motley and Macaulay, and by such poets as Tennyson. The object is, to depict or portray in vivid form the mental or material object.

(f.) This process, therefore, is imaginative rather

than historical. This is especially so in the abstract form, where the first thing to be done is, to give place and body to the idea as if it were a visible object. This power is at its fullest in the delineation of character. Hence, figurative language has a large function here. Hence, poetry is pervaded by this process. In addition to the fact that it enters into the various forms of poetry, such as the Dramatic and Pastoral, there is a special form which might be termed *descriptive* poetry. So important is this imaginative element that the description is not successful until the reader has formed the same mental images as the writer. He must not only hear or see the description with the bodily organs but mentally see it. Plutarch notes it as an excellence of Thucydides, that he makes his readers spectators. The description of Waterloo by Hugo, of Vesuvius by Wallace, of European Morals by Leckey, or of spiritual objects by the sacred writers, is of this vivid, graphic character.

(g.) The relation of this process to mental culture and mental power is, thus, important. It both reveals and develops such power. Clear and forcible description rests upon clear and strong conception. We cannot graphically describe until we fully understand.

(h.) Its province is much the same as that of Narration. In history, travels, fiction and poetry we often see the two processes in combination—*descriptive narration*. In object teaching, in experimental science, the descriptive element is prominent.

(i.) Its relation to style is thus manifest. It is used to impart vividness and vigor, and in its best forms is a rare excellence. The young writer can do noth-

ing for himself more fruitful of good results than to give faithful attention to these two processes, either separately or in union.

There are two or three species of Discourse which so fully and fitly illustrate the combination, as well as the separate excellences of Narration and Description, that they may be referred to at this stage. These are History, Fiction, and Journalism.

### History.

Though this belongs, as seen, mainly to Narration, it involves the descriptive element. In the broadest sense of the word, we find included here Annals or Chronicles. These are the materials—bare facts—out of which history is constructed.

*Biography.* This is simply personal history—the history of an individual, presented, at times, in the form of Memoirs or Reminiscences. When written by the person himself, it is called an Autobiography.

### *Characteristics of Historical Writing.*

(A.) *Fidelity to Facts.* The historian is not at liberty to swerve one iota from the truth. He must give the “whole truth and nothing but the truth.” A clear distinction is here to be made between the statement of facts and the expression of one’s inferences from those facts. Testimony is one thing, opinion is another. As to the first, the historian has no option or liberty. He is simply a medium of utterance. As to the second, he has all the choice of an intelligent man. He is, moreover, always bound to shape his opinion by the facts and not the facts by opinion. In what

is called Chronological History the facts are made prominent. In what is called Philosophical History the inferences are prominent. It is in this latter form, therefore, that the historian is especially liable to give opinions quite aside from the facts adduced.

(B.) *Clearness of Statement.* This has reference to the mode of expression rather than to what is expressed. If clearness is the first quality of Discourse, it is especially so in History. The end of it is instruction—to enable men to profit by the past. Ambiguity and obscurity are fatal to its purpose. The very fact that its form is narrative and descriptive necessitates clearness, in that the flow of the discourse is rapid. Its meaning must be seen at a glance. History is to be read rather than to be studied. It must be readable.

It is on this principle that such historians as Prescott, Motley, Irving and Macaulay have introduced a good degree of the ornate element, so as to please the taste of the reader while informing his judgment.

(C.) *Unity and Symmetry.* The historian must grasp and ever present as prominent the leading facts and principles. These must be presented in their due connections and bearings, so as to minister to the best ultimate effect. One of the main differences between the philosophic historian and the chronicler lies here. The former adjusts and discusses on the principle of logical method; the latter simply presents facts out of relation.

(D.) *Moral Fairness.* Much has been written in respect to the moral position and duty of the historian. Fidelity to facts will ensure safe results in this as in secular spheres.

Moral inferences are to be reached without prejudice or malice. Moreover, as the end of history is the peoples' good, the historian is bound, on the basis of his own moral instincts and those of the race, to give the morally right and good the preference over the evil or injurious. The presumption is always in its favor. The historian cannot safely assume an absolutely indifferent attitude. It is not his office to teach morality. He has no right, however, to advocate the immoral. Such historians as Buckle and Gibbon have gone beyond their province in this regard.

### Fiction.

Here, the descriptive element is prominent. Narration, however, is also a vital element.

### SPECIES.

(A.) *The Historical Novel*. Here, the combination of these two processes is happily seen. In this, historical events and characters are presented, the novelist having the liberty to modify the facts somewhat to the purposes of the story. He is the novelist first and the historian secondarily. Good examples are given us in Scott, Cooper and Miss Muloch.

(B.) *The Descriptive Novel*. This is sometimes called—the novel of Life and Manners, public, social and domestic. Its object is to delineate character and customs. It is in an important sense the typical form, as illustrated in Bulwer, Dickens, Thackeray and Reade.

(C.) *The Sentimental Novel*. This is purely temporary in its results and of the lowest order of fiction.



It often and easily degenerates into the most repulsive forms of literature, corrupting the taste and morals alike. The works of Smollett and Aphra Behn are of this type. It prevailed during the Restoration.

(d.) *The Philosophical Novel.* This is so reflective and didactic in character as scarcely to come under the class—Novels. Still, it finds place here. The object is, to examine motives and dissect character. Other things are subordinate. It is a kind of study in Ethics and Psychology. As it is the highest order of fiction mentally, it naturally assumes, also, a moral cast. George Eliot is, here, the queen. Plot and scenery give way to character. Characters themselves yield to character—the concrete to the abstract.

#### *Characteristics of Fiction.*

(a.) Its object is to please. In this, it differs from History. The word itself, Novel or Romance, indicates this. Something must be given as new or feigned. The real and the ideal combine.

(b.) It is imaginative or figurative rather than historical. The fanciful itself largely enters. In the Descriptive Novel, this is prominent.

(c.) It is marked by skill in Delineation. This is the special feature of our best novelists. It tests their power of conception and presentation. Everything must be as vivid as the light itself. Such a novelist as Victor Hugo is superb in this particular. His style is graphic.

(d.) Moral element. The novelist is bound to present character as it is, somewhat as the historian presents facts, but in addition to that he is bound to show what it ought to be. Fiction includes in its

nature and purpose a moral quality. Its staple is character, and the elevation of character should be its aim. Most novelists are forgetful of this, and widespread immorality follows.

### Journalism.

This species of composition, as the word itself indicates, is for the day. It is designed to serve immediate and transient ends. It deals with passing events. Whatever its nature and object, however, it has come into such prominence in modern times as to merit attention on the part of every student of Discourse.

### Characteristics.

(a.) It is, by way of distinction, the *popular* form of Written Discourse. It actually reaches more minds and influences more minds than any other form. The Press is the people's library, their educator and guide. The Bible and the Journal—secular and religious—are the only books of thousands of households, and in many the journal supersedes the Bible.

(b.) It must be marked both by *comprehensiveness* and *minuteness*. In narrating events and describing scenes, the Journalist must evince the rare faculty of giving the general and special in unison. He must know just when and where to amplify and curtail, so that all classes of readers may be satisfied. This is partially secured by the combination of news and editorials. In the one, we have the detailed items; in the other, suggestions and inferences drawn before them. It is simply the narration and description upon their abstract and philosophic side.

(c.) The phraseology must be *plain* and *pointed*. The journal, much more than the history or the novel, must be intelligible at a glance. Its meaning must be clear to the illiterate—to those who simply understand the homely aspect of every-day life. Hence, the journalism of a people should be an exponent and a standard of the popular language as distinct from that which is technical or professional. American journalism, in its diction, structure of sentence, method and general style, is below the English and Continental and is in danger of corrupting rather than purifying the national speech. An improvement, however, is now apparent in these particulars.

(d.) Moral Function. The Press, in so far as it is distinctively religious, is presumably an advocate of all that is good. The secular Press the world over is lamentably deficient here. The American Press is conspicuously so. It is not aside from the truth to say that very much of the wide-spread skepticism of the time, and much of our social and political corruption, is traceable to this source. The journalist, from his very position as public official, and representative, is bound to place himself on the side of conscience, general morality, and good taste. He has no moral right to use his position and his pages in the interest of infidelity and vice. Freedom of speech and of the Press is overreaching itself and degenerating into the wildest license. So extreme is this becoming that the desirability of a kind of official censorship is by no means doubtful. The secular Newspaper Press has its well defined sphere and mission. Within that sphere its function is to foster and conserve good morals. Into the sacred precincts of domestic life it has

no right to go, nor, on the other hand, is it responsible for settling the religious creed of the people. The fact that Journalism is assuming the rank of a profession makes it all the more important that, both in its literary and moral character, its influence shall be, at least negatively and indirectly, on the side of true progress.

### (3.) Specification.

(a.) This process consists in the exhibition of the subject as a unit or class through one of its parts or members as,

Beautiful Flowers, in the Rose.

Heroes, in St. Paul.

(b.) Here, the theme must be a class and but one class. Only those qualities in the example chosen are to be specified which are *common* to the whole class of which it is an example. It is only general characteristics and not individual ones that are to be marked. Hence an average example is to be chosen, rather than one above or below the medium level, in order that the class may be fairly represented. It would be scarcely proper to represent the wheat-growing states of our country by Kansas or its educational centres by Boston.

If the example chosen be a correct one, it will include all the *essential marks* of the class to which it belongs. The penitence of David in its general features would exhibit the essentials of true penitence in all hearts.

(c.) This process is complete, therefore, when there is a perfect *correspondence* between the essential characteristics of the class from which the example is

taken and those mentioned as belonging to the example itself. If not so, error lies in our judgment as to what the general characteristics of the class are, or in the special example selected to exhibit them.

(d.) This process is based on resemblance. The members making up a class are, for this reason, supposed to possess common qualities.

(e.) This process reveals our preference for what is specific and individual. It is, indeed, a matter of necessity. We must reach the abstract through the concrete; the class idea through the individual. We begin with that which is most definite, and thus most intelligible, and by it rise to general and broad conceptions. It is the order of nature.

#### (4.) Comparison and Contrast.

(a.) In this process, instead of exhibiting the class through one of its members, we compare or contrast one member of a class with another of the same class. We note the resemblance and differences. The process is, in a sense, a double one. It involves principles similar to those which we find under figures of resemblance and has, through the element of contrast, some relation to the balanced sentence.

(b.) It has two forms.

A—*Essential*. In this, things are compared or contrasted as to their properties, their inner nature. Two persons or governments might be thus studied.

B—*Relative*. In this, they are studied as to their external bearings or applications—their relation to some other thing. Two persons or governments might thus be studied as to their respective influence upon the world.

(c.) Special care is to be taken that the resemblances and differences be real and not fanciful—so natural as to be accepted as such so soon as suggested.

(d.) These points of likeness and unlikeness should not be carried to excessive detail so as to defeat the very object of the process. The tendency to error here is a common one. The only object is, to bring out in bold relief the more vital points. It is to be added that the transitions between the parallels and the antithesis should be in no sense abrupt. Much of the difficulty of this process lies here. The double character of the process increases this. In this particular Plutarch's "Lives" are a model. Pope and Dryden, Johnson and Macaulay, excel in this. For this reason it is a process in which younger writers should indulge with discretion.

(e.) Some unlikeness in the things compared makes the comparison stronger, as some likeness in the things contrasted makes the contrast stronger. The principle is, that it is pleasing to find differences among things mainly alike and resemblances among things mainly unlike. Points of difference between Washington and Madison are of special interest, as points of resemblance between Washington and Aaron Burr would be.

The difference between comparison as a process and the figures of comparison has already been noted under the Simile.

#### EXAMPLES OF SUBJECTS.

*Narration:—*

The History of the Anglo-Saxons,  
The Progress of Ideas,  
The Growth of Character,  
The Causes of Crime,  
The Effects of the Crusades.

*Description:—*

The Valley of the Amazon,  
The City of Jerusalem,  
The Character of Lord Bacon,  
The Poetry of Wordsworth,  
The English Language.

*Specification:—*

Philanthropy, as seen in Howard,  
Heroism, as seen in Paul,  
Instinct, as seen in the Beaver.

*Comparison and Contrast:—*

Jefferson and Madison as Politicians,  
Monarchy and Democracy as Forms of Government,  
Prescott and Motley as Historians,  
Scott and Cooper as Novelists.

## CHAPTER V.

### LAWS OF DISCOURSE.

It is not necessary for us to note the various classifications of these laws. Many of them refer to what are more properly called Forms or Processes. Using the term *Law* in its accepted sense—a principle laid down as a guide to action—we may note three main laws.

#### (1.) Unity.

(a.) This is the most prominent one. It has no exception. Not only do the other laws depend upon it and find their fullest expression in it, but it finds a leading place in every form and phase of the study of Discourse.

(b.) Unity is not Uniformity. They exclude each other. Diversity is essential to unity, as in creation. Uniformity is rigid and mechanical. Unity is free and flexible. It adjusts itself to the thought.

(c.) This law assumes that in every Discourse there is a *central* idea and demands that it be given its place as central among all other associated ideas. This does not exclude minor material if related to the central idea and kept in place. It does exclude all material which cannot thus be unified. What is irrelevant cannot be admitted at all. What is relevant can be admitted only in its proper position.



(d.) The law is essentially *natural*. Every rational mind finds itself working more or less fully upon this principle. It is ever asking as to the main idea and how all else is related to it. Many things, however, prevent its proper, natural working. Prejudice, ignorance, indifference and other evils may oppose. With the writer, therefore, it needs guidance and discipline till it becomes a mental habit—a second nature.

(e.) It may be noted that if the object of the Discourse is specified and clear, unity is thereby secured. The one object holds us to the one idea.

(f.) This law of unity finds illustration in all spheres—divine and human. We see it in the physical world. We see it in providence and human history, where all events among the nations are made to subserve one common end; and even in the sphere of grace, where amid diversities of gifts and operations the one Spirit acts.

“The end of philosophy (knowledge),” says Bacon, “is the intuition (perception) of unity.” This is true of any separate branch of study and of knowledge as a whole. In order to correct results, we must stand at the centre and look out.

(g.) The special method by which this law is applied is by a clear grasping of the subject in its leading and related ideas. These are not always, at once, apparent. They must be reached by close reflection and, when secured, firmly held. When thus before the mind, it will adjust itself into order.

(h.) It is a law whose observance the intelligent reader demands. Any obscurity here is an affront to him. He expects to see the main idea at once and note its prominence throughout.

## (2.) Symmetry.

(a.) This is closely connected with Unity. In common with it, it belongs mainly to the structure and indirectly to the development of Discourse.

(b.) It may be defined as that law which secures to Discourse the presentation of all its parts in due relation to each other and to the whole. It includes completeness of parts and proportion of parts. Its application is thus somewhat difficult, as it requires keen discernment to enumerate and adjust the parts.

(c.) There is a kind of moral feature in this law. Each part has its claim. We are to place every truth in strictest deference to its essential and relative worth.

This demands judgment, knowledge of the laws of Discourse, the value of truth, and force of circumstances.

## (3.) Method.

This is discussed by some writers as a process—the analytic process. It is, rather, a law. It guides us in preparing the subject for development. It gives us the skeleton or framework. It is a means to an end.

(a.) The Law of Method includes Analysis and Synthesis—the separation of the subject into its elemental parts and the re-adjustment of those parts into unity. It will thus be seen that Method in Discourse is something more than mere *analysis*. It is this in proper synthetic order. Many writers seem to be analysts only. They stop with the division of the idea and evince little skill in the re-arrangement of the parts with reference to discussion.

(b.) The relation of these two parts of the law of Method is a vital one, and yet, in a sense, they are distinct. In the one, we begin with the compact idea as embodied in the theme or proposition and work toward the elements. In the other, we begin with the elements and work back to the idea. It is the reverse order. It is to be noted that Synthesis does not necessarily re-adjust the parts back to the *one idea* but to certain leading divisions. By practice, the student may at length leave very little for revision in order to make the plan synthetic. He may, in fact, carry on the two processes together. The meanings of the words in themselves and as related are well expressed by the terms *Ἀνάλυσις* (*resolutio*), and *Συνθεσις* (*compositio*), in the Greek and Latin. Comprehensiveness is the end of the one; compactness, that of the other. "There are two problems in philosophy," says Mears—"to analyze and combine." They exist, also, in Discourse. The errors of the one may often be discovered and corrected by the other.

The Theme *Schools* may thus be divided and unified.

*Analysis.*

Public.  
Professional.  
Theological.  
Collegiate.  
Medical.  
Academic.  
Legal.  
Scientific.  
Commercial.  
Agricultural.  
Classical.

*Synthesis.*

I. Public.  
II. Academic.  
III. Collegiate.  
1. Classical.  
2. Commercial.  
3. Agricultural.  
IV. Professional.  
1. Theological.  
2. Medical.  
3. Legal.  
4. Scientific.

(c.) The special need of such a law arises from the fact that most of the topics arising from discussion are *complex* in nature. The first essential, therefore, is, division and arrangement of facts.

(d.) The law is eminently *natural*, and, as such, cannot be subjected to any arbitrary principles. No sooner has any intelligent mind become possessed of an idea than it begins the work of resolving it into its parts and of replacing them in due form. The work, in fact, goes on involuntarily and needs little more than careful guidance. As a natural principle, we see its illustration everywhere. "Order is heaven's first law." In science, philosophy, art, and on the lower planes of business and common life, what is called system is but a special application of this principle.

(e.) Strange as it may seem, this is a law of Discourse but little discussed in the earlier and later manuals. Quintilian may be quoted as an exception. In Vol. II, Book 7, of his "Institutes," he speaks of its utility under seven distinct figures. He compares method in Discourse to order in architecture; to statuary; to anatomy (the body); to war (troops in line); to nature; to sailing (in a direct course), and to travelling. He devotes an entire book to its discussion. Among recent authors it is briefly treated under the name of Division. Whately, Bain and others allude to it in speaking of the order of proofs, while Prof. Day and others discuss it as a process. It is safe to say that the neglect of this law will be fatal to the composer. "Want of method," says Addison, "is sufferable only in men of great learning or genius, who are often too copi-

ous to be exact. In others, it borders on the ridiculous, like the cuttle fish who, unable to extricate himself, blackens all the water about him till he becomes invisible." His contrast in the Spectator (476) between the unmethodical and the methodical disputants, in the persons of Tom Puzzle and Will Day, is as instructive as it is ironical. If the leading quality and object of Discourse is clearness, this law is fundamental. The writer and reader are alike in need of it. It insures to the truth its best effect and most permanent retention.

(f.) In the preparative mental work necessary to the full exhibition of this law, very much of that work is done which *belongs to the discussion*. Addison notes, that method is a great help to the writer's originality. He says, "When a man has planned his Discourse, he finds a great many thoughts rising out of every head, that do not offer themselves upon the general survey of a subject. Before I set pen to paper, I have the whole scheme of the discussion in mind." He refers to Tully and Aristotle as worthy examples and to Seneca and Montaigne as in error at this point. The outline which is prepared is not an *arbitrary* one. It is an outline of that discourse which, as yet unwritten, is substantially before the mind. In order to reach a proper analysis and synthesis, the full bearing of the theme as developed must lie in view. It is just here that the *intellectual* element in this law appears, which makes it so important and difficult—one to which the undisciplined mind is quite incompetent. The successful analyst must be a thinker, and he must see into and through a subject; and when he comes to co-

ordinate the parts into logical unity, still, again, he must think. His varied mental powers must be under control. Hence, by the beginner this law must be more or less imperfectly applied. Excellence in its use, however, may be acquired, and to that degree, that when the mind works most freely, it works orderly. It is, therefore, because of this rigid mental exercise involved in the law, that the after work is all the easier. The ablest writers do their main work before the act of verbal composition begins. It is a mental work—analytic and synthetic—and when the hour for expression comes, it is easier to express than to withhold the thought. It has come to the time when it should take on external form by pen or voice and it naturally assumes it.

(g.) The question as to *giving or not giving* the perfected plan to the reader or hearer before we enter upon its development is one of little practical value, and may be left to the judgment of the writer. That judgment will be based upon the nature of the subject and the character of the minds addressed. If the plan be brief and simple, it may be given at the outset. If otherwise, the several parts may be stated as they arise for discussion. The main thing is, that there be a definite plan in the writer's mind. If so, all will be well. In some way or other, he will cause the reader to view the subject as he views it. He will see the idea in its unity, diversity, and logical relations.

(h.) Special care is to be taken as to the *verbal expression* of the divisions. Error here is fraught with harm. The words are leading and should have a corresponding clearness.

(i.) Some of the ways in which this principle can be secured may be noted.

A—The student is never to write save upon some pre-arranged scheme. It may be crude, but the effort to construct it is of value. There must be an honest beginning.

B—This principle is not to be confined to Discourse. Persons and objects are to be dissected. As we listen and read and observe, we are to be on the alert as to this law. We are to seek the marks or properties of things. Coming to Discourse, this habit comes with us, and drill in outlining themes for drill's sake is of value.

C—A further agency of cultivation is seen in the relation which skill in method sustains to general mental culture. Each rightly disposed student is seeking in his study two things—breadth and depth. To see a subject in all its relations and at its centre is to understand it. This is nothing more nor less than the Law of Method. Analysis and Synthesis are the resultant of clear and full conception. Here the scholar and composer are one. Here it is seen that in cultivating general mental power in the pursuit of truth, we are cultivating skill in method as applied to Discourse. It is interesting to note that, in all the higher phases of Discourse, mental power and power of expression are vitally related. It is only on the lower plane of the purely verbal, formal, and ornamental, that these are disjoined.

### *Leading Principles.*

(a.) The order in which the successive parts are stated should be the *natural* order. It might be called *the logical order*, or *the order of dependence*. The parts which follow should be seen to depend upon those preceding, as a consequent upon an antecedent, or a branch upon a stock. The one should grow out of the other. We have "first, the blade; then, the ear; after that, the full corn in the ear." *Examples—*

#### *Human Frame.*

Head,  
Trunk,  
Limbs.

*The Roman Empire.*

Its Origin,  
Progress,  
Decline.

*Biography of Christ.*

Birth,  
Life,  
Death,  
Resurrection,  
Ascension.

The virtue of this principle is, that it secures progressive power on to the end. The order is climactic and the transitions, natural. In some abstract subjects the order of dependence is not so marked as to be invariable, but may be modified at the discretion of the writer, *e. g.*—The virtues—Faith, Penitence, Love, Joy, may admit of varied arrangements.

(*b.*) There are two types of subjects and two consequent divisions.

*A*—If the unit is a class, the parts are similar, and the name of the class is applicable to each part. *Examples*—

<i>Man.</i>	<i>Virtues.</i>	<i>Studies.</i>
European,	Patience,	Language,
Asiatic,	Meekness,	Science,
African,	Love.	Literature,
American.		Art,
		Philosophy.

*B*—If the unit is individual, the parts are dissimilar, and the name of the individual cannot be applied to each part, *e. g.*—

<i>Europe.</i>	<i>Faith.</i>
France,	Knowledge,
Germany,	Trust,
Spain,	Obedience.
England.	



In the class idea, we have some common attribute binding all in one. In the specific idea, this is not prominent.

(c.) The emphasis of any *particular part* of the division is determined by the special object of the writer at the time.

This takes for granted, in any given case, that of all the parts of the division, more or less good, there is one that is preferable to all. *Examples—*

*Character.*

Elements,  
Means of Culture,  
Modes of Expression,  
Benefits.

*Government.*

Origin,  
Forms,  
Ends.

In each of these cases, any one of the parts of the division may be chosen as emphatic, and the discussion based on it. It is to be noted that the part chosen at the outset must be maintained throughout as prominent. This is essential to unity and final effect. At times its importance may demand that it alone constitute the subject for discussion.

(d.) Any one of the important *subdivisions* may itself be made the *basis of a new division*. It may become a new theme within a theme, *e. g.*—

*The New Testament.*

Gospels—Matthew, etc.,  
Acts,  
Epistles—Paul's, etc.,  
Book of Revelation.

As to *how far* such subdivisions may be carried, the intelligent taste of the writer will generally dictate. There is a tendency here to extreme minuteness which is to be guarded against. This, if indulged, will defeat the very object of the law before us. We cannot but sanction the weariness of those hearers who, in the days of Barrow and the Puritan Divines, were unable to follow clearly after the twenty-fifth subdivision. It is to be remembered that the division of a theme is not an end in itself. The division is proper if it deals with parts in themselves important and vitally related to the object before us. If it go beyond this it returns upon itself. The procedure is a circular one. Though all truth is more or less closely related, there is an intelligent limit. The relation must be rational, definite and clear. Divisions are not to be created until they become distinctions without a difference. In the example given, Matthew might be divided into chapters, and these into verses, and so on, until the division would destroy itself. In this connection the error of *irrelevance* is often seen. In speaking of the evangelist Matthew, we might note that he was a publican; that publicans were despised tax collectors; that taxes are now oppressive; that taxation was the occasion of the American War, and that war is an evil. We are thus led step by step until our final point reached has no relation to the one at the outset.

(e.) The Test of a true Division.

A—*Completeness of Parts.* They are together to make up the unit of which they are parts—neither more nor less. As no more, all that is superfluous is excluded, and as no less, all that is essential is included.

## EXAMPLES OF VIOLATION.

*United States.*

Northern,  
Southern,  
Middle.

*Trials.*

Loss of Health,  
Loss of Wealth.

*B*—The various divisions are to be *exclusive* of each other—real divisions. There are times, indeed, when overlapping cannot be prevented. In most cases, however, the distinctions should be visible. This test secures the very important result that leading divisions and subdivisions are not confounded, *e. g.*—

*Duties.*

Personal,  
Social,  
Religious,  
Public,  
Filial,  
Obedience, etc.

*Old Testament Books.*

Historical,  
Prophetical,  
Psalms,  
Poetical,  
Metrical,  
Leviticus.

*Motives to Preservation of Health.*

Our bodies, a trust,  
Avoidance of suffering,  
Personal Comfort,  
Morally bound to preserve it.

In these examples we note the violation of the principles stated. The parts are not exclusive of each other and the distinctions between primary

and secondary divisions are not given with care. It should be remarked that although the divisions are to be thus exclusive, the transitions are to be natural. The ablest writers are far from an ideal excellence at this point.

(*f.*) The actual *order of discussion* need not always follow that reached by the law of method. A different order may be desirable. This is, generally, the *reverse* order, inasmuch as the regular gradation of parts is thus preserved. In the mere plan or structure of the Discourse, the order is assigned us. The *idea* suggests and controls it. In the discussion, however, the special *object* determines it, *e. g.*—

*Duties.*

To God.

To Man,

To Self.

There may be special reasons why this order should be reversed and the last point be first treated. This principle does not detract in the least from the importance of the first or natural order. It, in fact, increases it, for we must know what this natural division is, in order to judge whether, in any given case, we should observe or depart from it. It may, here, be stated that both the logical order and the order of discussion seem to be, in many cases, so fixed by custom that we are obliged to observe it, *e. g.*—

ARTS.	HUMAN POWERS.	VIRTUES.
Fine,	Intellect,	Faith,
Useful,	Feelings,	Hope;
	Will.	Charity.

*Benefits of this Law.*

- (a.) It determines the order of discussion.
- (b.) It secures unity and symmetry.
- (c.) It is suggestive of ideas bearing upon the theme.
- (d.) It renders it easier for the mind to apprehend and retain what is given.
- (e.) It makes the discourse progressive in its interest and force.
- (f.) It makes the discussion itself a matter of comparative ease.
- (g.) It cultivates a true method of extempore discourse.
- (h.) Its influence outside of Discourse is salutary.
- (i.) It involves a high degree of mental culture.

It is by reason of such benefits as these that this law has been carefully studied and applied by the best minds of every age and commends itself to the student of Discourse as essential to his success as a writer. Reference has been made to what the ancients called the Topical Art. Though the primary purpose of it was to arrange arguments so as to facilitate discussion, it has a wider function. It refers to the whole subject of method and is designed to assist the writer in the logical presentation of his thought. Some of these plans or outlines reached by the system of Topics may be of service to the student in the treatment of themes. The most important are as follows:

Causes and Effects,  
Means and Ends,  
Kind and Degree,  
Resemblances and Differences,  
Origin, Progress and Decline,  
Characteristics and Results,  
Conditions and Methods,  
Physical, Mental and Moral,  
National, State and Municipal,  
Subjective and Objective,  
Positive and Negative,  
Present and Prospective.

These and similar schemes may serve as guides to the writer by which he may be enabled to develop a subject with unity and progressive force. They are, in a sense, formulæ of Discourse.

PART SECOND.





## PART SECOND.

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### CHAPTER I.

#### DEFINITION OF DISCOURSE.

##### (SECOND DEFINITION.)

THIS second definition we have reached after much reflection and place it here as being more in keeping with the advanced discussion of our subject. It is as follows: Given the Materials of Thought and a Definite Object in view, Discourse is such a *selection* and *adaptation* of these materials and their *presentation* in such a form as best to secure the Definite Object.

This definition commends itself to us as a philosophic one, able to abide any legitimate test.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF DEFINITION.

##### Selection of Material.

By this process we choose from the material at hand, as gathered up from all sources, such a quality and measure of material as will best effect the special object which we have in view. There may be said to be three distinct mental elements involved in such a process.

1. There is, first of all, *a knowledge of the intrinsic worth of that material* from which we are to make a selection. This is something far higher than a mere knowledge of the fact that such material exists. It is an intelligent, appreciative and even critical view of such knowledge. It involves the power of keen perception, close reflection, and a consequent decision upon the basis of actual merit.

2. This process includes, also, *an appreciation of the special needs for which we are seeking material*. It is here that we note the presence and necessity of a definite object in discoursing. Here, again, we are in the higher region of mental action. The special object before us demands special choice of material both as to character and measure.

3. There is, still further, included what we may term *the knowledge of relations*, the relations of the material from which the choice is made to the object before us. Whatever the intrinsic worth of these materials, they are of varied relative values. Some may be absolutely essential; some, absolutely useless; some will have a modified value and may be accepted or rejected at discretion. It is evident, therefore, that excellence in selection will depend largely upon our knowledge of the relations of truth to varied objects. As the builder must know the intrinsic value of the material in hand, for what he needs it, and its relation to the plan of construction immediately before him, so with the discourses in his work of selection. Herein lies opportunity for the exercise of mental power. With the same broad field of universal knowledge open to all, they, and they only, choose wisely who perceive the full worth

of that knowledge and its worth for them with reference to a special and present object. The very opulence of the material is often the best test of their skill in selecting what is fittest. The special mental faculty employed in this process is the Critical Judgment—the power of discrimination. It includes discretion or good sense in its highest function.

#### INFERENCES.

(a.) This process is mainly *objective*. It appropriates a part of that mental treasure already gathered from without.

(b.) It is a process, however, *occasional and specific in its action*. There is no motive for its exercise save as specific. It is the application to Discourse of that general action, ever going on, by which the mind gathers its stores. It is the special acquisition of the writer as a writer.

(c.) We note the advantage of this word *selection* over that of *invention* as commonly used. The difficulty in the use of this latter word is, that if we mean by it the absolute *origination* of thought, no such work belongs to Discourse. If we use it to mean the *furnishing* of thought already supplied, then we depart from the proper significance of the term. In either case, we have ambiguity. The word *selection* is clear beyond question, and expresses the only true office of the writer at this initial stage. It is to make intelligent *choice* of material already before him and not to *originate*. This work is antecedent to Discourse.

### Adaptation of Material.

Stated in other form, it would be *The Mental Adaptation of Selected Material*. We come here to the discussion of a question which is vital to the subject before us.

This is the *final process* which the writer applies previous to the actual work of verbal expression or Presentation of his thought. It is the preparation proper to which all else is subservient. Already we have given us the materials and object of Discourse. By Selection, we have chosen those materials which will best effect that object. We are, now, specifically to *fashion* or *adapt* them mentally to the object in view. To resume the comparison—It is not enough for the builder to select the right material. He must cut and plane and turn—must *adapt* it to his purpose. Adaptation is, thus, the mental process between Selection and Presentation. As such, it looks backward and forward. It may be noted that it looks forward to Presentation with a keener eye than backward to selected material. The former is the end; the latter, but the means.

### INFERENCES.

(a.) This process is purely *subjective*. It is a definite mental action on the part of the writer—a working up of the chosen materials of thought. It is here, as nowhere else, that Discourse can be viewed as vitally connected with our mental operations. Not only is every mental faculty at work, but is at work within the mind itself. The process is difficult because it is so exclusively mental or subjec-

tive. To give shape or adaptability to thought demands, itself, a high order of thinking. All expression, oral or written, must necessarily take its character from it. Nothing can be written or delivered which was not before in the mind and there in the precise form in which it is to be presented. Writers may be classified as able or inferior in proportion as they possess or fail to possess this formative power. Its difficulty is the measure of its usefulness.

(b.) This process gives to Discourse its *Intellectual Form*. Special emphasis is to be laid upon this. The words *intellectual* and *form* are alike significant. These terms are generally used as exclusive of each other—the one referring to the internal and the other to the external. How, it may be asked, is our use of them justified? In this way—The word *form* has a two-fold use. There is a *subjective* as well as an *objective* form. What we get by this process of adaptation is, this *inner or mental* form as distinct from the outer and as preparatory to it. It is the form in which the mind of the writer presents his thought to *himself* ere he presents it to *others* and in order to present it to others. What we have termed Presentation (external form) is here all anticipated in its internal process. Not only is it true that before we give our subject visible or audible expression we have submitted it to thorough reflection in its general import, but that the very shape which it assumes externally is the actual transcript of the *inward shape*. "This sense of form," says Lathrop, "is the highest attribute of a creative writer—not a mere acquirement of art,

but the result of a deep necessity of genius." So complete may this interior work become that the mental adaptation of material for delivery often includes the very phraseology in which it is to be given. As Becker would express it—"Our speech is but our thought coming out into the light." This principle is often illustrated in the best examples of Extempore Discourse—when the thought has been so completely shaped as to make its verbal reproduction almost complete. This process is so normal and natural as often to be carried on unconsciously. The very language in which our thinking was conducted revives in the act of expression. In written discourse, the correspondence between the inner and outer form may not be so marked, perhaps, inasmuch as the very expectation of writing out our thought makes us less particular as to a detailed and minute shaping of material in the mind. Even here, however, this adaptive work is vital and its application should be urged upon every student of Discourse. The fact is, that Discourse will be elevated in character and useful in result just to the degree in which our mental energies have part in it. The ideal of composing is here,—making it to that degree a mental work that expression becomes simply a transfer of mind to manuscript or audience, and effected just as rapidly as the penning of a duplicate copy.

(c.) From such a discussion we note the true relation of *thought to expression*. "The words which a man of genius selects," says Mathews, "are as much his own as his thoughts." This is true in a real sense of every intelligent writer. Just in proportion as our

Discourse is subjective, thoroughly identified with our mental selves, to that degree will the inner and the outer forms be related. "Form is not form only, it is the form of something." In Discourse, that something is the thought.

### Presentation of Material.

#### STYLE.

The exact relation of this part of our subject to the one already discussed is clearly evident. After noting briefly the special Selection and Mental Adaptation to the object in view, of material given us, we are now brought to the study of Discourse in its purely external character as presented to the eye and ear.

#### *Presentation—*

(1.) The question now before us is—*How to present truth objectively to the minds of others?* It assumes a knowledge and love of the truth, a desire to communicate it, and a knowledge of those to whom it is to be addressed. The *mode* of presentation must, therefore, now engage the student. This is not something which will adjust and determine itself. The relation of word to thought and of outer to inner form indicates this.

(2.) The principle of *diversity of mode* is here important. *Form* in discourse does not mean *uniformity*. The outer form may be made to assume and naturally assumes all the varied richness of the thought itself. The outer form is as diversified as the inner. Discourse, thus apprehended, cannot be mechanical. It is varied by the state of the mind addressed and the mind addressing as well as by its own inherent char-

acter. Every able writer has his particular form of expression—his *modus*—and yet, ever varied and ever adaptive to new circumstances and purposes. Discourse, as a mode or form, is multiform and not uniform. The principle of freedom is native to it.

(3.) This leads to the thought that in *Presentation* the *personal element should be prominent*. The question is not simply—How can truth be presented, but how can *we* present it to men. There are, indeed, general principles and methods open to all and essential to all. Beyond this, however, there is space for individual action. The abstract truth must be personated in us and by us. It must pass to other minds through the channel of our own. Many act as media of the truth only as the wire or the earth as media of electricity. They are passive conductors of influence. Others set the seal of their personality upon every thought they utter. Presentation is a word indicative of positive action. It is more than a process—it is a person presenting.

(4.) We note, further, that as in *selection* we have a more definite word than *invention*, so in *presentation*—the purely external form of Discourse—we have a clearer term than *style*.



## CHAPTER II.

### QUALITIES OF DISCOURSE.

#### INTRODUCTION.

1. There are some writers who have confined the whole subject of Discourse to this one topic, what they have termed *style*. With such, the discussion of *qualities* would be the only one needed. This position is evidently an extreme one.

2. Others have regarded this portion of the subject as the one claiming the *main attention* of the student. To this view there is no serious objection and it gives us some indication of the value of the discussion now before us:

As to the *nature* and *number* and relative *position* of these qualities, we shall find some difference of opinion. This diversity has largely arisen from an equally marked diversity as to the nature of *Discourse* itself.

1. Many, magnifying the purely *grammatical* and *formal* elements in Discourse, make it little else than a study of words and sentences.

2. Others, regarding mere *ornament* as the final end, overestimate the element of beauty in Discourse and reduce it to a study of æsthetics.

3. Still others introduce the higher elements and

make conspicuous the vital relations of *ideas* to *words*.

It is manifest, therefore, that the qualities of Discourse would vary as each of these different conceptions of its nature, in turn, prevailed.

### Possible Principles of Classification.

1. If the Diction of Discourse be the standard, we would have as a result the *diffuse* or *concise*, the *idiomatic* or the *foreign*, type of expression.

2. If the Structure of Sentences be the standard, we would have the *periodic* or *loose*, the *direct* or *antithetical*, the *simple* or *involved* type.

3. If the Figurative element be the deciding one, we would mark the *plain* or *ornate*, the *didactic* or *poetic*, type.

4. If the *special process* adapted determined the mode of expression, we would term it *narrative*, *descriptive* or *comparative*.

5. If the special Form of Discourse adapted determined the expression, then we would note the type as *argumentative* or *persuasive* or *impassioned*.

6. There is, however, a higher and better principle involved—the *effect* of the Discourse upon the mind addressed.

We shall see that upon this principle a satisfactory enumeration of qualities may be reached.

### Varied Classifications.

Many of the older writers, such as Aristotle and Cicero, give us only general discussions upon this subject, without any specific statement of qualities.

While it is possible to surmise what their opinion was, it is not, in so many words, recorded.

1. *Quintilian mentions a three-fold classification—*

Correctness,  
Perspicuity,  
Elegance.

The first and second may be regarded as one, and the scheme is defective in that essential qualities are omitted.

2. *Prof. Bain names the following—*

Simplicity,  
Clearness,  
Strength,  
Pathos,  
Wit,  
Melody,  
Taste.

We note that the first and second are practically one, and that the fourth, fifth and sixth can scarcely be termed separate qualities. The error is one of undue enlargement. The essential qualities are, however, included.

3. *The division given by De Mille—*

Perspicuity,  
Persuasiveness,  
Harmony,

is not essentially wrong. He uses *persuasiveness* in the sense of *energy*.

4. *Prof. Hart's division is radically wrong—*

Sublimity,  
Beauty,  
Wit and Humor.

Leaving these detailed divisions, it is pleasing to note that nearly all the leading authors in this department agree substantially as to these qualities.

### 5. *True Classification*—

Clearness,  
Force,  
Beauty.

(a.) The order of the statement of these qualities is the order of their *importance*.

(b.) These qualities are to be studied and applied as *vitally related* to each other. They constitute a unit.

Though it has been said "that the Scientist may stop at clearness; the Orator, at Force; and the Poet, at Beauty," we shall find that to the model discourser each is essential. No one of them can exist alone in typical Discourse.

(c.) The division given is seen to be a *natural* one.

A—If Discourse be divided into Prose (Written and Oral) and Poetry, we note that the three qualities respectively correspond.

B—If, moreover, the different forms of Discourse be called the Intellectual, Oratorical and Æsthetic, we note a similar correspondence.

C—If the old division of the Human Powers into Intellect, Feelings, Will and Taste be given, still the correspondence holds. The classification is thus seen to be the normal one, having its reason in the nature of things, and adjusting itself on all sides to the varied methods of Discourse and the varied operations of the mind.

## QUALITIES.

### (1.) Clearness.

In the light of what has already been stated, *clearness* must be viewed as the *first* quality of Discourse, in itself and its relations. It is an absolute essential

to all true expression of thought. That can be said of it which cannot be affirmed of any other quality—that no production is presentable or *readable* if devoid of it. “Let excellence of style,” says Aristotle, “be defined to consist in its being clear.” This is, also, the meaning of Dr. Campbell’s statement—“that it is the only *original* quality” of Discourse. Strictly speaking, an author cannot be said to have a style at all, unless he express himself intelligibly. We might say, in mathematical language, that Discourse *postulates* clearness. Obscure Discourse is scarcely a subject for study. When it is made clear, it may then be offered for criticism as to its character.

If the literati of France could say—“That which is not clear is not French,” we may also add—that which is not clear is not English. It is an unknown language. Coleridge regarded this quality as so important that he defined Discourse as, “The art of conveying our meaning with perspicuity.”

“We may as well be dumb as not to be understood.”

“As Love among the lesser graces,” says one, “so, Clearness in Discourse is the fulfilling of the law.”

*Definition.* Clearness is that quality of Discourse by which the thought is so presented as to be intelligible, more or less readily, to the mind addressed.

#### REQUISITES (*Negative*).

(a.) This quality does not require that *all* writers be *equally* clear. In the nature of things, this would be impossible. Writers may and must differ greatly in degrees of clearness, and yet each of them may be regarded as clear. There is no standard so absolute

and fixed that every writer, in order to be clear, must come up to the full measure of it.

Bacon and Macaulay are clear authors, but in different degrees and in different ways.

What is required is that each one be *comparatively clear*, clear in a good and well understood sense, near enough to some acknowledged standard as to practically meet all the conditions enjoined.

(b.) It is not demanded that the discourser be equally clear in *every separate part* of his Discourse—without exception uniformly clear.

Here and there may be obscurity: some words or sentences may be at fault in this regard. True indeed, it were desirable if no doubt as to meaning existed, and this should be the author's aim, but ere he reaches such a result he may be clear.

Such an author is De Quincey. What is demanded is that, *as a whole*, the composition be marked by clearness. The general drift of the meaning and the main purpose should be apparent throughout, so that when we have done with the author he is substantially understood.

(c.) It is not supposed that *every separate subject* coming under discussion may be made equally clear to the mind.

There is sound philosophy in the words of Vinet—"To be perfectly clear on some themes is to be perfectly superficial." There are many subjects that cannot be simplified beyond a definite limit. The very nature of the subject, its wide scope and varied relations to other truth, make it impossible.

Writers are thus often held responsible for a degree of clearness which the subject itself will not allow. It is in vain for them even to attempt to meet such a demand.

Most of the higher topics in Theology and Mental Science are of this character. The limit of human insight and power of presentation is soon reached. Just what is demanded here is, that the subject be made clear up to the *limit of possible* clearness. As to what that limit is, and when it is reached, the judgment of the author must determine. Mistake at this point is fatal.

It may be noted here, that clearness is a mark and measure of mental power in proportion to the *inherent difficulty* of the subject. Other things being equal, the presence of this quality in a writer indicates mental vigor. As historical examples of the principle before us, we may refer to Edwards, on "The Will"; to Charnock, on "The Divine Attributes"; and to Dorner, on "The Person of Christ." These writers are clear up to the limit of clearness. As they pass that they become obscure. Most of the obscurity in philosophical and religious discussions would have been avoided by a more humble estimate of human wisdom.

(*d.*) It is not required, here, that a subject which is *essentially* clear should *appear* so at *once* to the observing mind. Much patient explanation, on the one hand, and much patient study, on the other, may be needed, and is generally needed, to accomplish the desired result.

This principle is justified in daily experience. The

second reading of an author may be required in order fully to grasp his meaning, and still the author be in no sense at fault. Had we rested in our perplexity, at the close of the first study, the blame would have been our own.

All that is demanded of the author is, that if the subject is capable of being made clear he make it so to him who gives the subject *due attention*. In every instance, the mind addressed, as well as the discourser, has its duty to perform. By way of illustration it may be stated that most of the masterpieces of literature fall under this principle. Who has ever approximately understood Hamlet at the first reading?

Coleridge and Carlyle are examples. They are substantially clear, but they need a studious perusal, and reperusal.

(e.) It is not demanded that what is addressed to any class of minds should be so presented as to be *equally* clear or clear at all to *every mind* of the class. Men are so varied in mental capacity that, even among those who are classified on the basis of general resemblance, much diversity exists. In addressing such it is the business of the discourser to adapt himself to the *average* mind of the class before him—to that general mental power which gives it character as a class. This is the sole criterion. If a minority, larger or smaller, falls below that level, as is generally the case, that is its misfortune and not a condition of the writer's course. As a clear writer, it is simply his duty to make his meaning manifest to the great majority—to the class as such in its corporate capacity. This is a normal and wholesome principle. It



insists that the recipient mind be fully up to the average ability, and also relieves the discourser from much needless labor and anxiety. Here, again, the judgment must determine as to what this common ability is. Mistake here is most harmful.

The application of this principle to the work of the teacher and the preacher is of value.

Each is expected to graduate his instructions to the average level. Those above it must descend for the sake of others. Those below it must suffer neglect, and deserved neglect. They have one resort. It is to place themselves in a class of which their grade of intelligence represents the average. In this way, all can be reached.

The common remark that he is not a clear preacher who is not understood by every child and illiterate person before him is utterly false, unless indeed these are the ones whom he is especially addressing.

Hence, we infer—

*A*—That clearness is a *relative* and not an *absolute* quality. It depends on certain conditions as to its character and measure—upon the nature of the subject, the ability of those addressed, and the varied circumstances at the time.

*B*—Though the standard of clearness, theoretically, is the average of the best writers, the practical standard for the individual is the aspect of the subject as it lies before his own mind. Making the thought, first of all, clear to himself, he is then to present it to others as it lies in his mind. Herein is the difficulty, and the recompense. To place a thought before another just as it presents itself to us is not an easy matter. The very effort to do this, however, combined with the earlier effort to make it clear to ourselves, is mentally helpful and leads to large results.

#### REQUISITES (*Positive*).

(A.) *A constant desire and aim to be clear.* This reads as a truism, and yet very much of the obscur-

ity in Discourse arises from inadvertence or carelessness. This first and main quality should ever be in view, and the purpose to illustrate it be a dominant one.

(B.) *Faithful criticism of our work.* The reference here is not so much to the criticism given by others as to that given by the writer himself. Each one is to be his own severest censor. When he detects obscurity it is to be removed at whatever cost. Self-culture is here the main agent. Every writer, for his own sake, should so discipline his critical faculty as best to please the judgment of others when he satisfies his own.

This habit of self-criticism is forcibly illustrated in the lives of Addison and Macaulay

(C.) *Familiarity with authors notable for the exhibition of this quality.* Even standard writers are not equally able in all the various forms and expressions of their art. They have, respectively, their points of special excellence. Such authors as Goldsmith, De Foe, Lamb and Bunyan are models of clearness. Intimate companionship with them will have its result in the development of such a quality. Just here lies the special need of caution to young writers in the formation of their habits of expression. They will certainly be known by the company which they keep.

(D.) *Knowledge of the mind and nature of man.* The principle here involved is, that our success in making our thought intelligible will depend largely upon its adaptation to others. This, in turn, will depend upon

our knowledge of those addressed. If we are to make men understand us we must make it evident that we understand them. Hence, it is becoming more and more apparent that the clear writer, and most especially the orator, must be versed in "the wisdom of this world." He must be, in the best sense, a man of the world. In our best novel and essay writing, and in popular oratory—secular and sacred—marked success is largely due to the fact that men say what they understand to those and for those whom they understand.

(E.) *The cultivation of a habit of clear thinking.* The intimate relation of thought to expression is here involved. Clearness, after all, depends more upon internal than external conditions.

Other things being equal, the clearness of our expression is measured by our mental clearness; though in exceptional cases we cannot clearly and fully state what lies clearly in our minds, as a law we are able to do it. If not, the difficulty lies in the want of a copious diction, or in personal embarrassment, or in something which should not exist as an obstacle.

The oft-repeated statement, sanctioned by Whately and others, that obscurity of expression may arise from wealth of thought, that an author is often devoid of clearness because he knows so much concerning his subject, argues nothing against the principle here stated. Largeness of acquisition does not necessarily involve a corresponding obscurity, and, even if it does, the reason why obscurity of Discourse arises is in the fact that the discourser, in the fulness and grasp of his subject, omits the intermediate steps and processes

which ought to be given. The obscurity arises from an error of method.

Ideas and utterance determine each other.

(F.) *Special care as to Diction.* Aristotle dwells with marked emphasis upon this feature. "The virtue of Diction," he says, "consists in its being perspicuous," and he applies this quality of diction to the corresponding quality of Discourse. "Perspicuity," writes Locke, "consists in the use of proper terms." As many writers have confined Discourse itself to what we are discussing as the quality of clearness, so they would confine the means by which this is to be secured to the use of Diction.

As to what particular *kinds* of words are the most desirable, the student may be referred to the discussion of this subject under *Media*. All that is there presented bears directly or indirectly upon this quality.

Special emphasis might be given to *native* and to *concise* words.

A most important principle to be borne in mind in reference to the relation of diction to clearness is, that due allowance must be made for the *personality* of the writer. The ablest writers have the most distinctive individuality. General laws, therefore, must not be pressed to an extreme.

Dr. Johnson cannot justly be called an obscure prose writer, and yet he uses a type of diction which, in others, would beget obscurity. Long words are as simple to him as short words to others, and though objectionable in themselves, as a prevailing type, he uses them so naturally, and they are so fully in keep-

ing with the largeness of his body and mind and habit, that they are clear. The same is true as to native and foreign terms. While the former are much to be preferred, the latter may be so discreetly and aptly used as to be clear. The fact is, every masterly writer who is clear while observing general principles, has yet a diction of his own. The law of liberty applies to Discourse.

(g.) *Care as to the structure of sentences.* Reference, here, may be made to the discussion of this subject already given.

As to the kinds of sentences, particular mention should be made of the Periodic, Short and Balanced. As to the Laws of Structure, those of Simplicity and Brevity are of special value. The *mental* law, so called, is the most important. Here, again, the principle of *personality* holds. The same remark is true of long sentences as of long words, and Dr. Johnson is an example of the possible clearness of each.

So as to the *loose sentence*. Though objectionable as a type of sentence, Milton and Addison use it with clearness.

Few authors could use the *balanced sentence* as freely as Bacon and Dryden and Carlyle, and be as free as they are from unpleasant formalism.

All possible freedom within the limits of propriety must be allowed. Each able writer has a structure of his own. It expresses not only his ideas but it expresses *him*, and is not to be imitated, if it could be. In oral discourse, this principle both as to words and sentences is especially applicable. The liberty is even greater, inasmuch as by gesture, tone, and general

manner, errors may be obviated which in written discourse must be seen by all.

(H.) *Definiteness.* This important agency has various forms of application.

A—*As to Theme, or Subject.* This is to be so definite that in it we find the only occasion of writing.

B—*As to Proposition, or Object.* This is still more specific and is the logical outgrowth and expression of the theme in definite form for discussion.

C—*As to central Idea, or Ideas.* Every topic treated is supposed to possess such ideas. They must be at once seen and firmly held. All is vague without this.

D—*As to Method.* As already stated, this includes the analysis of the idea or ideas, and their readjustment for discussion.

#### *Examples.*

Theme.	CHRISTIAN ORDINANCES.
Proposition.	To show their Spiritual Value.
Main Idea.	Spiritual Value.
Method.	Analysis and synthesis of this idea.
Theme.	THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.
Proposition.	To show its History and Structure.
Main Ideas.	History. Structure.
Method.	Analysis and Synthesis of these Ideas.
Theme.	GOVERNMENT.
Proposition.	To show its Origin and Forms.
Main Ideas.	Origin and Forms.
Method.	Analysis of these.

#### INFERENCES.

A—It may be noted here that if definiteness be secured in Theme, Proposition, Ideas and Method, the clearness of the entire Discourse is thereby secured.

It would seem to require special effort on such a basis to be obscure.

B—It will be seen that the Parts here mentioned

become more and more specific. The Proposition is more so than the Theme, the Idea in turn more specific than the Proposition, and the Method or Analysis of the Proposition more specific still.

The quality of clearness is thus more and more manifest.

C—We note the prominence here of the *mental* elements.

The Theme being obtained, we come to the statement of the *proposition* and possession of the *main idea* by close reflection. This being secured, we, also, by patient and earnest thinking, ascertain what are its *elements* or component parts. It resolves itself as the mind dwells upon it. The process from first to last is a mental one, and to the degree in which the student of Discourse is successful here he will be notable for clearness and for all its kindred qualities.

## (2.) Force.

Various names have been given to this second main quality of Discourse—*energy, vigor, cogency, strength*. Dr. Campbell, in having special reference to the emotions, calls it *vivacity*. We may use the term *force*. In material things it has its illustration in what are called The Forces of Nature, Physical and Mechanical Force. In the higher sphere, we speak of the Mental and Moral Powers, Force of Will or of Character.

Its *necessity* in Discourse is manifest. "A style which is appropriate," says Aristotle, "invests the subject with persuasive efficacy." Discourse is often defined in terms by this one quality—as the Art of Effective Expression. Discourse which is clear is, to that extent, excellent. It may, however, be com-

paratively powerless over others. It is intelligible, and that only,—good as far as it goes. It is grammatical, logical, possibly elegant—everything but *effective*, and by reason of this absence of power it scarcely rises to the true dignity of Discourse. It is thus that the essay as distinct from the oration has often been the object of a just criticism. Clear as crystal, it has been as cold and lifeless. Much of the best literary talent of every age is thus made useless. The words of the author have no impetus or inspiration. They lack heart and soul and personal potency, and their influence is thus transient and limited. Such writers seem to act upon the supposition that the truth *in itself* is mighty and will prevail; that its simple utterance, however feeble, if only clear, will produce the desired result. It is forgotten, however, that although the truth has an inherent life and force, it is not able to exercise its full influence over the minds of men. Were the mind free from passion and prejudice; from indifference and hostility to the truth; the theory would be all-sufficient. The truth would then be welcomed as soon as seen or heard, and be allowed to have its full and happiest exercise in the heart and life. This is most suggestively illustrated in the sphere of divine truth. Inspired as it is, it is always attended by the Spirit of Power to give it efficacy. It is only through his divine agency that it becomes “quick and powerful,” the very “power of God unto salvation.” Precisely so is it in the human sphere and in the province of Discourse. As men are, the truth needs a *helper* and this is found in the special method of its presentation as *forceful*.

“We mistake men’s diseases,” says Baxter, “when



we think there needeth nothing to cure them of their errors but the evidence of truth. Alas! there are many distempers of mind to be removed before they receive that evidence." If prejudice is to give way to candor; if perverted judgments are to be rectified; if passion is to be calmed; if indifference is to be removed, and hostility to be conciliated; then, something more is needed than a clear and chaste and facile diction. The truth must be seconded by the special and cogent agency of him who presents it. There is need here of what the Greeks called *ἐνέργεια*, the working quality—the active exercise of power. It is the *action* of which Demosthenes spoke, applied not only to the external manner of the speaker but to the mind of the writer in the hour of composing. Though absolutely essential to the orator, this quality of force has a far more prominent place and function in written expression than is generally conceded.

#### DEFINITION OF FORCE.

Bain speaks of it as that quality "which gives us the experience or elation of power."

Suffice it to say, it is that quality by which the thought already made clear to the understanding is *impressed* upon the heart and conscience and will.

The relation of these two qualities to each other is full of interest.

(a.) In Clearness, *instruction* is the end; in Force, *impression*.

(b.) In Clearness, the *subjective* element is prominent—truth for its own sake.

In Force, the *objective*—truth for the sake of the mind addressed.

(c.) In Clearness, the effect is *remote*.

In Force, *immediate*.

(d.) In Clearness, the *intellect* is prominent.

In Force, the *emotions* and *will*.

(e.) Clearness is *literary* in character.

Force is *oratorical*.

Clearness without Force is comparatively useless.

Force without Clearness exposes to ridicule.

Herein is seen their essential unity. The one needs the other as its complement.

Dr. Witherspoon in his "Lectures on Eloquence," referring to Baxter's Definition of Style, expresses the relation of these qualities—

"May I Discourse plainly, pertinently and somewhat nervously, I have my purpose."

Clearness and Force must co-exist and interact in the production of the best results.

#### AGENCIES.

In common with the first quality, some of the agencies already noticed apply to Force.

(A.) *The special Purpose to be forcible.*

(B.) *Criticism as to its Presence or Absence.*

(C.) *Familiarity with Authors notable for this Excellence.*

The authors here would be somewhat different from those adduced as clear. Reference might be made to Bacon, Johnson, Milton, Addison, De Quincey.

The Puritan authors in the time of Cromwell are a signal illustration. In the sphere of oratory, examples are most abundant.

(D.) *Knowledge of Men and the World.* Force might be termed the masculine or manly type of expression, by way of distinction. It is rugged and bold and aggressive. Its very character implies contact with the external world. The recluse cannot possibly wield so rigorous a pen as he who mingles with men and is acquainted with their life. Oral Discourse is

an especially forcible form, largely because it has this element in it. It is of and to and for the people. Written Discourse in order to be effective must be, in a sense, *oratorical*. Its source and aim must lie outside of itself. The monastic may instruct his age. He will not awaken and vivify it. He may rebuke it. He will never reform it.

(E.) *Cogency of Thought*. Force in expression is the result of mental force. When a man thinks with all his "heart and soul and mind and strength" he will discourse with corresponding power.

An inferior mind or an able mind addicted to loose mental habits cannot be forceful in its utterances.

Here, again, the vital relation of idea and word is visible, and Discourse in its distinctively mental aspect is once more prominent.

(F.) *Care as to the Diction*. There is such a thing as a forcible diction as distinct from one that is clear only. As to the different kinds of words that are to be chosen, reference may be made to the discussion of Media. Special mention might be made of Cogent, Standard and Weighty Words and to Native Words as applicable alike to Clearness and Force. It is to be noted that many of the Figures are full of boldness and force. They are by some authors, such as Day and De Mille, discussed under the head of Energy.

The exclamation of the Scriptures, "How forcible are right words!" is one that finds abundant illustration in the daily habit of the best writers. With such words, therefore, this second quality of Discourse must abound.

(G.) *Care as to Sentences*. As far as the kinds of sentence are concerned, the Periodic and the Balanced

belong alike to this and the preceding quality. What has been defined as the Period, as distinct from the ordinary periodic form, is here of special value. It is in its very nature and form significant, and as such well adapted to oral force. The Long Sentence and the Paragraph are here in place.

As to the Law of Structure, the one mainly applicable is, the Law of Emphasis—the leading ideas in the leading places. This has not only the advantage of securing the fullest force of such ideas, but enables the Discourser to place the secondary ideas in such position as to conceal their weakness and make them contribute to the general effect. To know the emphatic points of a sentence and make them so appear in written and oral discourse is of essential value.

As to Structure, the Law of Variety is, also, essential to force. Each one of the different forms of sentence is to be discreetly used and often used when there is no other reason for the change than the change itself. There is to be a studied diversity. This imparts life to Discourse and makes it effective in the sense that a living thing is effective. Most of the impotence of Discourse arises from its sameness,—sameness of theme, of method, and of discussion, and this begins with the sentence. This principle is not at all inconsistent with the prominence of some particular type of sentence—the periodic or the balanced. It simply precludes monotony and allows the varying thought to embody itself in a varying form. In Macaulay, the periodic sentence prevails. This, however, is wisely supplemented by the free use of balanced and correct loose sentences. It makes the

writing readable. If the expression is the man, then its forms must vary as personal character varies.

In addition to these agencies more or less applicable to Clearness, may be noted others as applying especially to Force.

(A.) *The observance of the Law of Relation or Connection of Thought.* This takes for granted that in every process and form of Discourse there is some *natural* line of thought which the discourser is supposed to follow. It is what Coleridge has termed The Law of "Sequence." One idea follows another in regular, logical order, and this gradation is everywhere visible. In Narration, the order would be *historical*—that of time; in Description, local or *topical*—that of place; in Comparison and Contrast, that of resemblance or difference, and so in Specification.

As far as the Forms of Discourse are concerned, yet to be studied, the same principle holds.

Force is thus secured in that there is nothing in the structure to *break* or *weaken* its fullest influence. Each element is a help to others. A kind of climax, alike logical and oratorical, is secured. It is cogent because it is *consecutive*. So natural and so practical is this principle that the reader or hearer, after receiving from the discourser the statement of his theme and certain suggestions concerning it, expects that he will follow a certain line of thought, and is disappointed unless it is observed. The discourser himself has awakened these expectations and is bound to satisfy them.

According to Bascom, the three things by which Force is secured are, "Thoughtfulness, Rapidity and

Directness." The principle now before us practically includes the first and last of these. The second one has place in what we shall next discuss. This Law of Sequence has close relation to the agency of Definiteness as viewed under Clearness. It materially differs from it, however, in having to do with the discussion of a subject rather than with its preparation or outline.

(B.) *The Cultivation and Expression of Emotion.* The definition given by Dr. Shedd of Eloquence—"Thought with an impulse in it," is applicable to written discourse. Genuine feeling, wherever exhibited, is, in its very nature, forcible. "Vehemence," says Æschines, "tends to force." He refers to emotion. It carries us along with it. Emotion is *motion*,—the expression of inner activity. As Clearness has special reference to the mental faculties, Force has reference to the feelings.

The relation of this quality to *personal character* is, thus, an important one. He who is impassioned in his nature will be energetic in his utterances. He may not be as clear as others, or as ornate, but he will always be more or less cogent. As he discourses in a glow, impressiveness will follow.

A—At times this feeling may be subdued, taking the form of a deep and tender pathos. It is not, thereby, any the less real or effective. It so pervades the entire man that all he expresses is energized and fired by it. This type of emotive energy is illustrated in many of Shakspeare's female characters and by Dickens in Little Nell and Little Dorrit and in the prose of Lamb and Irving.

B—At times, this emotion is demonstrative, bold and rapid in its expression. There is a drift and rush about it. This form of force may be seen in authors and orators venting a holy indignation against some flagrant wrong. The history of reform is full of it. The pas-

sions of the populace must be met by corresponding passion. The great questions of life must be discussed and presented with impassioned ardor.

Many of the male characters in the drama and in fiction are of this order, and we see its type in the prose of Baxter, Milton and Webster. The best oral prose, most especially, is passionate and thus potent. These two forms of emotional expression when properly combined produce effects that are irresistible. It need scarcely be stated that feeling should always be under the control of the mental nature. The discourser must always be its master. "Energy," says one, "is the pressure of disciplined impulses."

Force, in any sphere, if not under control, is a dangerous agent.

(c.) *Full Knowledge of the Subject.* This in itself begets a consciousness of power. The discourser feels that he is able to do what he proposes to do, and it enables him to do it with effectiveness. The influence upon the mind addressed is equally marked. The presence of mastery always attracts and controls. The people acknowledge it and open their natures to its influence. Other things being equal, those who are masters of their subjects become master of their readers and auditors. All the power that comes from profound conviction is evident here. There is not merely largeness of knowledge but depth of impression. The mind possesses the truth and is possessed by it, and thereby obtains the possession of others. The question so often asked by the orator—How Self-possession is to be obtained?—is a question whose answer is here manifest. Constitutional timidity aside, the best way to become *self*-possessed is to be *subject*-possessed. Such a mind will be so absorbed with the theme and the truth as to be quite unaffected by its surroundings.

The object is to do full justice to the thought. This makes all else secondary.

In this subject, to the writer and orator alike,

"knowledge is power." Knowledge of the subject is power over self and over others.

(D.) *The Development of one's Personality.* No man can discourse forcibly who does not think and act for himself. His opinions and his character must be his own. What is called a writer's style is based on this. It is simply the particular way in which he expresses his own ideas and himself. A man's utterances are simply the audible and visible form of his individual thought and life. Personality in Discourse is always potent.

### (3.) Beauty (Sublimity).

It is not our purpose here, to discuss the Science of Æsthetics, but simply to study the beautiful in so far as it enters into Discourse as a quality.

#### ITS TRUE PLACE.

We are, first of all, to guard ourselves against its undue *separation* from the other qualities already mentioned. As remarked, they are rather a unit in a three-fold manifestation. The relation of Beauty to Clearness is especially close. The beautiful and the obscure exclude each other. In proportion as men are educated, and their judgments are enlightened, these qualities appear in their unity rather than in their diversity.

It is a significant fact, however, that each of these three main qualities has in turn been magnified into the *first* and exclusive place. As to Clearness, this is the correct view. Not so, however, as to Force, and still less so as to Beauty. The student



is to be cautioned against the error of regarding Discourse as synonymous with the beautiful. Such authors as Blair have done much to establish and propagate this error. They would have us learn the art, as Dr. Hope expresses it, of "coquetting" with beauty. It cannot be too strongly stated that, though this is one of the three qualities of Discourse, it is the least important of the three—the one that might the most easily be dispensed with. Even were it of equal importance with the others, it could not be made to embrace the entire province of the art.

#### THE NATURE OF BEAUTY.

Beauty in Discourse is both *inherent* and *relative*. It exists alike in the subject-matter and the form, and its existence in the latter is modified by its existence in the former. As Cousin pertinently phrases it, "Form is not form only; it is the form of something; it unfolds something inward." And again, "Beauty is not mere expression, it is the expression of ideas." "It is," says Shedd, "an essential part of the Discourse itself."

This view of the nature of beauty results from the important truth which we are pressing throughout—the vital relation of thought to expression and the dominance of the mental element in Discourse. Even beauty, the least important of the qualities, and the one in which the form would seem to be especially prominent, is no exception to the principle that mind determines everything in Discourse. Even if Beauty be erroneously viewed as consisting in mere external ornament, it is known that the

brilliancy of the polish which any material body may be made to assume depends upon the intrinsic excellence of the substance. A poor quality of metal will defy the most laborious attempt to make its surface attractive to the eye. Hence, if asked, How beautiful a Discourse is to be made, the philosophic answer is—as beautiful as the *subject-matter* will allow. As soon as the student discovers that the essential idea and the form which it takes are not disconnected, but vitally united—that the one, in fact, determines the other,—then all danger of giving to the form undue prominence is removed and Beauty as an element does “its perfect work.”

Attention should be here called to a further theory of Beauty. On this theory it is regarded as a *natural resultant* of the presence of other qualities, not a separate quality at all.

It would thus be argued that if Clearness and Force were present, Beauty would follow as a necessary effect.

There is a sense in which this theory is true and not inconsistent with the views already expressed.

We are now discussing it, however, as a distinct quality.

#### HISTORICAL THEORIES OF BEAUTY.

- (a.) It consists in perfection.—*Leibnitz*.
- (b.) Beauty and Utility are one.—*Socrates*.
- (c.) Beauty is mental or spiritual.—*Plato*.
- (d.) It consists in design or order.—*Augustine*.
- (e.) It consists in relations.—*Diderot*.
- (f.) Beauty lies in expression.—*Goethe*.
- (g.) It lies in character and expression.—*Hegel*.
- (h.) It consists in uniformity and variety.—*Hutcheson*.
- (i.) Harmony between the revealed idea and the revealing matter  
—*Day*.

Such are but a small part of the theories given by those who from the earliest times have argued upon this subject. It reveals the interest which the subject has ever awakened among thinking men, the difficulty of grasping and developing it, and discloses something of that variety of opinion which the student of *Æsthetics* must meet and examine.

#### DEFINITION.

As far as any precise definition of it is concerned, we shall find that, being a simple idea, and thus quite incapable of analysis, its meaning can be but approximately stated. It may be negatively defined by the statement of what it is not, it may be studied through those objects which, as far as we can judge, seem to manifest its presence, or what we term the sense or sentiment of the beautiful within us may be analyzed. Natural Beauty, as seen in a landscape, or Moral Beauty, as seen in character, or these combined, as seen in the human countenance, may thus be studied in connection with the feelings which are awakened, as giving us a partial definition.

More specifically still, this quality may best be defined in terms of what is called Taste—That faculty and sensibility through which we come to the knowledge and appreciation of the beautiful, what Coleridge well calls, “the intermediate faculty between mind and sense.” It is both a faculty and a sensibility. It combines knowledge and feeling.

#### Theories of Taste.

(a.) Some make it a distinct and prominent faculty as Reason is. Thus, Hutcheson.

(b.) Some make it a distinct and yet inferior faculty. Thus, Akenside, who subordinates it to the imagination.

(c.) Some regard it as a mere sensibility, as Hume.

(d.) Others, as Cousin, find in it the union of all faculties and feelings.

(e.) Burke's language is as follows—“That faculty

or those faculties of the mind which are affected with or form a judgment of the works of imagination and the elegant arts." Ruskin magnifies the element of sensibility in Taste.

These various views, we will notice, differ mainly in the prominence given to Taste as a Faculty or as a Feeling respectively, and the relations of these to each other.

In the light of these statements, Beauty may be defined in general as that quality whose presence is discovered and appreciated by the Taste.

More directly, as applied to Discourse, it is that quality by which the truth, already made *clear* and *impressed* upon the heart and conscience and will, is made *attractive* to the taste.

#### CONDITIONS OF ITS EXPRESSION.

(A.) *Sincerity*. An ingenuous, guileless mind is here presupposed, expressing itself in free and full and artless forms. It invites a profound love of the truth in its purity and simplicity, and an aversion to anything that has the appearance of deceit, perversion or falsity. Sincerity in character and expression is not only, thus, a condition of beauty, but is itself beautiful. It has all the attractiveness of that which is natural and unaffected—

“Beauty when unadorned, is adorned the most.”

(B.) *Propriety or Fitness*. This is what the older writers mean by Grace—a perfect adaptation of one thing to another. This is secured, in part, by the condition already mentioned. Sincerity is always

more or less appropriate. This propriety may be manifested in various forms.

*A—In the Theme.* This in itself must be pleasing. The general principle here involved is, that the Theme must be in keeping with the character and object of the Discourse.

*B—In the Discussion.* All the means adopted here must be in deference to good taste. Unity and symmetry must be manifest as in a work of art. This involves propriety of plan or outline on which the discussion is based.

*C—In the Object of the Discourse.* This is not so much to instruct or to impress as to attract. The aim must, thus, be a pure and worthy one, fully in keeping with the theme and discussion, and lending to them additional grace.

*D—In the Diction employed.* Propriety is one of the ruling principles in diction—"the right word in the right place." "A word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in pictures of silver." As to kinds of words, special reference may be made to those discussed as Concise, Figurative and Euphonic, it being remembered that Native words belong alike to all the qualities. "Beauty of words," says Aristotle, "consists in the meaning conveyed, in the image they present, and in the sound." These correspond precisely to the classes specified.

*E—In the Sentences used.* As to kinds of sentence, the Short and the Balanced. As to Laws of Structure, those of Simplicity and Agreeableness. Beauty of Structure has special place in the sentence.

The law that the idea determines the position of clauses, applies to all the qualities. Beauty results from the vital union of thought and expression.

*F—In Adaptation to Time and Place.* "Beauty has a variable as well as a permanent element." It varies with circumstance and the discourses must be governed by this principle. What would be beautiful under one class of conditions would not be so, necessarily, in another. As Motion is one of the essentials of natural beauty, so Variety is essential to this quality in Discourse.

#### AGENCIES.

(A.) *By the Cultivation of Taste.* This may be effected by the close observation of nature and art. These open so wide a province to every intelligent mind, and their forms, especially those of nature, are

so simple and varied, that it would seem to lie within the power of each one to make large progress in the cultivation of Taste. If the mind and soul are ever kept open to these impressions from without, the results cannot but be marked. It is true that different persons differ widely at this point. Some are keenly sensitive and alive to all that is attractive, others are made of "sterner stuff" and study the practical only. Still, the taste of the most indifferent may be purified by the agency now before us.

A—It may further be stated, that Taste may be cultured by a careful study of the Laws or Principles of Beauty as deduced by masters of the art from a close observation of beauty as illustrated in these two spheres.

B—Still further, by the Study of Beauty in Literature—by an acquaintance with those authors specially notable for this quality,—Goldsmith, Irving, Hawthorne.

Familiarity with the best English and American Poetry is here essential.

(B.) *By the Cultivation of a pure, moral Character.* The *καλος* and *αγαθος* of the Greeks are most suggestive as connecting natural and moral beauty. The "True, Beautiful and Good" of the ancient schools is, also, full of interest in this particular.

"Beauty is Truth," says Keats, "and Truth is Beauty." "Moral sensibility," says Ruskin, "is essential to its appreciation."

Plato, among the Greeks, and Cousin, in France, are full of this high conception. In Scripture we read of the "beauty of the Lord," the "beauty of Holiness," and Zion is called "the perfection of beauty."

Other things being equal, he will make the best progress in the sphere of the beautiful who comes to its study with a pure mind and for the highest

moral ends. Beauty of character is the extreme of beauty.

It is in place here to state that this quality is not to be sought so *directly* in Discourse as the other qualities. It is far more delicate in its nature, more spontaneous and free, and cannot be so easily confined to prescribed limits or reduced to rule. It is understood and, at times, instinctive or intuitive. It is often seen and felt and loved when it cannot be explained, and the more unconscious one is of having secured it, the more is its possession enjoyed. The principles and methods already discussed have, thus, rather a general than minute application. As to the agencies of criticism and knowledge of men, mentioned under Clearness and Force, suffice it to say that these have their proper functions here to preserve us from offending in our expression the tastes of others.

As to the relation of expression to thought under this quality, this is substantially presented in showing the importance of moral character in the cultivation of Taste.

Purity and Grace of expression are the natural result of purity of mind and thinking.

### (Sublimity.)

As this is a quality belonging more especially to Poetry than to Prose, sustaining the same relation to the one which Clearness does to the other, it demands, at present, but a partial discussion.

#### *Definition.*

The remark made by Ruskin—"Anything is sublime which elevates the mind,"—gives us the essential element of this quality. It is Elevation. This is precisely what the word means in its original Latin usage (*sub-levo*).

This same idea is very suggestively brought out in the Greek of Longinus. The title of his celebrated treatise is *περι υψους*—concerning height or elevation.

The five sources which he gives of sublimity impress this idea.

Elevation of Spirit.	
“	“ Expression,
Dignity	“ Diction,
“	“ Figure,
Pathos.	

In this series, elevation or dignity is the governing word, and expressed in the shortest form it would read—

Elevation of Thought,
Feeling,
Expression.

In consonance with Ruskin and Longinus, the French critic Boileau writes—“The sublime is a certain force in Discourse which *elevates* the soul, either from grandeur of thought or from magnificence of words.”

For all practical purposes, sublimity may be defined as that quality by which the thought already made clear and impressive and attractive is also made elevating and ennobling. It uplifts the soul to higher levels of thought and feeling.

#### RELATION TO BEAUTY.

The open question as to the precise relation of these two qualities is one that belongs to the Science of *Æsthetics*.

It is sufficient here to indicate any general points of resemblance or difference.



It is important to state, at the outset, that it is wiser for the discourser to view them as essentially one and the same quality in a two-fold expression than to seek to emphasize their differences. It is thus that Ruskin vitally connects them by the statement, "the highest Beauty is sublime."

*Resemblances.*

- (a.) Each is a simple idea—incapable of full analysis.
- (b.) The final end of each is pleasure.
- (c.) Each finds its highest form in the moral sphere—character and action.
- (d.) In each, Simplicity is an essential element.
- (e.) Each is alike inherent and relative, in the subject-matter and in the form of expression.
- (f.) The conditions and agencies of each are substantially the same.

*Differences.*

(a.) The emotion derived from sublimity is peculiar in character—bold and grand and exalting rather than gentle and soothing.

(b.) Sublimity is less frequent and less diversified in its manifestation than Beauty, and the feeling awakened is less permanent.

(c.) Sublimity produces, at times, the emotion of awe. The mind is overpowered. Hamilton expresses this view in the words—"A thing is beautiful when it occupies both the understanding and the imagination in a full activity; sublime, when these fail to measure it."

Burke carries this theory to an injurious extreme in holding that the element of fear or terror is *always* involved in the sublime. Human experience contradicts it. Approximately true, as far as natural sublimity is concerned, it is by no means so in the spheres of character and Discourse.

(d.) Closely connected with the difference here stated is this. In sublimity, the idea is often too spacious and essentially grand for the language fully to embody and express it. However majestic the language may be, it has its limits in this direction, and there are times when it is quite incapable of putting the thought into form. Vital as is the relations of words to ideas, they will ever be inferior both as to number and essential character.

This is the very view of Sublimity which Kant had as he defined it—"The attempt to express the infinite in the finite."

(e.) As Beauty is more closely related to Clearness, Sublimity is to Force. The word indicates and includes this element of vigor, cogency, strength.

Longinus speaks of it as "invincible." Power and Vastness are essentials to the sublime.

(f.) It is scarcely too much to say that Beauty is human in its origin and forms of expression, and Sublimity takes on something of the unearthly and divine. There is in it nothing of the sensuous. Its very nature is supernatural.

#### CONDITIONS.

(A.) *Sublimity of Theme*, as in Epic Poetry or the Christian Scriptures.

(B.) *Sublimity of Discussion*. This, in order to be in keeping with the Theme, must be conducted on a broad and comprehensive plan. The philosophic method must here be the ruling one,—the presentation of great principles, of ideas germinal and shaping. It is thus that something even of obscurity finds place in the sublime. All is not disclosed. There is a dignified reserve of expression,—a glimpse of that which exists rather than a full disclosure.

"The infallible mark of the sublime," says Longinus, "is, that a Discourse has left us much to think of." It is stimulating and suggestive rather than exhaustive.

There is no call here for verbal display or minute detail or contracted plan. Everything must be spacious and lofty. The discourser himself must in a sense be sublime, of large mental and moral mould, able to conceive and to express that which is majestic.

Longinus blames Cecilius for having written on the sublime in a common manner.

(c.) *Sublimity of Aim.* This involves the elevation of mind and the ennobling of character—the worthiest possible object which the writer can have before him. So vitally related are all the parts of Discourse to each other, and so potent is the influence of our purpose in Discourse upon the entire conduct of it, that sublimity of aim becomes an essential.

As to the conditions thus far stated, the superiority of the *sacred* discourser is manifest. With the sublimest themes already at hand in the Word of God, with the sublimest aim ever before him,—the moral elevation of men,—and with the spacious province of spiritual truth in which to furnish himself for discussion, what limit can be placed to the possibilities thus opened? Given the aid of the Divine Spirit, and an inherent grandeur of soul in the man himself, the result should be little less than miraculous.

(d.) *Sublimity of Diction.* As already seen, Longinus lays special emphasis on this principle. Though language, as suggested, can never rise to the full sublimity of the highest thought, there can be an ever closer approximation thereto. Illustrations of this are abundant in the Bible—in the words of prophets and apostles, and, above all, in those of our Lord. The diction of the miracles is essentially sublime. So, also, in the highest examples of secular Discourse.

As to special kinds of words, those mentioned under Force are here in place.

(e.) *Sublimity of Sentence.* This is what Longinus means by *elevation of expression*--the particular form in which the idea is conveyed.

The Kinds and Laws of Sentence mentioned under Force are here applicable. Special reference may be

made to the Period or Climax and to the bolder kinds of Figure.

Sublimity is often found in the shortest sentences:

“Let there be Light!”

“Peace! be still!”

“I say unto thee, Arise!”

(F.) *Sublimity of Fitness.* By this is meant—adaptation to time and place and general circumstance. In proportion to the dignity of this quality, is this principle important. Just here lies the middle line between the sublime and the ludicrous. This quality “takes advantage of circumstances,” and may be worse than nullified by indiscretion. All other conditions may be met, and yet the failure to observe this vital one may be fatal.

Sublimity out of place and time degenerates into the veriest bombast.

#### AGENCIES.

(A.) *Familiarity with Authors notable for this Quality.* At this point, poetry must take the precedence of prose. In Homer and the Greek Tragedians, in Dante and Shakspeare and Milton, we find this quality most conspicuous. As far as prose is concerned, the Bible aside, the authors mentioned under Force are here in place. Examples of it are not infrequent in Hooker; in the Divines of the Commonwealth and Restoration; and, most especially, in the oratorical prose of the time of George III.

(B.) *The Cultivation of Taste* in the two-fold method already indicated—the study of nature and art in reference to this quality, and the study of the laws and principles of the sublime as thence deduced.

(c.) *The Cultivation of moral Character.* It requires that one keep himself in contact with all the higher forms of thought and life.

In Beauty, the injunction to be heeded is "Keep thyself pure." Here, the behest is—"Set your affections on things above."

Of all the sources of Sublimity given by the Greek critic, Elevation of Spirit is the first. Its very nature implies reverence of soul, gravity of manner—a kind of Mosaic or Miltonic habit of thought and type of character. Bad men cannot appreciate or illustrate it.

Moral sublimity is the highest form of it. The idea of God is the sublimest idea. God himself is the most sublime personality in the universe.

Further agencies mentioned under Beauty apply in similar manner to this quality also.

In addition to the three main qualities of Discourse already examined, and the study of sublimity as related to the last of them, there remains one indirect and subordinate quality which deserves a brief attention.

### Wit and Humor.

Usage has sanctioned these two terms in this connection, on the ground of common characteristics somewhat as it has sanctioned the combination of Beauty and Sublimity.

The quality thus indicated may be termed an inferior one not only because in nature and object it falls below the level of the others, but, as matter of fact, cannot be said to be found to any marked degree in most of our ablest English authors—Bacon, Milton and others.

As to their origin, Aristotle calls them "peculiar gifts of nature, requiring no aid from instruction." "True wit," says Pope, "is nature to advantage dressed."

For purposes of clearness it will be wise to view them separately and in their relations.

### *Definition of Wit.*

(a.) The word is pure Anglo-Saxon, derived from the verb *witan*—*to know*, forms of which we have in the early English, as *wot* and *wist*, and in the expression *to wit*, the contraction of the Saxon phrase *I do you to wit*—*I cause you to know*.

In Anglo-Saxon, the *Wita*, was the wise man; the *Witenagemot* was the meeting of the wise men (the Parliament), and the *Witness* was the man who had knowledge to impart.

The first idea involved, therefore, is that of *knowledge* or *wisdom*.

(b.) It was also used to signify some *one mental faculty*, as the imagination, the understanding, or the *various faculties* in combination.

The *Wits* of a man, as the old writers would have expressed it—his *intellectuals*, were his *faculties*. In the time of Bunyan, the five senses were thus called the five wits—the inlets of knowledge from the external world.

(c.) Still again, it is used to indicate *native* in distinction from *acquired* knowledge—the *genius* or *instinct* of a man. Hence the phrase *mother wit*—that intuitive sagacity or common sense which often surpasses the profoundest wisdom of the schools.

(d.) Then follows its present use, to indicate a spe-

cies of *pleasantry* or *amusement*—knowledge turned to this special end.

To this last meaning the others have largely given place, the explanation being that human nature tends much more to the lighter, mirthful side of life than to the serious and reflective. It is noticeable, however, that, in all these specific senses of the word, the idea of *knowledge* is the prominent one, this knowledge being used, in different cases, for different ends.

In seeking a more precise definition for the purposes before us, we note in wit such elements as *surprise*, *incongruity*, and *verbal perversion*, expressed generally in *brief* and *pointed* form, for purposes of *pleasure*. When Locke speaks of Wit as “chiefly concerned in tracing resemblances,” he would imply that these resemblances thus traced are more or less unexpected and often brought to light by a peculiar use of language combining these various ideas.

Wit may be defined as—That subordinate quality of Discourse whose *object* is amusement, whose *elements* are surprise, incongruity, and perversion, and the *form* of whose expression is brief and antithetical. Shakspeare in telling us that “brevity is the soul of wit,” does not mean that this is its most essential characteristic, but simply that it is generally expressed in short, pithy form. The real soul of wit is, Verbal Perversion—a wresting of words from their rightful meanings—it is Punning.

It is thus more in keeping with an inferior order of minds, both indicating and begetting a type of mental habit in no sense to be coveted. It is ever on the search for exceptional and double meanings. It never accepts the language as it reads, but forces an

interpretation of its own. It respects no restrictions, however hallowed. It is bent upon its end and will adopt any means thereto. Mere wit is positively immoral in its tendencies. It flourishes at the expense of the truth. "The character of a mere Wit," says Sydney Smith, "it is impossible to consider as very safe."

Voltaire and Swift were the Wits of their respective epochs and countries. They never were above the low level of the punster and clown. Even Shakspeare failed when he essayed to play this role. He was too great in mental structure and method and purpose to excel on such a plane.

Viewed on its better side, Wit is not to be altogether discarded. The nearer it approaches to Humor, the less objectionable is it, and finds a place and function in the sphere of social life and manner. "When it is in the hands of a man who can use it and despise it, who loves honor and morality better than wit," then, according to Sydney Smith, it is desirable.

### *Definition of Humor.*

The history of this word is full of interest. It runs back to the old and prevalent theory, that there were in the body four natural *humors*, or *moistures*, and that physical health depended upon the proper adjustment of these four—choler, blood, phlegm and melancholy. Jonson's plays—"Every man out of his Humor" and "Every man in his Humor"—illustrate this old view.

The word, thus, indicated, first of all, the close connection of mind and body, that the state of the one determined that of the other. The humorous man was



simply the man in a certain cast of mind or disposition, good or bad, and the word has come to be used mainly in the sense of good humor or pleasantry, for the same reason that the word *wit* is restricted in use, namely,—the tendency in human nature to turn away from the darker to the brighter side.

More especially, it is defined by Worcester as “kindly pleasantry.” Carlyle says—“It is the product of a warm, tender, fellow-feeling with all forms of existence.” “The best humor,” says Thackeray, “is that which contains most humanity.” In his work on English Humorists, he gives copious illustration of the truth of this remark.

For our present purpose it may thus be defined—That subordinate quality of Discourse whose object is pleasure, and whose elements are surprise, sensibility, and kindliness of feeling.

Notable examples in prose are Addison, Lamb, Sydney Smith, Thackeray, Dickens, Irving.

The element of kindliness deserves special emphasis.

(a.) At times, the humorist, as Falstaff, indulges in pleasantry at his own expense.

(b.) At times, the humor makes those to whom it is directed the subjects of positive compliment.

(c.) It is, moreover, often employed with reference to those things respecting which the object of it is not unduly sensitive or, if so, the very rebuke is genially dispensed. In a word, genuine humor, either in Discourse or social life, never runs to the extreme of cold ridicule, never grows merry over the representation of vice or suffering. It is too exalted in its aim to be uncharitable. Cicero was right, as he termed it

—"That species (of Discourse) in which there are no stings of sarcasm."

As to the element of sensibility, this is often seen in the form of the most affecting pathos in which, at times, sadness itself enters. It is suggestive, indeed, that many of our best humorists have exemplified this close relation of laughter to tears. Thomas Hood is a signal example of it. De Quincey and Goldsmith, also. The most notable example, however, is that of Charles Lamb. His life and writings, alike, are full of a sad and tender and sympathetic pleasantry, and this even as he stood on the border land between saneness and madness.

Wit and Humor, as to their differences, may best be viewed in the light of a series of contrasted statements.

#### DIFFERENCES.

Wit is transient;	Humor is permanent.
Wit is local;	Humor is pervasive.
Wit is studied;	Humor is spontaneous.
Wit is verbal;	Humor is thoughtful.
Wit surprises;	Humor pleases.
Wit is bold;	Humor is gentle.
Wit is indifferent;	Humor is kindly.

To these may be added the remark of Whipple—"Wit laughs *at* things; Humor, *with* them," and that of Massey—"Wit deals with characteristics only; Humor, with characters." Combined in their highest forms this two-fold quality may be said to serve in Discourse various useful ends—to awaken attention, afford mental relief, disarm prejudice, simplify the complex, and cast a general pleasantry over all. In Burlesque or Comic Discourse, this quality has a primary place and office.

*Remarks on Qualities.*

(a.) However diverse these various qualities may be, they form an essential unity and are so to be studied by the writers.

(b.) The study of them, as defined and discussed, will serve to correct existing errors as to the relation of thought to language, subject-matter to form, and prevent further error.

(c.) In these qualities it has been seen, that the mental element predominates. Their theory and application are based on the knowledge of mental laws. Style, itself, so called, is the style of the man—his mind and character. It is more—it is the man himself—not imitative but original and personal.

**Synonymous Terms.****1. *Discourse as Clear.***

Plain,  
Simple,  
Pure,  
Suggestive,  
Logical,  
Narrative,  
Didactic.

**2. *As forcible.***

Nervous,  
Animated,  
Impassioned,  
Persuasive,  
Oratorical,  
Vivid or Descriptive,  
Dramatic.

**3. *As Beautiful.***

Chaste,  
Figurative,  
Poetic,  
Finished,  
Elaborate,  
Brilliant,  
Natural.

4. *As Sublime.*

Majestic,  
Grand,  
Elevated,  
Dignified,  
Imposing.

5. *As Witty and Humorous.*

Epigrammatic,  
Ludicrous,  
Satirical,  
Quaint,  
Pointed,  
Burlesque,  
Mock-Heroic or Serio-Comic,  
Sarcastic.

## CHAPTER III.

### FORMS OF DISCOURSE.

#### General Forms.

1. *Written Discourse—Prose and Poetry.*
2. *Oral or Spoken Discourse.*

#### RELATIONS OF PROSE TO POETRY.

They agree in that they are *both written forms* and may become oral. The marks of difference are to be noticed.

(a.) *In Form.* Prose is *unmetrical*, Poetry is *metrical*.

(b.) As to *Faculties* employed. In Prose, it is the *intellect*; in Poetry, the *feelings* and *imagination*.

(c.) As to *Object*. In Prose, it is *instruction* and *impression*; in Poetry, it is *pleasure*.

What is termed Poetical Prose, or Prose Poetry, is transitional between the forms.

It is that prose which has an unusual degree of rhythm in it, or that poetry which has an unusual degree of the instructive or scientific in it.

The subject of Poetry as a distinct form will be presented briefly in its proper place.

#### RELATION OF WRITTEN TO ORAL DISCOURSE.

1. *Their external form is different.* One is written, the other is oral.

2. *The methods by which they are taught are somewhat different.*

3. *They do not necessarily co-exist in the same person.*

These differences aside, the relations between these forms are so vital that they must be studied in their unity. Such a relationship may be easily shown.

Oratory is the art of rendering written discourse effectively by the voice. It presupposes written discourse, is based on it, and its character is determined largely by it.

The explanation of the word *oratorical*, in its relation to written and oral Discourse respectively, will throw increasing light upon this subject. Oratorical Discourse, by which is meant vigorous, impassioned and persuasive Discourse, is transitional between written and oral Discourse. Written Discourse, to the degree in which it is *oratorical*, tends to become *oral* or spoken. Soliloquy is thus explained. The man must express his thought orally and he makes himself the auditor. "Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh." "My heart was hot within me," says the Psalmist, "while I was musing, the fire (of feeling) burned. Then *spoke* I with my tongue."

In so far therefore as written Discourse is prepared for oral delivery, it takes on the oratorical cast, and may the more easily be spoken. The actual preparation for the delivery itself, as to voice and manner, has been given by general consent to the Elocutionist. Even here, however, as already intimated, the results will be all the more satisfactory when the oral expression of the oration takes its standard from the thought

and personality of the writer. Hence, the features of agreement rather than of difference should be prominent. All the principles applicable to the preparation of written Discourse apply, also, to oral Discourse.

“For my own part,” says Quintilian, “I think that we ought to write and speak on the same principles and by the same rules.”

The leading forms of oratorical Discourse will be treated briefly in their appropriate place.

### SPECIFIC FORMS.

#### INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSION.

##### (1.) Analysis of Human Powers as exercised in Discourse.

It is not our purpose here to enter into minute distinctions. Such a work belongs to the Department of Mental Science. We need but the main distinctions accepted by the leading philosophers and of practical utility in the subject before us. The classification given by Sir William Hamilton and as modified by his critics will best answer our purpose, as we remember that all classifications are approximate and not ultimate.

#### GENERAL DIVISION.

(a.) According to some, there are *cognitive* or *intellectual powers* only. Others are subordinate. This view was that of Leibnitz and Descartes and is not valuable for practical use.

(b.) Others have given them as *cognitive* and *motive*. This was the theory of Aristotle and the Schoolmen and is the view which Reid gives us in his “Intellectual and Active Powers.” It is an advance upon the previous order, but not complete.

(c.) A triple division gives us—*cognitive, emotive and volitional*—Intellect, Feelings and Will. This is substantially the theory of Hamilton. It may be said to be the generally accepted division and will be found useful in our discussions. As Bain expresses it, "These are the only three ultimate modes of mind."

## (2.) Classification of Forms.

As to the varied classifications that have been given, we shall find, that however different they may be in number and order, they are, in the main, based on the generally accepted division already given of the Human Powers into Intellect, Feelings and Will, the faculties of Taste and Conscience being more or less involved.

For the sake of variety of view a few of these historical divisions may here be given.

(a.) *Dr. Hope discusses the subject under three forms:*

Argumentative,  
Impassioned,  
Persuasive.

(b.) *Prof. Day adopts the four forms:*

Explanatory,  
Argumentative,  
Pathetic,  
Persuasive.

(c.) *Prof. Bain, combining forms and processes, notices four:*

Narrative,  
Descriptive,  
Expository,  
Persuasive (argumentative).

Profs. De Mille and D. T. Hill adopt a similar division.



(d.) *The order of the French School is:*

Argumentative, (*prouver*).  
 Persuasive, (*persuadere*).  
 Descriptive, (*peindre*).

This is the order specially discussed by Fenelon in his "Dialogues upon Eloquence."

Many authors, such as Blair and Campbell, give no particular order, while the older writers, Aristotle, Quintilian and Cicero, reduce Discourse to the Argumentative or the Persuasive form—persuasion by argument. In this division they are followed by Archbishop Whately. It is thus evident that these classifications are substantially one. In determining the precise order which it is wisest to adopt, it will be best to follow the order given of the analysis of the Human Powers.

*The Forms would then be—*

The Intellectual,  
 Emotional,  
 Persuasive.

For purposes of Clearness they may be discussed as follows:

Intellectual—Expository (Knowledge).  
 Argumentative (Conviction).  
 Emotional—(Feeling).  
 Persuasive—(Action).

### (3.) Relation of Forms.

#### *Differences.*

(a.) The presence of any *one* form does not, as a matter of fact, always *involve* the presence of the *others*. Knowledge may exist apart from conviction, and each of these apart from emotion or action. The cases of Felix and Agrippa before Paul illustrate this. The observation and experience of every-day life confirm this declaration. Men act without knowledge or reason—from pure impulse, as they also fail to act when these are present. "The good that I would,"

says Paul, "I do not, and the evil that I would not, that I do."

(b.) The *faculties* employed, the *methods* adopted, and the *object* in view, are, respectively, different. This will be evident as the different forms are in turn examined.

### *Resemblances.*

(a.) These forms *theoretically* and *rationally* include each other. Instruction ought to lead to conviction and this to feeling and action. In such an exercise as expository preaching or debate we see the natural union and co-working of all the forms. Instruction, Argument, Impression and Motive—all are present. It is suggestive to note here that Aristotle, in discussing persuasion, treats also of the Passions, including the one in the other. The Argumentative and Persuasive Forms are often discussed as one. The relation is thus vital and normal.

(c.) These forms together constitute a *series* in which each part is dependent upon the one preceding, the last form being the summation of the series. In this sense, persuasion is the most important form, because it is final. It comprehends the virtue of what precedes and has a value of its own. It is thus that Aristotle calls Persuasion "the end of Discourse"—the art of instruction, conviction and impression in order to action. This series of Forms has, thus, the unity and interdependence of a series. If the intellect is informed, action is probable; if the judgment is convinced, it is more probable; and if the feelings are aroused and enlisted, still more probable. The order is climacteric.

It follows, therefore, that the marks of resemblance, rather than those of difference, are to be magnified in the study and application of these forms. The wisdom of this course may be shown in noting the strong tendency to their separation and the evils resulting therefrom.

A—*In Common Life* men are classified as intellectual and emotional, as men of thought or men of action, as if the one were necessarily distinct from the other. This separation has given rise to various phases of character familiar to every reader of history. The Sentimentalist is the man whose feelings are divorced from intellect and action. The Fanatic is the one whose feelings and action are divorced from intellect. The Steic may be the intellectual man, but is devoid of feeling and fails to act. Each type is an extreme and a dangerous one.

B—*In Philosophy*. The philosophy of Pantheism is a mere intellectual abstraction—nothing to love or to obey. The various philosophies of ancient and modern times—Stoic, Epicurean, Ideal and Materialistic—illustrate most aptly the principle before us. Here, as everywhere else, Christian philosophy shows its superiority. In this system and this only are things rightly related.

C—*In Morals and Religion*. Here, the tendency to separation is stronger than ever and the evils more serious.

With some, the *intellectual* is the all. They are Rationalists. Everything must be made accordant with reason. They accept as far as they understand and no farther. Even with many who are evangelical, the rational element predominates. They are theological rather than religious. They think more of creed than of character and conduct. They speculate and dogmatize and conceive of God only as the Infinite Intelligence of the universe. They remind us of the character so aptly described by Wordsworth,—

“One to whose smooth rubbed soul can cling  
Nor form nor feeling great or small;  
A reasoning, self-sufficient thing  
An intellectual all-in-all.”

Others, as the old mystics, unduly magnify the *emotional* until their piety becomes more of an impulse or a sentiment than an intelligent conviction. This extreme is so common that we hear from skeptical writers the statement “Religion belongs to the emotions;

Science to the intellect"; a statement, we may say, which, on the one hand, proves too much, and on the other, is disproved by the notable examples of Christian Scientists. It is founded, also, on the erroneous theory that the divisions of our nature are essential and not accidental.

It is not out of place here to affirm that Christianity, properly understood and exemplified, is the only religious system in which there is a perfect adjustment of the different parts and powers of our nature. Here is the very highest exercise of the intellect and reason in the knowledge of God, and the highest exercise of the affections and will in his love and service, and here they meet, unite, and are together expressed. Doctrine, sentiment and life, faith and works, co-exist. If men are commanded to love the Lord their God, it is to love "with all the heart and soul (emotion) and mind (intellect) and strength" (active obedience). Christian zeal is "according to knowledge." The Christian disciple must possess "a wise and an understanding heart."

If it is true, as Hooker phrases it, "that the mixture of those things by speech, which by nature are divided, is the mother of all error," it is also true that the forcible separation of things naturally united is equally fruitful of evil.

Such suggestions as these will confirm the importance of insisting upon the vital relation of thought to feeling and of these to action. It is a principle as true without the province of Discourse as within it, and we shall be free from all error in the matter if it be remembered that these distinctions of the Human Powers and the consequent distinctions of the Forms of Discourse are not original and essential, but purely conventional, adopted for the sake of human convenience. The Intellect is the whole man knowing and reasoning. The emotions are the whole man experiencing and exhibiting feeling; and the Will is the whole man desiring and deciding. The Powers of man are one power, and the Forms of Discourse are one form with variety of manifestation.

## THE INTELLECTUAL FORM.

### Analysis of Cognitive Powers.

The general division of the Human powers having already been given—Cognitive, Emotional and Volitional—it is now in place, by way of preface to the discussion of the Intellectual form, to present a very brief outline of the Cognitive or Intellectual Powers.

As to this outline, much difference of opinion has existed. The scheme presented by Hamilton has, however, fewer objections than the others and is worthy of careful study.

- (a.) Presentative—Sense-Perception,  
Self-consciousness.
- (b.) Conservative—Memory.
- (c.) Reproductive—Suggestion,  
Reminiscence.
- (d.) Representative—Imagination.
- (e.) Elaborative—Faculty of Comparison.
- (f.) Regulative—Reason, Common Sense.

#### (1.) Presentative.

This is the faculty by which new objects are *presented* to the mind. It might be called the *Acquisitive* or *Receptive* faculty, inasmuch as it is the one mind that receives and presents the truth. The knowledge thus derived comes to us in two ways—from the outer world of matter through the Senses (Sense-Perception), and from the inner world of mind and spirit through Consciousness, Self-consciousness. This, therefore, in its two-fold function is, by way of distinction, the *furnishing* faculty. Its office is, to perceive and gather material, to present it from without and within to the recipient mind.

### (2.) Conservative.

By this, is meant, the Memory. Hamilton calls it the Retentive Faculty. The Memory is the mind conserving. Its office is, to hold knowledge in the mind *out of consciousness*. Material presented is thus preserved for use. It lies latent in the mind.

### (3.) Reproductive.

Its function is, to *recall* the knowledge existing in the mind out of consciousness into consciousness. If it come back involuntarily, Hamilton calls it Suggestion; if voluntarily, Remembrance or Recollection. Material presented and preserved is now reproduced with reference to use.

### (4.) Representative.

It is the power of bringing vividly to the mind the knowledge that has been recalled and *holding it up* before the mind as a picture—it re-presents it. The imagination possesses, also, a *formative* and *grouping* power. Working upon materials given, it constructs mental images at will. We speak of it, thus, as a constructive faculty as well as symbolic. In its highest action, as in epic poetry, it may be said to be original or creative. Knowledge presented, preserved and reproduced is now re-presented to the mind's view and new combinations formed. The imagination is historic and philosophic as well as poetic.

### (5.) Elaborative.

It is, emphatically, the *working* faculty. It works upon the materials already at hand. It is a faculty to which the others are preparative—the faculty of

relations and comparisons. It is in this connection that Hamilton treats of the reasoning process.

Reason, in its general sense, is that faculty by which, upon the basis of knowledge already possessed, we rise to truth as yet unknown. The process known as Generalization—by which we rise from individual to general conceptions—is here included.

The Reason is the mind reasoning.

#### (6.) Regulative.

This power deals with native cognitions—first truths. It is the law or *regula* on the basis of which the reasoning powers work. It may, thus, be connected with the preceding faculty.

The scheme thus given is not a perfect one. The criticisms upon it by Dr. McCosh are in point. It is, however, a far-reaching and substantially correct outline and may be profitably kept before us. The separate faculties which it exhibits may be reduced to four, Perception, Memory, Imagination and Reason.

With these the Discourser has to do.

#### EXPOSITORY OR DIDACTIC FORM.

This is that form in which the understanding as such is specially employed and addressed. Its object is to inform, instruct, explain—to lead to the acceptance of new views or to modify such as are already held.

The general method of effecting its ends is, by the simple presentation of the subject to the mind. This, however, may not be sufficient. More definite methods may be needed.

### Specific Methods.

(A.) *By a substantial and judicious restatement or repetition of the idea.* It is at times found to be true in oral Discourse that even a *verbal* repetition is demanded for the sake of clearness and emphasis. Hence, the phrase "I repeat," as used by energetic orators. The repetition, however, to which we here refer is substantial rather than verbal, that of the essential idea from another point of view and in different language. Very much of Discourse in general, or of any separate Discourse in particular, consists of just such a presentation of thought in different forms. Even those specimens of Discourse that are regarded as standard may ultimately be reduced to a very small amount of original material. The view advocated by Ruskin and others, that there is no such thing as originality, is not tenable. It is true, however, that there is far less of it than is supposed. The open secret of this truth lies in the fact, that the variety of view of which any cardinal idea is capable is so vast that the different aspects appear to be essentially distinct. It is a legitimate and pleasing delusion. The repetition has the force of original statement. Lord Stanhope once remarked of Pitt—"He knew that to the multitude one argument stated in five different forms is, in general, equal to five new arguments." This principle is not confined in its application to the "multitude," but has force among the educated and critical. It is the old Latin doctrine—"non nova, sed nove"—applied to Discourse. Its illustration in sacred and secular spheres is of interest. In the repetitions of the Old Testament, as in Deuteronomy, or of the New Testament, as in the Gospels, the principle is manifest.

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The various histories of England, or of any other country covering a common period, illustrate it. The same ideas are expressed in variety of form for the sake of clearer exposition and in obedience to the individuality of the writer. It is vitally important to note that this repetition must be of the *idea* rather than of the language, and must be *judicious*. The writer must know what to repeat and when to repeat it. If this is not observed, the veriest tautology is the result.

Prof. Seeley, in his "Essay on Milton," speaks with approbation of the repetitions that occur in his writings. "Their monotony," he says, "is their glory." He designs not to praise monotony. He means, that Milton's thought is so rich and varied that its essential purport cannot be too often presented. From this method of exposition we infer—

*A*—That the young writer is to be encouraged. Although he is to be as original as possible, he is not to despair if he is obliged to restate in various forms ideas which he has already presented. He may become, thus, an effective and acceptable writer. The peculiar forms of statement are to be his own, and if the idea itself is also his the result is all the more satisfactory—it is a kind of double originality.

*B*—If the science of Discourse is, as many wrongly maintain, only a *formal* science, it is still of vast utility, inasmuch as, on the basis of the principle before us, the form of the thought becomes of increasing interest and has a value of its own.

(*B.*) *By Hypothesis.* When unable satisfactorily to interpret a subject or detect any error, it may be well, accepting it as true and clear, to reduce it to actual trial. Thus, by noting the nature and place of its failure, the difficulty may be detected. As in Science, so here, a true hypothesis is often a solution. The

Hypothesis becomes a Theory. The hypothesis, in every case, must be probable and rational, not a mere surmise or conjecture. The expositor must be in serious earnest, and resort to no means that have not the sanction of his judgment and that are not in the interests of truth.

(c.) *By Definition.* The essential idea here involved is that of Analysis—the resolution of the one idea into its constituent parts. This idea may be expressed by a single word, as, *Virtue*; or in the form of a proposition, as, *Virtue is essential to Happiness*. In the latter case, the definition would include the analysis of the different ideas of which the proposition is composed, and their combination.

It is important to note here that some ideas cannot be defined because they are incapable of analysis. They are already reduced to their final form. They are called, for this reason, *simple* ideas, in distinction from those that are complex. Such ideas as Beauty, Sublimity, Spirit, are of this character. There is no genus or higher class under which they may be ranked and studied.

If the question be raised as to how such ideas are to be explained, the answer is, that an approximate definition may be reached.

A—*Negatively.* It may be possible to state what the idea does not involve, what it is not in itself. Spirit, we say, is immaterial. Heat is the absence of cold. The idea is simplified by contrast. We see it partially by looking at its opposite. Language is full of these contrasted terms—Prose and Poetry, Solid and Liquid, Natural and Revealed.

B—*Through Illustration and Example.* Beauty and Sublimity may thus be studied in the light of objects called beautiful or sublime. Even where the ideas may be defined this additional help is often

resorted to. It gives force and beauty to the idea. The more abstract the idea is, the more needful and appropriate is this method.

This is sometimes called Definition by Particulars. Specific instances are cited to make clear that which is general or vague. The ideas of solidity, polarity, chemical affinity, taste, law and others, are defined by example. "If we wish to know the nature of the species hard," says Plato, "we should look to the hardest things."

This Method of Particulars corresponds with the Process already studied under the name, Specification.

Though this, in common with the negative method, is not definition in the strictest sense of that term, it may be regarded for all practical purposes as such. Though it does not lead to absolute, it does lead to relative, clearness.

It is evident that these two methods, the negative and the illustrative, may be, at pleasure, combined by the student. He may give the contrast and the particulars under it. Prose may be defined by saying that it is not metrical, and examples of both metrical and unmetrical productions may be given.

With regard to the examples adduced to explain any abstract notion, special care is to be taken that they be familiar ones, discreetly selected as to number, and, beyond question, directly applicable to the case in hand and to that only. In fact, these examples should be so well chosen and presented that were not the idea itself mentioned at all, it might be easily ascertained therefrom. It is, thus, the habit of some writers and orators to defer the statement of the general principle until the particulars have been given.

C—*By Figure.* The whole department of figurative language may be here applied. Apart from serving to unite and fix the attention to the idea, they present that idea in a novel and attractive light. A type or figurative phrase will often unravel a meaning which has defied the most rigorous logic or make plainer that which is already but partially clear. A Metaphor is often an explanation. The most celebrated of the ancients, such as Plato, Socrates and Cicero adopted this method of instruction. Many national proverbs are expressed in figurative form, and, as proverbs, are plain to the popular mind.

It is interesting to note, here, that figures in exposition must always be used as aids to clearness and not as mere ornaments. It confirms what has already been said as to the higher uses of figurative terms.

The various examples of figures given in the discussion of that subject may here be referred to as confirming the principle before us. The Bible is full of approximate exposition of this method.

### Laws of Definition.

(A.) *It must be specific.* The older writers were wont to say that it was not enough to give the *genus* or class under which the idea to be defined might fall, but that the *differentia* must be given—those particulars which marked it from the other ideas falling under the same class. The idea *Man* would not be defined by placing it under the general class—Being or Animal. The special things that mark him from other beings or animals must be given.

The idea *Faith* is not defined by placing it under *Virtues*. Its characteristic as a specific virtue must be given.

To define, therefore, we must *differentiate*.

Definition is, thus, seen to be something more than mere description, with which it is often confounded, *e. g.*—

Faith is a rare Grace and difficult to exercise.

Knowledge is Power.

Sculpture is one of the Fine Arts and flourished in Greece.

Government is of God and designed for the public weal.

These are all descriptions rather than definitions. They go around the subject rather than into it. They give what the old logicians called the “accidents” of the idea and not its essentials. Definition includes description and something more,—the analysis of the idea.

(B.) *It must be comprehensive.* All the necessary parts of the idea must be given. It is not sufficient that it be correct as far as it goes. It must go to the full and complete enumeration of elements. If such completeness be secured, the subject and predicate of

the definition may be, at pleasure, interchanged. The one expresses what the other expresses. They are appositive, *e. g.*—

Man is a rational and religious being.

A circle is a plane figure contained by one line everywhere equidistant from a point called the centre.

(c.) *The word or words to be defined must not be included in the definition.* If so, no progress would be made. It would be similar to what is called in logic—Arguing in a circle. We end at the place where we began, *e. g.*, “By a natural action is meant, one that is done naturally.” In such a sentence no definition of the word *natural* is reached, simply because it is repeated and the difficulty remains.

Examples of this error abound in literature and belong really to the province of the comic.

In the *Endymion* of Lyly we read—

“A poet! what’s that?”

“Dost thou not know what a poet is?”

“No.

“Why fool, a poet is as much as one should say, a poet.”

In Shakspeare, Bardolph gives us the definition of *accommodated*. “That is, when a man is, as they say, accommodated, or when a man is—being—whereby—he may be thought to be accommodated, which is an excellent thing.”

*A.*—There is, indeed, a figurative use of language where, for the sake of emphasis, the word is repeated in epigrammatic form—“Truth is truth.” “A pound is a pound.”

In such cases however, there is no attempt at definition.

*B.*—In connection with this law it is also to be mentioned that, although a different word is used, a correct definition may not al-

ways be reached. The word may be such an exact equivalent of the one to be defined that no progress is made.

This error is especially easy and frequent in a composite language, as the English, where synonyms of all grades abound. In such an expression as this—"By liberty of choice is meant freedom of choice"—no real advance is made in the exposition of the word *liberty*. In Shakspeare ("Love's Labor's Lost") this error is caricatured in the persons of Armado, Moth and Holofernes.

A.—Boy, what sign is it, when a man of great spirit grows melancholy?

M.—A great sign, sir, that he will look sad.

A.—Why, sadness is one and the self-same thing, dear imp.

M.—No, no; O lord, sir, no.

So Holofernes speaks of the *cœlo*—the sky, the welkin, the heaven; and of *terra*—the soil, the land, the earth.

In such cases, ignorance is concealed under a parade of mere words, and the mind is led to believe that any grade of difference is sufficient.

Hence, the important principle is reached that one idea or word must not only be defined in the terms of another, but in the terms of another *radically different* from that to be defined.

(D.) *A true definition cannot admit of words more difficult than that which is to be defined.* Trite as this statement is, the error is frequent. We find Faith thus defined to a humble inquirer—"A voluntary assent of the understanding, founded on authority, to a system or series of propositions and not to one isolated fact." Such a definition is not only unduly long but perplexing. The difficulty is increased rather than diminished. True definition proceeds from the abstruse and complex to the simple until it has reached the fullest simplicity. Simplicity of thought and expression are here mutual helpers. Clearness of conception does away with much of the

need of definition. The first and most natural form of utterance is the plainest form.

With reference to Definition in general, we may note—

(a.) Its Difficulty. Frequency of error among scholars in defining the terms which they use would seem to confirm this. A thoroughly satisfactory definition in any department of knowledge or in general Discourse is extremely rare. Those who excel in all else often fail here. It is safe to say that most of our leading terms are used in senses more or less vague. It seems to be agreed so to use them, and it would surprise us to find how few of them would bear the test of a close and rigid analysis. Very many if not most of the important discussions in theology and philosophy have arisen from faulty definitions.

Such words as *law*, *idea*, *virtue*, *truth*, *style*, *force*, *inspiration*, *art*, *substance*, have been presented by different authors and even by the same authors with such variety and vagueness of view as to mislead and bewilder.

As one of the great controversies between the Romanists and Protestants was said by Boileau and others to have turned upon the use or omission of a vowel, far more certain is it that many questions have turned upon the peculiar meanings assigned to prominent terms. The special reason of the difficulty of clear definition is, that it presupposes a knowledge both of the nature and relations of the word or idea to be defined. Such knowledge is rare.

(b.) Hence, the special attention of the student to this matter will be invaluable in its results. Not

only will it recompense him in the way of practical utility but will form within him the habit of mental and verbal accuracy. Clear thinking and clear definition are mutual cause and effect.

The principle to guide us here is, so to persist in the practice of this art that it may become a second nature. When we Discourse, our object is, not to mean more than we express, nor to express more than we mean, nor to mean something different from what we state, nor to convey no meaning at all, but to use such terms and in such a manner that we shall express precisely what we design to express.

To *define* is to *bound* or *limit*. The very word implies unqualified accuracy.

#### ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS.

(a.) The Expository form of Discourse naturally finds place in all the other forms. It precedes and underlies them. Though it may exist as a separate form, the others cannot. It is connected especially closely with the Argumentative form, in that the first thing in argument is the exposition of terms, and in that often the best way of explaining an idea is to prove it. Aristotle magnifies this form into special prominence when he says—"The power of explaining what is inherent in the subject and adapted to it is the peculiar province of Rhetoric."

(b.) This form is the least impassioned of all. Hence, it is called Didactic. Its sole office is, to instruct. It never aims to effect its ends by any of those agencies proper in the other forms. It relies upon the simple presentation of the truth. Hence,



it has little or nothing to do with the ornate or imaginative or emotional in Discourse. It is satisfied with plain statement. It has no special use for oratorical methods. As it simply aims to establish the *meaning* and not the *truth* of a proposition, it has no place for the convincing and persuasive.

It is the Scientific Form of Discourse, in distinction from the Literary and Oratorical. The experiments in Science are visible expositions. It is thus that Bain speaks of it as "The mode of handling applicable to knowledge or information in that form of what is called the Sciences. It thus corresponds with Clearness as a Quality of Discourse and may properly adopt the various agencies mentioned in the discussion of that subject.

(c.) Literature, both in its Prose and Poetry, may be said to furnish examples of this form. As there are certain productions and styles which may be called Argumentative, or Impassioned, or Persuasive, or Æsthetic, so, some are Didactic or Expository. Hence, there is a peculiar species of poetry termed *didactic*, its aim being to instruct rather than to please, or to instruct by pleasing. Most of the poetry of Pope, Akenside, Young, Cowper, Coleridge and Wordsworth, is of this character.

In Prose, what are called essays, reviews and treatises, whether in philosophy, theology, science or literature, are examples of this form of expression.

In Sacred Discourse, what is called Expository Preaching, or the explanation of principles and doctrines, is a good example. The exegesis of a written text is, also, of this order.

Its range is thus as wide as the bounds of human knowledge, and though it has a definite sphere and method and object of its own, it should have place more or less fully in every form of Discourse.

Instruction, after all, is the basis of conviction, impression and persuasion.

Every successful discourser must be a clear expositor.

## ARGUMENTATIVE OR LOGICAL FORM.

### DEFINITION.

In this form, the Reason or Judgment is the prominent faculty employed and addressed. The object is, to induce a new *conviction* in the place of an existing one or to modify a conviction already in the mind. The method by which it accomplishes its object is, *by the exhibition of proof*.

### IMPORTANCE.

So valuable is this form that it has been regarded by many able critics as equivalent in its province and purport to Discourse itself. Thus, Aristotle dwells upon the various kinds of proofs. He says—"Rhetoric is an art consisting chiefly in *proofs*, the object being to win belief (by proofs) in the hearer." Cicero and Quintilian state similar views. In Plato's *Gorgias* we read—"Rhetoric is the worker of *conviction*." "It is the art," says Whately, "of inventing and arranging arguments." This view of the science is undoubtedly extreme and misleading. The Argumentative Form is but one among others. There are other faculties in man besides the Reason and other ends to be reached besides conviction, and if, indeed, the va-

rious forms were to be reduced to one, it would be the Persuasive as the final and all-inclusive one.

### Relations of Logic to Discourse.

Defining Logic as The Science of the Formal Laws of Thought, and Discourse as The Science of the Formal Laws of the Expression of Thought, we note certain inferences.

(a.) They are similar in that each is a formal and not a material science—having to do especially with form.

(b.) They differ in that the one has to do, primarily, with the form of the thought; the other, with the form of its expression. This is what Aristotle means when he says—"As it is by the Sense that Rhetoric holds (relates) to Logic, so it is by Expression that Logic holds to Rhetoric." So close was the relation regarded by Cicero and Quintilian that they attempted to combine them into one science. Aristotle, in the opening of his celebrated work on "Rhetoric and Poetic," treats them as substantially one. "Rhetoric," he says, "is the counterpart of Logic—a kind of offshoot of Logic—a subordinate division of Logic and portraiture of it." He insists that they are founded alike on natural faculties—Reason and Expression—and are, alike, useful. He argues that they differ rather in *method* than in nature and object, and contends that he who would excel in the one must excel in the other. He speaks of them as "Anti-strophic." They answer to each other as the answering chords of music. Bacon speaks of them as having a common object. Zeno, in his celebrated Simile, compares Logic to the fist or closed hand, and Rhetoric, to the

palm or open hand. The one has the rigid and compact structure of the syllogism; the other, the flexible and natural ease of the narrative style. The one imparts solidity to the other, while it, in turn, receives freedom, facility and grace. "The logician," writes Whately, "is a judge; the rhetorician, an advocate." The one decides; the other presents. The one has to do with criticism; the other with composition. The one ascertains truth by inference, the other establishes it by proof."

It is thus evident, that, in view of the resemblances and differences between these two sciences, the points of resemblance should be especially noted. Whately, in commenting on Dr. Campbell's "Philosophy of Rhetoric," remarks, "His great defect is, his ignorance of the nature and object of Logic." The very phrase *Argumentative Discourse* implies the closeness of the relation. The very word *Logic* (Logos—Reason—Discourse) implies it. The successful discourser must be conversant with the art of reasoning. He must know how to convince as well as to instruct and impress.

### *Basis.*

The basis or source of this form of Discourse is eminently *natural*. Man is a rational, a reasoning, being, ever in search of proof and arriving at conclusions.

"It adds to my calamity that I have Discourse and Reason."

—*Massinger.*

"Reason is her being,  
Discursive or intuitive."—*Milton.*

It is to be noted that in this form of Discourse there is, strictly, no such thing as a Theme. The idea to be

discussed must, at the outset, be expressed in the form of a Proposition—a Judgment.

### Leading Terms, Defined.

(A.) *Judgment*. It is a mental *conclusion*, stating the agreement or disagreement of two conceptions—a logical proposition. It is, thus, affirmative and negative.

That faculty of the mind which is employed in drawing such conclusions is called the Judgment. It decides between two conceptions.

The various other uses of the word need not here be given.

(B.) *Conviction*. Etymologically, the word means complete conquest of another's opinions, to overpower by argument. It is used in its wider sense as synonymous with *convince*, and not in its technical, legal sense as applied to the culprit. Even here, however, the primitive idea is prominent. "The prisoner is convicted"—subdued or silenced, by proof. In Early English the words are used interchangeably.

More specifically, it is inducing by argument, that belief in others which exists in our own minds, and expresses both the process and result. It is to be carefully distinguished from *persuasion*, as this latter has reference to the Will and not to the Judgment, and presupposes conviction.

A man cannot be *persuaded* unless he is *convinced*. He may be convinced without being persuaded. Butler speaks of men "convinced against their will." Their judgments endorse what they are not prepared to carry out into practical action.

(c.) *Subjective and Objective.* Despite the adverse criticism of these terms, they still held their place as suggesting useful distinctions. No better terms have been proposed as substitutes. As Hamilton expresses it, "They are convenient expressions, the one denoting what is to be referred to—the thinking Ego; the other, what belongs to the Non-Ego." They express the difference between us as thinking and that of which we are thinking.

The words *internal* and *external*—or, as the older writers were wont to express it, *intrinsic* and *extrinsic*—are, for our present purpose, synonymous terms with these.

Other possible uses of these words are not here in place.

(d.) *Dialectic.* This older term is, practically, the same as Logic. It has been called by some the subject matter of Logic or its more practical part.

(e.) *Cause and Occasion (Antecedent.)* There are various words in this connection which are used in Argumentative Discourse and elsewhere with more or less looseness—*cause* and *effect*, *antecedent* and *consequent*, *occasion*, *motive*, *purpose*, *reason*. Clearness will result when it is noted that the chief element in *cause* is *power*, power sufficient to produce the effect assigned to it and *freedom* in its action to produce such effect. In the idea of an antecedent there is no such element. As the word suggests, it simply means that which goes before, as the night precedes the day.

The occasion is that *by which* the cause proper oper-

ates or is set in operation. Hence, it is often called The Inciting or Exciting Cause. It stimulates to action. It is not a power in itself, but a medium by and through which it acts. It is called a cause only by accommodation.

In a Cause Proper, the whole effect may be said to exist. There may be less in the effect than in the cause, but never more.

"A Cause," says Locke, "is that through which something else begins to be."

#### CAUSES CLASSIFIED.

The four-fold scheme given by Aristotle is as follows:

Formal,  
Material,  
Efficient,  
Final.

A three-fold and simple scheme will suffice—

First,  
Second,  
Final.

The term *First Cause* means *Cause Proper*—the original cause in which there exist the power and will to produce the effect—that without which the effect could not exist—

God is the First Cause of the Universe,—of all things.

The term *Second Cause* implies subordination, called, by the older writers, the *auxiliary*, in distinction from the *principal cause*, the instrumental or efficient cause—the Occasion. Of the products of the earth, the physical agencies—sun, air, water, soil, seed and man himself—are second causes, through which the First Cause operates.

The term *Final Cause*—or, as many prefer, *final end*—has reference to the end or object of the action—the reason or motive. In creation, it is the divine glory. In agriculture, the securing of products; in education, mental culture and knowledge; in the Revolutionary War, the Freedom of the Colonies.

Serious results are ever arising by the confusion of First and Second Causes.

This is specially true in the sphere of religious controversy, and at the present day. Attempts are made either to exclude the idea of a great First Cause of all things or to give this dignity and function to material laws. This method, though called materialistic, is, virtually, atheistic.

In the Art of Discourse, and more especially in the province of argument, the distinction should be sharply drawn.

(F.) *Deductive and Inductive.* The one term indicates reasoning from general laws or principles to facts; the other, from facts to principles.

#### THE SYLLOGISM.

The radical meaning of the word is, to reckon or count together—to present in compact, unified form. Symmetry of structure is a prominent idea in it.

It is a logical structure consisting of three propositions—the last of which states the conclusion arrived at, while the first and second give that by which it is to be reached. The principle on which it depends is—whatever is affirmed or denied of a class is affirmed or denied of every individual under that class, *e. g.*—

All men are mortal.  
John is a man.  
John is mortal.

The first and second propositions are called, respectively, Major and Minor Premises. The middle term (man) is that which is found in each of these and has, of course, no place in the conclusion.

In such a structure as this—"John is a man" (and) "As all men are mortal, John is mortal," the Minor Premise is stated first.

In the following—

John is mortal, (for)  
All men are mortal, (and)  
John is a man—

The conclusion is first given.



A—It may be noted, as illustrated in the examples given, that though the Major Premise, as a law, states a general principle or fact, and the Minor, a specific one, this is not always so.

B—It is also worthy of note, that, mechanical as the syllogism seems to be, it is the natural form in which the reasoning faculty in man expresses its action. It is not the product and peculiar property of the schools. All men reason, substantially, in this manner. Even though the premises may be so well known as to make it necessary to state the conclusion only, they are still present to the mind in the act of reasoning. Method in Discourse is more or less natural. In Argumentative Discourse it takes the syllogistic form.

C—The peculiar form of the Syllogism, which may be called, the *oratorical* or *rhetorical* rather than the logical, is, The Enthymeme. Its peculiarity is, that one of the premises is suppressed. It is the most compact and cogent form in which an argument can be presented. Its brevity is its strength, *e. g.*—

The Americans are prosperous because they are industrious.

*Full Form.*

All industrious people are prosperous.

The Americans are an industrious people.

The Americans are prosperous.

Here the Major is suppressed.

War is an evil because all that begets crime is an evil.

*Full Form.*

All that begets crime is an evil.

War begets crime.

War is an evil.

Here, the Minor is suppressed. It is easy to see that this is the special form of syllogism which would be used by a sophist. From the very fact that there is the concealment or suppression of some essential part, error is more difficult to detect and the unwary may be misled. Hence, this form is generally seen in connection with the forms of refutation to which attention is yet to be called.

The false premise being suppressed, we are led to accept what is stated and the conclusion follows.

In all such cases, the full statement of the syllogism will reveal the error, *e. g.*—

As John does not give us a full account of the parables of our Lord, his gospel is spurious.

The error lies in the untruthfulness of the suppressed Major, viz. : "Any gospel of Scripture that does not give us a full account of the Lord's parables is spurious." As this is false, the argument has no force. The Enthymeme is thus a most important form of argument, both by reason of the use and abuse of which it is capable.

### Prerequisites in Reasoning.

(A.) *The full Meaning of the Proposition must be known*—its nature, force and scope. As Quintilian and the older authors were wont to state it—The Discourser must know the Thesis or Cause, the Quæstio and the Status Causæ (Quæstionis). By the first was meant, the *general* topic or theme; by the second, the *special* topic issuing from it; and, by the third, the *vital point* under discussion. They correspond, in some degree, to what was presented under Definiteness in the Qualities of Discourse. Of these three, the last is the most important one. It includes the others and is definitely expressed in the formal statement of the question. It is that which makes the proposition what it is. In speaking of missing the main point of a proposition, Aristotle remarks—"All fallacies are referable to it." The unity and force of the argument—progressive and final—depend upon a just conception of it. Taking as the Thesis, Chinese Immigration, the Quæstio might be—Ought it to be encouraged by our country?

The point at issue would be—Is it constitutional not to encourage it? Is it expedient not to do so?

It will thus be seen that the mere understanding of the words of a proposition as clearly defined is not enough. The special force of it must be seen and its fullest reach. We must know what we have in hand and what we are to do.

(B.) *The Evidence on which the Proposition rests must be known.* The discourser must have in present possession, or accessible by reference, the means of its confirmation. There is a principle involved here applicable to all Discourse—that, before expression is attempted, there is something to express. In this case, that something is Proof. To proceed without this argues presumption or studied deceit. Whatever the habit of some may be, the theory is, that no one ventures to argue a cause unless he has sufficient evidence at his disposal—what seems to him to be sufficient.

(C.) *The Proposition must be regarded as true and capable of proof as such.* The moral feature of Argumentative Discourse is manifest here. Arguing in what is believed to be a bad cause is as unrhretorical and illogical as it is immoral. The relation of mind to conscience is too close to admit of it with impunity. "Nothing is expedient," says Cicero, "which is dishonorable." Paganism may, perhaps, become our teacher here. The temptations of the jurist are especially strong in this particular. A lucrative business often lies in the line of the neglect of moral principle. In the task work of the class room and the lyceum the matter is unimportant. In active, professional life, however, it becomes of vital moment. The Sophists of the older schools have far too many representatives in these days. Our Logic and our Ethics should agree and not conflict.

### States of Mind Addressed.

Of course, where there is perfect agreement as to the proposition—its meaning and its truth—there is no need of argument. The reference, now, is to cases where this does not exist.

(A.) *A State of Indifference.* In this case, all possible means are to be brought to bear to arouse the mind to attention and to the importance of the special subject in hand. This interest is to be awakened before the actual work of conviction begins. All is futile without it. The process which some writers have called *Excitation* is to be applied here.

(B.) *A State of Hostility.* This is a condition of mind at the other extreme, and yet more hopeful. It is sincere, and presents an open front which may be attacked. The first work of the reasoner, therefore, must be *conciliatory* and, perchance, in relation to himself as well as the proposition. Special courage and personal force of character, and ability to argue vigorously, are here needed. Timorous spirits, but half convinced by the validity of their arguments will certainly fail at such a crisis. Truth and error confront each other and one must yield. Some of the most brilliant specimens of argumentative Discourse have been occasioned by this hostile attitude on the part of opponents.

(C.) *A State of Doubt or Vacillation.* If this is captious and insincere, there can be little hope of effecting good results. If it is honest, there is every prospect of success and the best power of the dispu-

tant is to be employed in determining the doubting mind to the adoption of his views. The work here is confirmatory. This is the most common condition of mind addressed, so that this form of Discourse has sometimes been called *The Art of Confirmation*. Moreover, as belief, in its degrees, may range from the faintest probability to the fullest assurance, it should be the object of the disputant to bring the mind addressed as near as possible to this assurance. All doubt is to be banished. To ascertain these conditions of mind is a preparatory and essential work. It is what the diagnosis is to the physician before he prescribes. The kind and order of proof are determined thereby.

It is, thus, the truest economy. Hence, skill in detecting these should be sought, and skill in adapting our argument thereto.

### Classification of Proofs.

What was known by the ancients as *The Topical Art*, had, for its object, the orderly distribution of the proofs—their placing (*τοπος*). This art, as already seen, has indeed a much wider reference. It applies to the whole province of Discourse and might well be studied with the interest with which the ancients regarded it. Whether applied to argument or elsewhere it has all the benefits of logical and rhetorical order. It economizes time and study, presents the proofs in their relative value, and gives to the reasoner the position of advantage over the trickster and the sophist. It is simply the *Law of Method* (*Analysis and Synthesis*) applied to *Argumentative Discourse*. The classification is as follows:

(A.) *Moral or Probable and Necessary or Demonstrative.* The principle of division, here, is, the *force* of the respective proofs. In Mathematics, the proof is demonstrative. In the sphere of morals—that of free will and human action—proof is probable only. In the one case, contradiction leads to absurdity; in the other, a greater or less degree of doubt may rationally exist. In the one case, the certainty is absolute and final; in the other, relative and approximate. The one has to do with pure conception; the other, with actual existences and matters of fact. The one is, therefore, metaphysical; the other, practical, in character and force. Care is to be taken lest these two forms of proof be confused. It would not only be unwise but expose to ridicule to aim to establish, by demonstration, an external, historical fact, or, by moral evidence, to prove a mathematical proposition. As they differ in nature and result, they also differ in method.

(B.) *Direct or Positive and Indirect or Negative.* The principle at the basis, here, is that of the *form* of the proof. In the one, there is the actual confirmation of the question by evidence in the possession of the reasoner. As we say—He advances arguments. In the other, the arguments of the opponent in the form of objections are answered. In a lengthy or exhaustive discussion they are combined. When but one can be used, the former is preferable. The wise reasoner will always establish an argument of his own. A basis is thus laid on which the better to meet the objections themselves. As we say in suggestive phrase—This is proof positive, that is, forcible and satisfactory

proof. The name generally given to Indirect or Negative Proof is, Refutation. It has two forms—

A—Admitting the correctness of the premises in themselves, to show the fallacy of the reasoning from them—the fallacy of the conclusion.

In the syllogism—

All quadrupeds are animals,  
Birds are animals,  
Birds are quadrupeds—

however true the statement of the premises may be, the conclusion does not follow. In fact no conclusion follows from the syllogism as thus constructed.

If the conclusion is to stand, as given, the Major Premise would read—All animals are quadrupeds. This statement would, at once, be condemned and the syllogism be destroyed.

B—Admitting the conclusion, to show the fallacy of one of the premises.'

In the syllogism—

Food is necessary to life,  
Alcohol is food,  
Alcohol is necessary to life—

the error is not in the reasoning but in the Minor Premise. The reasoning itself is strictly logical. Of these two methods of refutation the second is the preferable and the common one. It is an easier and a safer and more satisfactory method. The danger in the first method, especially to the inexperienced disputant, is, that having admitted the truth of the premises, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to show the fallacy of the reasoning. Sophistry may more easily be concealed in this way than in the other, and, hence, it is the method of the wary and unscrupulous reasoner.

Archbishop Whately alludes to another method of refutation, which he calls *proving the contradictory*. It is based on the principle that of two contradictory statements or conclusions one must be false. This is scarcely a specific method of refutation, but belongs to the sphere of general proof. The suggestions of Whately—that unanswerable arguments may exist on

both sides and should be so accepted, and that all objections should be stated in their exact force, neither above nor below the truth, are worthy the attention of the student of this art. In such a case, the method of the reasoner is, to outweigh all opposing argument by proofs of still higher validity or by a larger collection of proofs of equal validity.

As to the precise *place* of refutation in the order of proof, this may be left to the intelligent judgment of the reasoner. It is modified by the character of the question, the state of the mind addressed, and by general circumstances. There are two or three forms of argument which are so well adapted to Refutation, though used elsewhere, that they may be examined here.

A—*Argumentum ad hominem*. In this, there is a direct reference to the principle or actions of our opponent as confirming the position which is assumed against him.

The conference of David and Nathan, as given in 2 Sam. xii. 7, will illustrate it. Courtesy will, at times, lead to its omission, but when demanded it has positive force because of its very personality. Its effect is, to confound or silence, and though not a proof to be used alone, affords valuable aid to other forms.

Hooker's question to the profane atheist is in point—"Is there a God to swear by, and none to believe in, none to pray to?"

B.—*Reductio ad absurdum*. This form is based on the principle that absurdity follows the denial of the conclusion reached. The argument may, thus, be tested by assuming the conclusion false and reconstructing the syllogism—

All men are mortal,  
John is a man,  
John is mortal.

*Reductio.*

All men are mortal,  
John is not mortal,  
John is not a man.

C—*Dilemma*. By this, the opponent is shut up to an alternative in which the choice of either side of it will be detrimental. It is a



choice of evils and in this lies the peculiar force of it. In Luke xx. 4-8 there is a marked example of this as used by the Saviour to refute and silence the Pharisees.

The only way in which its force can be impaired is, by showing that, in the given case, it does not hold, that there is possible choice outside the assigned alternative.

(c.) *Subjective and Objective or Internal and External.* The principle of this division is, the *source* of the proof—whether from within or without. Subjective Proofs are two-fold—Mental (Intuitive) and Propositional. They lie in the mind itself or in the very structure and terms of the proposition. They are reached, therefore, simply by looking within to the mind, or by the analysis of the proposition, *e. g.*—

Goodness is praiseworthy.

Man is possessed of an animal nature.

Objective Proofs lie outside both of the mind and the proposition—Extra Mental, Extra Propositional, *e. g.*—

Social discontent is the result of bad legislation.

Geology is a modern science.

### Comparative Force of Proofs.

Theoretically, Necessary Proofs are stronger than Probable. For all practical purposes, however, probable proofs are valid and convincing.

Positive Proofs, as the name would indicate, are stronger, as a class, and in most cases, than Negative.

Subjective Proofs, especially those that are Mental or Intuitive, are stronger than Objective. Though each of the propositions—

We are free moral agents,

Wellington fought at Waterloo—

is unquestionably true, there is a valid sense in which the first is more unquestionable than the second. It admits of no doubt whatever. It may be stated that the force of these Internal Proofs is such that in normal conditions of the mind they must be valid. At times, the existence of prejudice, indifference, or hostility, may preclude the correct interpretation either of the mind or of the proposition, and impair the value of such proof. These proofs cover, however, but a separate sphere. Hence the need of External Argument. When these are combined in the establishment of any proposition, the result is as sure as anything within the province of the finite and fallible can be.

The internal and external evidences of Christianity, thus conjoined, make up a body of proof that has ever defied the assaults of skepticism.

### Specious Proofs.

(A.) *Begging the Question.* The error lies in taking for granted, as already proved, that which has not been proved—the very point at issue in the argument, *e.g.*—

The free use of alcohol is to be encouraged because it promotes health.

Inflation should be encouraged because it will promote the industries of the country.

That such a use of alcohol will promote health and that inflation will promote the industries are mere assumptions. It is noticeable that in this proof the form is that of the Enthymeme. The suppression of the premise conceals the sophistry. As in other cases, therefore, the complete statement of the syllogism will reveal the error.

(B.) *Arguing in a Circle.* This is akin to the previous error, in that it assumes that which has not, as yet, been proved. It involves an additional error—proving a proposition by itself. It uses a premise to prove a conclusion, or a conclusion to prove a premise. The argument returns upon itself. As in a definition containing the very word to be defined, so here, no progress is made, *e. g.*—

To be honest is politic because it is politic to be honest.  
Inflation is beneficial because it is beneficial to inflate.

Here again, the form is that of the Enthymeme and for a similar reason. This is, in fact, no argument whatever. There is a mere repetition of terms. Hence the attempt to state it in full syllogistic form will reveal the error.

All that inflates is beneficial,  
Inflation inflates,  
Inflation is beneficial.

Erroneous as these two forms of argument are, their use is by no means rare. This is due to ignorance of the nature and scope of the question, to ignorance of the art of reasoning, or to a deceitful and purposed evasion of the point at issue to mislead the inexperienced.

Much of the logic of the schools and of the world is spurious and specious.

(c.) *Proving too much.* Here, the argument defeats itself. The error is not as central and positive as before, but still an error, *e. g.*—

If we argue against the necessity of rules and methods in the art of Discourse, in that we should rely upon

nature, the principle is too broad. Other arts similarly related to nature must thus be viewed. If the Romanists argue for seven sacraments, on the ground of their sacredness and mystery, why not, as Trench suggests, argue for a much larger number. Too much is proved and the argument is invalid. Other fallacies that might be mentioned belong more properly to the province of Logic and are there exhibited.

### Discussion of Proofs.

(A.) *Deduction (de, duco)*. This is an order of proof based on the *uniformity of law*—the law of cause and effect. Like causes under like circumstances produce like effects. It is an argument from principles or laws to facts, from genus to species. It is called, *à priori* proof. Moreover, inasmuch as the general law being established, the result is supposed to follow, it is called *necessary* proof, *e. g.*, “A God of infinite power, wisdom and goodness being granted, we reason to the existing order of things.” “Virtue being worthy of respect, the character of this virtuous man is praiseworthy.” The function of this form of argument is, to account for *admitted* facts. In this sense, it does not seek to prove anything new. Mathematics and Logic are, thus, deductive sciences. This is the ancient and mediæval form, and suggests the names of Aristotle and the Schoolmen.

(B.) *Induction (in, duco)*. The basis of this proof is the same as that of Deduction. Here, however, we argue from particulars to generals, from facts to laws and principles, from the species to the genus. It is called, *à posteriori*. It is also, at times, termed *con-*

*tingent* or *conditional*, in distinction from deductive as necessary.

The existing order of things being given, we argue back to an adequate First Cause. From the evident prosperity of Christian nations, we argue that Christianity promotes the general good.

The function of this form is, to establish that which, as yet, is *not admitted*—through the known to reach the unknown. Hence, it is largely illustrated in the progressive or experimental sciences. It is the more *modern* form of reasoning and, as it is based on facts, a *safer* form. It suggests the name of Bacon and the later philosophers.

The cardinal principle in Induction is, to have *enough* facts of the right character to warrant the inference of the general principle.

What is called *hasty induction*, or *imperfect enumeration*, refers to the violation of this salient principle, and is a common error in reasoning, *e. g.*, From some apparent errors in Scripture, the entire revelation is pronounced untrustworthy.

After a short and superficial travel through a country, the broadest statements are made relative to its people and institutions.

As Homer and Milton and Byron had physical defects, poets of eminence are physically unsound.

As to the number of facts or examples in any given case, this cannot be exactly stated. It will depend on the nature of the question and the sphere in which it is argued. It simply demands intelligence and candor on the part of the reasoner. If these exist, discretion will guide him.

Allusion should be made to the four methods of Induction presented by Mill.

A—*Method of Agreement.* If under a great variety of circumstances two facts are always found together, they may be viewed as being in most cases cause and effect. Thus: Prevalent intemperance is ever found with social misery and crime. This method, however, is to be used with discretion. It may lead to grave error. Effects are thus assigned to causes which really are not causes, *e. g.*, "Certain institutions are traced to certain men in that during their existence the people prospered." In this case, other causes may have been the real ones, or, at least, operative with the ones assigned. There is danger, here, moreover, that causes and occasions be confounded.

B—*Method of Difference.* When two facts make the only difference in two classes of circumstances, by their presence in the one and absence from the other, they may be viewed as cause and effect. Thus, "The immoralities of the Restoration in England are largely traceable to French influence." In this method, also, judgment is needed.

C—*Method of Residues.* An effect being said to be due to one or more assigned causes, certain of these being eliminated with their effects, the remaining effect is due to the cause or causes remaining. The final object, of course, is, to eliminate all but the one cause.

A case of murder assigned to insanity, passion, or deliberate purpose, might be argued on this method.

Gibbon's five-fold cause for Christianity as an effect may thus be discussed.

D—*Method of Concomitant Variations.* This is called by Whately, the Argument of Degrees or of Progressive Approach. \*

In this we reach the idea of cause and effect from the proportionate rise or fall of two accompanying facts. The progress of Christianity and that of the higher civilization might be thus viewed. Further, to the degree in which the laws of health are violated, physical vigor declines. What is called, Extreme Case, may here be shown, *e. g.*, As sin is removed, spiritual character develops. If it should be completely removed, character would be absolutely pure.

### Relation of Induction to Deduction.

One way of showing this is, to inquire as to the source of the general principles on which we reason in Deduction. The source is a double one.

(A.) *The Mind itself—Intuitions.*

(B.) *Induction.* Herein is the closeness of the relation manifest. Apart from intuitive truth, the very principles used in Deduction are secured by Induction.

If from the general principle, Attention to physical laws secures health, we reason to the health of the man who observes them, the principle itself is determined by an accumulation of facts from observation and experience. If from the general principle, Drunkenness tends to crime, we reason to the tendency on the part of those addicted to the vice, the principle has been obtained by a large and careful aggregate of cases. The dividing line, therefore, between these two kinds of reasoning should not be too sharply drawn. It may here be noted that in so far as the principles used in Deduction are intuitive, the force of the proof is demonstrative, and in so far as they are derived by induction, it is probable and approximate.

(c.) *Historical Proofs.* The relation of this class of proofs to Induction is vital, in that facts are the basis of Induction. They are the material used in reasoning.

The validity of this proof is founded on the principle that the truth of the facts is the only reason for the statement of them. Whatever the exception may be in isolated cases arising from ignorance, prejudice or malice, historical fact as a body of proof must be ac-

cepted as valid. The discussion of the various forms included in it will tend to clearness.

*A—Personal Observation and Experience.* As far as it goes, this proof is as valid as any other form. What we have observed and experienced we know as surely as we know our own existence. It has the force of self-evident truth. With reference to any particular question, the proof is conditional upon three things.

Reliable moral character.

Sufficient scope and opportunity of observation.

Ability to observe intelligently and draw proper inferences.

In the case of complicating testimony upon the same question, the witnesses must be tried by this three-fold principle, and if, as is often the case, decision is impossible, new testimony must be procured.

The question as to the benefits of compulsory education or of capital punishment or of prohibitory laws might be thus tested. This proof, as all historical proof, virtually includes what some authors term Testimony and Authority, the one referring to matters of fact (History Proper); the other, to matters of personal opinion or judgment. Though each is based on the same principle, testimony is stronger than authority. The personal element that enters into the latter makes error possible.

*B—Concurrent Testimony.* When the same testimony is given to a fact by a variety of witnesses, it is especially strong, not simply because the testimony of one witness is multiplied a certain number of times, but because there is, in the very concurrence, a new element of strength. There being no opportunity for collusion, or no inclination to it, the truth of the testimony is the only explanation of the concurrence. The opposite is morally impossible.

If, indeed, previous collusion is proved, the proof is destroyed in that the collusion itself and not the truth of the statements becomes the reason why they are so stated. In the courts of law, and in the historical argument for Christianity, this form of proof is of great utility. What is called Public Opinion, is, thus, of force, because it is general and concurrent. No one can afford to decry it. We must be sure, however, that it is the popular will freely and naturally expressed.

*C—Incidental and detailed Testimony.* The more minute and specific testimony is, other things being equal, the more conclusive it is. Its special force lies in the fact that its minuteness makes the supposi-



tion of its being forged less probable and less possible. Even on the concession that the more general and prominent facts might be feigned, it is still highly improbable that such deceit would apply to the minutiae.

D—*Undesigned Testimony*. Its force lies in its being undesigned and it is, thus, closely connected with the previous form. When combined, the proof is irrefutable.

Paley's great argument from undesigned coincidences in Scripture combines these two forms. It may be applied as he applies it, to those coincidences which exist among different portions of Scripture itself, as between inspired and secular history. The testimony is natural and spontaneous. It must be accepted. Fabrication was not possible. What is called indirect or circumstantial evidence is closely connected with this.

E—*Negative Testimony*. If what is stated is allowed to stand unanswered, the supposition of its truthfulness must follow. This is especially so when those from whom the answer is expected have every reason to answer it. Much of our knowledge rests upon this kind of a basis. Proof is challenged and it is not forthcoming and the position taken is held.

F—*Testimony of Adversaries*. This is, in some respects, the strongest possible form of historical evidence, in that there is every reason to falsify.

The testimony of infidel historians to the truth of Christianity; of bad men to good men; of Pilate to the blamelessness of Christ's character; of monarchies to democratic government, is of this character. It would be irrational to question it. The testimony of apostles and reformers to the truth, when they knew it would bring them to the stake, was of a similar character.

In fine, testimony as a proof is based on the principle of moral veracity as inherent in man, and in special cases, as in courts of law, in order to guard the testimony from all possible error, the solemn sanction of the oath is used. This strengthens the moral sense where it is weak or perverted. Testimony given under oath and sifted by cross-examination expresses the most reliable result to which human insight can attain.

(D.) *Analogy*. This form of proof is based on resemblance. From the facts possessed in one case, we pass to a conclusion as to facts in another case

similar to it. It is similar to the Process of Comparison and Contrast, and suggests also the subject of figurative language.

A—Analogy as a proof has reference to things similar and not to those identical; to relations and not properties, *e. g.*, The growth of ideas in the mind is analogous to that of seed in the soil. Things which have no resemblance to each other may have a common relation to some third thing.

The force of analogy, therefore, is probable and not demonstrative. It finds its best function as an aid to other proofs. It may be used to good purpose in refutation by silencing the opponent. In such a case, its force is practically positive. Probable as the proof is, it may yet rise to the verge of demonstration. The best example of this in all literature is Butler's "Analogy." *A priori* objections against the doctrines of Christianity are there answered by analogies drawn from the "constitution and course of nature." The argument may be said to be conclusive. Where it does not reach this force, it approximates to it and furnishes a basis for positive opinion. As an aid to investigation in science, and as helpful to the writer in all the forms of Discourse, it deserves careful study.

B—Analogy is inductive in form and force when enough instances are found in any given case to enable us to argue to a whole class. It is then guided by the principles discussed in Induction.

C—The force of this proof is destroyed by showing that the analogy is fanciful rather than real, that it does not hold, or, if holding in some particulars, it does not hold in others and in the most important.

Christianity and Mohammedanism may be compared as to the geographical area which they have respectively covered, but their respective moral influence infinitely separates them. The present support of polygamy, or slavery, or community of property, on the basis of the toleration of these in Scripture, involves the error that the circumstances are so different that the analogy does not hold.

It may here be added that *a posteriori* proof is often used effectively with analogy. Butler, in defending the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, argues that if in worldly governments this principle is applied, much more may we look for its application under the perfect government of God hereafter. It is reasoning from the weaker to the stronger.

### Order of Argument.

This depends, somewhat, on the state of mind addressed and the special object in view. The general principle applicable is, that the argument both at the opening and close should be forcible and pertinent. This is especially needful at the close. The law of Discourse as to conclusions has no more important application than in this form. As already indicated, Discourse involves progress. It is climacteric. Argument is cumulative both as to amount and convictive character. As to any specific order in the light of the classifications given, it may be noted that demonstrative proofs may precede moral; positive proofs, negative; and subjective proofs, the objective. As to this last division, the subjective must precede, inasmuch as the analysis of the mind and of the proposition is the first essential.

More specifically still, the deductive and inductive proofs precede the historical and analogical. These last are supplementary to the first.

As to the precise order of proofs, however, the writer must be left to his own judgment, it being assumed that, where those addressed are candid and favorably disposed, almost any order may be chosen. As to the practical use of the various forms of proof, it may be said that the plan adopted by some, as by Butler with *analogy* and Dr. Clarke with the *à priori*, of employing but a single kind throughout, is wisely modified by selecting some form as the leading one and using most of the others as tributary and adjutant.

### Burden of Proof (Presumption).

#### *Definition.*

This phrase is used in connection with the word Presumption. If the burden of proof is on one side, the presumption is on the opposite. In a question that arises for discussion there is, previous to the study of the intrinsic merits of the question, a presumption of truth with one party or the other, growing out of the very nature of the subject. There is a kind of abstract probability one way or the other. Where this lies being determined, the burden of proof is cast thereby upon the opposite side.

#### ITS IMPORTANCE.

(A.) *It is the economic method;* it saves the disputant the attempt to establish that which at the outset he has a right to assume. It gives him all the benefit of the doubt, and we know that to start doubts and wait for their solution is often a positive victory. As suggested by another, "The advantage is analogous to that of holding a fort over that of taking it by storm." It enables the reasoner to take the defensive. Further than this, if the presumption were ignored it might be impossible and would always be difficult for the disputant ignoring it to prove his point. If the presumption of innocence to which a man unjustly charged had a right were not accepted, it might be impossible for him to prove his innocence. It is indeed true that criminals escape under cover of this conceded privilege, and, yet, still greater harm would result from its abolition.

(B.) *If not accepted* when it is proper to do so, it reveals to an opponent the disputant's ignorance of the nature and scope of the question and of his privileges. It exposes to attack and to scorn. It concedes the case. It is to be carefully noted that, important as the presumption is, it is not to be unduly magnified. It is not to be confounded with the merits of the question, nor in itself to be regarded as an argument. Caution is to be exercised lest the possession of it may lead to carelessness as to positive proofs, lest a purely defensive attitude may beget inactivity or pride.

#### HOW DETERMINED.

(A.) *The Presumption is in favor of that which exists.* The Burden of Proof, therefore, lies with him who proposes to modify the present order of things. As the common law of England phrases it, "He who puts anything in affirmation must prove it." Such a presumption as this seems to be founded on the principle that there is an established order of things from the beginning, and that any departure from it is abnormal and must, as such, be justified. It assumes that the existence of the present order is an *à priori* proof of its being the best order, that any change is, *per se*, an evil. The wisdom of past ages is herein commended. All changes, therefore, that have taken place in Church and State have been obliged to meet this principle and overcome it. All reformers have had the Burden of Proof as Reformers. The maxim, "Possession is nine points of the law," is grounded on this principle. Mere occupancy, especially if protracted, is a presumption of title and the rival claimant must accept the burden of proof.

Manifestly, this first law as to presumption has *good* and *evil* elements. It is good in that it is protective of established institutions and interests. The conservative principle is everywhere a safe guard. Ecclesiastic, civic and social order is founded upon it. The wild impulses and passions of the ignorant, as well as the deep-laid schemes of the adroit politician, are rebuked and frustrated by it. The principle, however, is often abused. Constitutions are, thus, perfect only because they are constitutions—an established thing. Traditional institutions, customs and beliefs must abide, at whatever hazard. The fact is, practically viewed, something more than mere present existence is of right looked for in most cases. So true is this that this presumptive evidence may be made to *refute itself*. If, with reference to any given thing, permanence is its *only* merit, and it can be shown on other grounds that it has wrought harm, its very permanence is the weightiest reason for its abolition. Precisely so did the reformers argue with reference to the Romish Hierarchy in Europe. They felt that this tyranny had existed far too long and must be broken. So might it be argued with reference to English rule in Ireland and the existing jury system. Hence:

(B.) *The presumption is in favor of that which is beneficent, and morally right.* This is, indeed, more valid than the other, and in cases of conflicting presumption, must decide. If Christianity and certain false religions have alike the presumption of past existence in their favor, the question must turn on this second element. If these exist together, the double presumption practically amounts to valid evidence. The principle on which this second presumption is

based is, that man is a moral being, possessed of conscience and amenable to moral law. Despite the doctrine of the fall of man, we are bound to proceed upon the theory that man is still possessed of a higher nature, and that his normal condition is that of integrity.

*Additional Statements.*

*A*—The presumption may be shifted to the opposite side of the question by pressing a counter presumption, *e. g.*—The presumption being, at first, against Christianity, as a new system and life, is now in favor of it.

It is, of course, evident that the presumption ceases, or is shifted as soon as the discussion on the merits of the question begins. If the opponent's argument fails, the presumption returns in its primitive force.

*B*—Some questions seem to be practically unaffected by this law of presumption. They are, in general, the lower order of questions. Many that are purely speculative are of this character.

*C*—At times, the presumption seems to be equal on both sides, and rather than aim to draw a balance of probabilities, it is better to discard it and allow the subject to rest upon its merits. Such a question as the relative superiority of classical and mathematical study is of this character.

In all leading questions, however, presumption exists for or against and may readily be determined. The opinion sanctioned by many, that we are to come to the discussion of every question with a perfectly unbiased mind, is not a correct one. In the nature of things it cannot be, and is the less true the more vital the subject is. In the great questions relative to kindred, country, and religious belief, we are bound, as social, rational, and moral beings, to come with a certain bias of mind. The demand made by modern skeptics, that absolute indifference shall characterize the mind of a believer as he enters upon the discussion of fundamental religious truth, is contrary to nature and the actual practice of skeptics themselves.

Prejudice, in the best sense of the word—pre-judgment—has its place and function in argumentative Discourse.

## GENERAL REMARKS ON ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSE.

## EXPEDIENTS.

(A.) *There is to be agreement, as far as possible, with the opponent.* This makes necessary disagreement all the more courteous and effective. In the great discussions in the English Parliament, as to the claims of the Colonies, the champions of colonial rights expressed warm affection for the mother country, as their ablest opponents did for the Colonies. It made the debate incisive and vigorous. In such agreement, irony often enters. It is real innuendo. Pitt, when convicted by Walpole "of being a young man," answered, "I shall neither attempt to palliate or deny it," and then adds with deepest irony, "I desire, however, to be one of those whose follies cease with their youth and not of that number who are ignorant in spite of experience." Here was agreement, but it furnished the basis for stinging satire.

(B.) *Not every argument of an opponent is to be noticed simply because it is presented.* Some may be ignored and others passed with a remark. When Pitt was accused by Walpole "of playing a theatrical part," he answered, "It is too trifling to be refuted." Grattan answered to the charge of Irish ingratitude by saying, "I name the argument to despise it." This method is especially effective when the argument thus ignored is presented by the opponent as a forcible one, but has in reality little or no weight. The very inattention to it by a debater of any ability weakens faith in it. Special care must be taken, however, that the argument thus neglected be not so essentially vital as to survive all neglect and turn the reproach

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upon the one neglecting it. Here, as everywhere else, judgment is assumed.

(c.) *The question, at certain points, may be waived.* As already seen, conflicting presumption or testimony may require it. Apart from this, certain proofs or suggestions may be advanced as mere tests or feelers. If accepted, well. If opposed, they are withdrawn and no special harm results. It is clear how an adroit reasoner may, at this point, gain advantage over the unwary and unskilled. The tentative arguments are accepted. We allude, however, to the legitimate use of this expedient. It has its place and is of value.

(d.) *All valid objections are to be fully and frankly stated.* Allusion has been made to this. It takes the opponent on his own ground, reveals candor, courage, and a conception of the scope of the question, positive and negative.

(e.) *Courtesy of manner and address is always in place.* The violation of this is the vice of much modern discussion. Personal calumny betokens mental weakness. It increases as argument declines. After Grat-tan had been abused by Cory, he simply answered, "Before I sit down, I will show him how to be severe and parliamentary at the same time." In fact, the more courteous the debaters are, other things being equal, the more effective is the argument. It is based, then, on reason and facts, and not on personal slander.

This principle does not preclude the use of irony, the denial and even scorn of baseless arguments, the *Argumentum ad Hominem*, or the strongest forms of discourse. It simply demands courtesy in all. Opponents cannot, for their own sakes, decry and de-grade each other.

## ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS.

(A.) *Possession of Logical Ability and Knowledge.* The most essential element is what may be termed the logical habit or faculty, aptitude in seeking and finding the reasons or grounds of things. It is, indeed, partly natural. At times, it is conspicuously so, as with Webster and Choate. It may, however, be cultivated, and is well worthy the ambition of the student. By knowledge is meant, familiarity with the principles and processes of reasoning as given in Logic and Argumentative Discourse, with the facts and philosophy of history, and with human nature and the world as exhibited before us. Such a kind and measure of knowledge, apart from its inherent value, will cultivate the logical habit itself, while this, in turn, will ever demand new material. Success in argument, as in life, is postulated upon a well-trained and well-furnished mind—discipline and data.

(B.) *The Detection and Enforcement of Vital Issues.* As already seen, the first and best discovery in a question is that of the point at issue. That secured, other lesser but leading phases are seen. All that is inferior or irrelevant is rejected and the mind bends to its best work. This quick comprehension of the meaning, reach and application of a question is, with some, an instinct; with others, the result of patient study. It presupposes sagacity, insight and foresight, and is especially needful in emergencies and when time is limited.

(C.) *Self-Possession.* Important as this is in all spheres, it is especially so in debate. Nervous as the contestant may be, he is not to become unnerved, but

always to be master of himself. The very words *logical, argumentative, deliberative*, indicate this.

The question of natural temperament apart, this habit is based on the ability and knowledge referred to. Natural timidity itself will soon yield, in this method, to the presence of ease and courage.

(D.) *Power of Rejoinder.* The very word *debate* implies objection and opposition. To meet and answer this must be a large part of the contestant's work. It is rare to find men equally skilful in positive and negative argument. Very many fail in this latter. They can state and unfold their argument better than they can defend it. They are argumentative orators rather than debaters.

This power, as the others, is both natural and acquired. Partly the result of careful study, it lies, often, and mainly, in the man, and is called for at the moment. Some of the most brilliant specimens of parliamentary debate are of the character of rejoinder.

#### METHODS OF DEBATE.

(A.) *The Memoriter Method.* It is thus written and delivered as the oration and is in no sense distinct from it, save that it is argumentative in character. To this form of debate there are valid objections.

A—It is contrary to the very ideal of debate as a method free and informal, colloquial and personal, and leads, thus, to mechanism. Not to be recommended in any type of Discourse, it is peculiarly out of place in this.

B—It is, as a matter of fact, contrary to the habit of the best debaters. This, in itself, is substantial proof against its desirability.

C—It prevents taking advantage of the hour as to the new arguments and objections that may arise. It unfits the debater, thus, for the important work of refutation. A compromise is frequently

effected at this point, the first argument being committed and the second informally presented as occasion requires. In the hands of a mature and masterly contestant, this double method might serve important purposes. With the beginner, however, it is fraught with peril, and mars, in addition, the principle of unity.

*D*—This method makes the main work of the reasoner subjective when it should be objective. He is looking within to recall what is in the mind rather than without to the mind addressed. The memory should be cultivated, but not with reference to Discourse. Save in exceptional cases, where it exists in unwonted power, its unpleasant subjective action can be detected by the discerning mind and with all men it is apt, at times, to betray them into humiliating failure.

(*B.*) *The Written Debate, studied but not memorized.* In this instance, the manuscript is so carefully perused that it is, substantially, in the mind of the debater while yet he makes no effort verbally to reproduce it. Much may be said for and against this method.

*A*—It prevents the formality of the first method, as specific words are not reproduced. Thus far, it conforms to the ideal of debate.

*B*—It secures a written preservation of the argument for further use or reference. On the other hand:

*A*—There is danger of failure by the constant temptation to reproduce the written copy and yet be free from it. The unity is thus broken. Abruptness of transition often results.

*B*—As to the work of refutation, it would have the same objection as the other method. It is a method, however, which should be recommended to the aspiring student. Difficult as it is, it will repay all effort to realize it.

(*c.*) *The Analytical Method.* This may be called the lawyer-like method. The question is thoroughly studied in connection with reading and research and the results of such study are compacted into a brief analysis, from which the debater discourses. This is, undoubtedly, the most desirable of the three methods.

*A*—It carries out most fully the true ideal of debate; all mechanism is prevented in that there is no attempt at verbal reproduction.

*B*—It has been the habit of the ablest debaters and is well exemplified by statesmen and jurists. The negative argument or refutation is here fully provided for.

*C*—It has all the best characteristics of the other forms with additional elements of good. It develops a habit of discourse which serves important ends in the emergencies of life. It is, distinctively, the mental form.

#### DEBATE AS A FORM OF DISCOURSE.

(A.) *It is the mediate form between the essay and the oration.* While it demands all the precision of the one, it demands all the vigor and life of the other; all the varied laws and processes of Discourse may be exemplified in it. It is, thus, the typical form.

(B.) *It is a form appropriate to Representative government,* to the times in which we live. Many of the best orations of Great Britain and America are of this argumentative character. They are debates. In Popular Government issues are to be discussed before the people. Hence, the new interest which our colleges are taking in it is a sign of promise.

(C.) *Every man in process of liberal education should give special attention to debate,* enough, at least, to test his probable capacity in that direction. Most satisfactory results could be reached on the part of most students by careful and protracted practice. Every scholar should aim to be a clear and cogent reasoner.

It occurs to us that there is no better way in which the student can apply the culture and the knowledge he is gaining than through the practice of Argumentative Discourse, both as written and oral. It elicits, defines and adjusts all the mental forces and possessions.

Here, again, the close relations of Logic and Rhetoric are manifest, and here, again, the intellectual element in Discourse is seen to be supreme.

**IMPASSIONED (EMOTIONAL) FORM.***Definition.*

It is that form in which the Feelings are prominent. The object of it is, to excite or allay feeling, and the method by which it effects its object is, in general, by the feelings themselves.

**THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS.**

Related, on the one hand, to the Intellect, and, on the other, to the Will, feeling is based on knowledge, and the action of the Will, more or less, on feeling. "All our reasoning," says Pascal, "must resolve itself into yielding to sentiment." "Our system of thought," says Fichte, "is, often, only the testimony of the heart." The Feelings not being distinct faculties, as Imagination and Reason, it has ever been difficult to present them in a logical division. Hence, in most of the leading authorities upon Mental Science and the Science of Discourse, no satisfactory analysis of this part of our nature is found. Dr. Cogan's work, "A Philosophical Treatise on the Passions," approximates to good results, but is injured by the three-fold distinction running through it, of the Passions, Emotions and Affections. Kame, in his "Elements of Criticism," has much valuable suggestion, while special reference is to be made to Dr. M'Cosh's recent treatise on "The Emotions." To this last work the student may be referred for a theory of the emotions that is both philosophical and practical.

**CLASSIFICATION OF EMOTIONS.**

They have been divided, as by Hartley and others, into Pleasurable and Painful; by Stewart and others,

into Rational and Animal; and by Hamilton, into Sensations and Sentiments. An analysis suggested by Cogan is one of the simplest and best. The principle of classification is, The Exciting Cause or Final End of the Emotion.

## I.

*Subjective.*

- |                       |                      |
|-----------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Higher,            | 2. Lower.            |
| a. Self-Respect, etc. | a. Selfishness, etc. |

## II.

*Objective.*

- |                 |                   |
|-----------------|-------------------|
| 1. Higher.      | 2. Lower.         |
| a. Toward God.  | a. Toward God.    |
| Reverence, etc. | Irreverence, etc. |
| b. Toward Man.  | b. Toward Man.    |
| Social.         | Social.           |
| Civil.          | Civil.            |
| Domestic, etc.  | Domestic, etc.    |

In this classification, the æsthetic feelings may be regarded as both objective and subjective.

A further analysis of merit is that given by Dr. Thomas Brown. He divides the emotions into three classes:

I. *Retrospective:*

1. Self-satisfaction,
2. Regret, etc.

II. *Immediate:*

1. Joy and Sorrow,
2. Pride, etc.

III. *Prospective:*

1. Surprise,
2. Hope and Fear, etc.

Here, again, the student may be referred to the work cited on "The Emotions," in which this three-fold classification is adopted and developed and fully illustrated. The discussion of what the author calls Complex Emotions, is of interest in this connection and may be perused with profit.

## REMARKS ON EMOTIONS.

(A.) *They are*, in an important sense, *voluntary as well as involuntary*. It is, indeed, true that our feelings cannot be forced into existence or exercise. They are not the subjects of our commands, appearing and disappearing by sheer resolution on our part. Still, the feelings are not outside and above our control—the control of the judgment and the will. “Though a man,” says Dr. M’Cosh, “may not be able to command his sensibilities directly, he has complete power over them indirectly. He can guide and control, if not the feeling itself, at least the idea which is the channel in which it flows. He is, thus, responsible for them—their perversion, excess and defect.” Our feelings are, thus, voluntary in the sense that they may be excited and allayed, diverted and destroyed, by the action of the will, by bringing and holding before the mind ideas calculated to awaken or banish feeling. Close and protracted meditation upon scenes of sorrow or upon persons suffering will excite the emotion of pity. The various emotions may thus be elicited by dwelling upon the correspondent ideas at the basis of them. It is essential here to remark that Impassioned Discourse, as a separate and prominent form, is founded on the principle that emotion, in a valid and practical sense, is under the guidance of the judgment and the will, that it is a product of reflection upon ideas, specific and individual.

(B.) *They are permanent as well as transient*. Perhaps there is no more common idea connected with the feelings in any view of them than that they are fleeting and evanescent. Each one’s experience confirms



this. They come and go with rapidity. One feeling or class of feelings gives way to another, and this to a third, in rapid succession. This is all true. It is also true, and needs special emphasis, that our feelings are, in a real sense, permanent. There is such a thing in man as a *state* or *condition* of feeling, an emotional nature or habit, which may be relied upon as abiding. This arises from the very constitution of man. His emotions, affections, passions,—whatever we term them, are an integral part of himself. Here, again, it is to be stated that Impassioned Discourse is based on the principle of the *permanence* of feeling. Were they temporary only, no appeal could be made to them, and man would be at the mercy of every influence, good or bad. Though the channels through which our feelings flow, and their objects change, feeling itself abides. It is the aim of Impassioned Discourse to change these channels and objects, and, thus, practically, the feelings themselves.

(c.) *In their nature, forms and degrees of expression, they are conditioned on temperament and varied circumstance.* With many, strong emotion is a gift. They are always impassioned. Others are sluggish and indifferent. We hear of The Motiveless Man. Such an one is, also, The Emotionless Man. He has scarcely any perceptible stirring of soul in any event or before any subject. Others seem to form a middle class and oscillate between the apparent absence and the exuberance of feeling. There is action and reaction, a rise and fall of feeling as regular as that which marks the tides, or, at times, quick transitions from hope to fear, from ecstasy to despair.

As to the different periods of life, the earlier years are marked by emotion; the later, by reflection.

Entire peoples, as the South European, may be called impassioned, and the Northern nations, unimpassioned. The Orientals are such as compared with the peoples of the Occident.

The character of woman is distinct from that of man is emotional. Thus it is evident that the expression of feeling will depend on time, place, character, and general circumstance.

The tendency to decry or undervalue the presence of feeling and its expression in manifest form is to be opposed by every student of Discourse. The idea is far too current that the word *emotional* is quite synonymous with *mystical*, *fanatical*, *sentimental*. These all mark the abuse of feeling in one form or another and should have no weight with intelligent men. We have already seen that feeling is to be under the control of the judgment. We might argue for its presence:—

A—*A priori*. Our emotions being an essential part of our nature, should, with all other essential parts, have their proper place and function. To deny this would be proving too much. It would involve the neglect of the intellectual as well. Dr. McCosh has done no better service in his recent treatise than to show that our emotions are vitally related to our ideas. They have a mental element and application.

B—*Historically*. Within and apart from Discourse it is shown that the highest order of minds has illustrated the desirability of feeling. Character cannot be symmetrical without it. In such examples as Augustine, Edwards, Pascal, Luther, Milton and Knox we see the principle. It is difficult to state on which side of their nature they were the greater—the mental or emotive. The fact is, the strength and beauty of these characters arise from the union of the two.

There are some hindrances to the exercise of true feeling in Discourse which may be easily removed, and to which special attention should be called.

A—*Undue Ornament.* This literary evil has been alluded to before. The evil consists in giving the form or finish of Discourse precedence over the subject-matter. Feeling is informal in its expression. As already seen, it is suggested and guided by the idea behind it, and in no sense by the external character of the Discourse.

B—*Undue Exactness or Precision.* Discourse is far more of a growth than a mechanism. When the structure or mechanical feature becomes the main one, the true conditions are reversed. In the one case, feeling flows as freely as sap through the branches of a healthy tree. In the other, as sluggishly as through the boards of a building. Precision within its limits is desirable, but there may be such a scrupulous nicety of diction and sentence and figure and method as to overreach itself and make the style rigid. Emotion needs range and freedom—a kind of literary abandon.

(D.) *The Necessity of Emotion in Discourse is, thus, evident.* "The spirit and soul of eloquence," says Quintilian, "consists in moving the passions," while Aristotle devotes a large portion of his treatise on Rhetoric to a discussion of the Passions. As was noticed in discussing the quality of Force, the indifference and prejudice and hostility of men cannot be radically and permanently removed by the intellectual element alone. Ideas must be impressed as well as expressed. There must be heat as well as light. Hence, it may be noted that Discourse, both in its general and specific forms, includes the impassioned element as a vital one. If we view it as written and oral, this latter form is distinctively emotional. "Passion," says Alexander, "is eloquence." If we view it as prose and poetry, this latter form, again, is distinctively emotional, while three out of the four

specific forms that we are discussing involve this principle as fundamental.

Still more specifically, certain forms of poetry, such as the Lyric, Pastoral and Elegiac, are so called in that feeling is the chief characteristic, while its marked absence from Didactic Poetry occasions the inquiry whether this form is in any sense poetic. The model discourser, in a word, must be a man possessed of all the elements of manhood, so that what he expresses may be seen to proceed directly from the head and the heart.

We are now brought to the more particular treatment of Impassioned Discourse, and the central topic before us is—The *methods* by which *feeling* may be *awakened* both in *ourselves* and *others*.

#### FEELING IN OURSELVES.

(A.) *By a careful study of the element of feeling in our nature*—our emotions and affections as they may be said to be distinct from the mental side of our being. There is gross ignorance, here, arising from criminal neglect. Many who have made a careful study of the intellect and will, and, perchance, of the conscience and taste in their purely mental aspects, have strangely overlooked the domain of feeling—its sources, nature, and modes of expression. Though to some such a study may not be indispensable, to the student of Discourse it is so. He must know himself as an emotional being.

(B.) *By the positive cultivation of this side of our nature* as thus revealed, by the *actual exercise* of feeling upon appropriate objects. It is to be expressed and not suppressed. In so far as it is possible, the whole

being is to be kept open to noble impulses and these are to be acted out in the life. More is meant, here, than that our feelings should be simply awakened by proper objects. They are to be expressed and applied; and the result will be a still more profound awakening. Pity, as awakened by suffering, is to be followed by acts of charity, by which the emotion of pity is deepened and hallowed. Indignation, excited by that which is ignoble, is to be positively expressed against it. If the emotion is suppressed or restrained, the result is most injurious. The very fountain of feeling is thereby sealed. Men may thus arrive at a condition of soul when the biblical statement is as true in Discourse and in life as in morals, that they are "past feeling."

The condemnation of the lower drama as distinct from the higher, and of the sensational novel as distinct from the historical and descriptive is just here. Passion is excited for its own sake. There is no reference to the expression of feeling on worthy objects and for worthy ends. Hence, there is a reaction which is morbid and fatal to all true emotion. For this reason, if for no other, the lower forms of the drama and of fiction should be shunned by every intelligent man.

Even in the higher forms of these types of Discourse something of this evil enters, but it is counteracted by other agencies that are involved.

(c.) *By a careful study of the impassioned element in the theme, the occasion, and the special object of Discourse at the time.* Webster remarks of true eloquence, "That it does not consist in speech. It must

exist in the man, the subject and occasion." The principle is a true one and has an important application to the topic in hand. Some themes and occasions are, in themselves, emotional. They need but to be studied in order to elicit the emotion from them, and, thereby, from ourselves. The celebrated French preachers of the age of Louis XIV. fully understood this principle. They aroused their own souls by thoroughly comprehending the situation. They were stimulated and inspired by the circumstances. Bossuet in his "Funeral Orations" and Massillon in his "Lenten Discourses" are illustrious examples. The general principle, here, is that the discourses should accommodate himself to his surroundings. If they are calculated to beget emotion, he should be emotional, and the more fully he brings himself into sympathy with them, the more appropriate, affecting, and effective will he be.

(D.) *By the cultivation of the Imagination in its emotional agency*, as the poetic in distinction from the philosophic faculty. The important principle involved is this: Emotion is excited in us with reference to any object in proportion to the *nearness* and *reality* of the object and it is one of the functions of the Imagination, as a poetic, pictorial or representative agent to effect this very result. It brings the distant near; makes the insensible, visible; and the unreal, substantial. We see it and touch it. In the times of the Crusades so potent was the action of this faculty in the minds of the common people of Europe, as they pictured to themselves the indignities against the Cross and the Holy Sepulchre and the Holy Land,

that feeling developed into passion and this into the wildest fanaticism. They were inflamed with enthusiastic ardor on behalf of their Lord.

George Whitefield so portrayed to his own soul the sufferings of the lost that he preached as one who had seen the misery he described.

We are not speaking now of the fancy in its waywardness and whims, but of the imagination in its normal action as one of the agents through which emotion is awakened. We notice, in passing, that faith in the spiritual sphere accomplishes results somewhat similar to those effected by the imagination in the purely secular sphere. "It is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." Moreover, "Faith worketh by love,"—through the emotional nature.

(E.) *By the cultivation of our Moral Nature.* Here is the source of our deepest, purest and most permanent emotions. Hence, no better examples of emotion, as seen in character and Discourse, can be found than those given in Scripture and religious biography. David, Peter and John are typical examples in character, as are the Psalms and the Gospels and Epistles in literature. It is safe to say that there are no emotions of our complex nature that are not exhibited in these men and their writings. Addison, in one of his *Spectator* papers, dwells upon the indebtedness of English to Hebrew for pathetic terms.

Such a culture of our moral nature with reference to feeling involves:—

A—A deep sense, on the part of the discourser, of the needs of those addressed, as making zeal on his part essential to meeting them.

B—A high conception of his work as a discourser—its character

and aims, stimulating him to increasing enthusiasm in realizing it. Discourse rises, thus, from the level of the official and mercenary to the moral plane.

C—A sincere love of the truth and faith in its power to affect man. This, at once, begets zeal in the study, defence and circulation of it.

D—Negatively, there is involved the rejection of every method and aim not fully sanctioned by conscience. The principle here is, that immoral procedure would stifle true passion. True pathos and purity of theme, treatment and final purpose, go together.

### FEELING IN OTHERS.

(A.) *By Exposition.* To teachable and candid minds, the mere presentation of the truth is sufficient to awaken feeling. We have seen, however, that such minds are so rare that this method is practically invalid when alone.

(B.) *By Argument.* Here, we advance a step farther with reference to emotion. The method, by itself, is still inefficient. Reason may be satisfied, and yet the feeling that ought to be awakened is not awakened. The connection between proof and passion is not always or in most cases apparent. Hence, more specific and reliable methods must be sought.

(C.) *By the exhibition of feeling in ourselves.* The attention is thus at once secured, so as to give to what is said the fullest advantage. Conciliation of prejudice is at once effected and interest awakened. Even the indifferent and the hostile are pleased by minds in earnest. They respect what they do not practice. This power of earnestness is especially great over the middle and lower classes of society—the people. Indifference cannot even have a hearing. The one hop-



ing to reach them must be deeply interested in his theme and in them. He is accepted by them as the exponent and test of his own principles. Have they absorbed and quickened him? If so, this will atone for many deficiencies. If not, no amount of exposition or argument can avail. Scholars might apprehend the idea, though presented coldly, but the people cannot and will not. Hence, in oral Discourse, this principle is especially potent and essential, in that the relation of mind to mind is closer. There are elements and opportunities present not possible elsewhere. Still, in written Discourse, the principle is far more practical and vital than supposed. There is, here, a mental law operating—the reciprocal and mysterious influence of mind upon mind. This intimacy may become almost confidential, on the basis of a kind of elective affinity. The mind addressing and the minds addressed, for the time being, are one. “Passion is catching,” and the passion of the one is caught by the other. All that is meant by the power of sympathy is included here. Persons and interests are unified in a common cause. What one feels the other feels. The ability on the part of a writer or orator to identify himself with others will mark the measure of his influence over them. To do it at all is a sign of power. To do it fully is the evidence of genius in Discourse. It is through such a deep and spacious channel that feeling flows as a flood from soul to soul. Here lies the explanation of the most brilliant results in Discourse. The biographer and the novelist excel here. If “Boswell’s Life of Johnson” is the best biography ever written, it is on the principle before us. In oratory, Webster against Hayne in Congress, and Burke

against Hastings in Parliament, illustrate the principle. The respective audiences were simply overpowered, so that the emotion broke forth into audible expression. The orators had identified themselves with their hearers so that they took a common view of the truth presented. The application of this principle in sacred Discourse rises to the level of the morally sublime. "Good God, he is gone!" cried Chesterfield, as he sat listening to Whitefield depicting the perilous course of the sinner under the image of a blind man walking on the margin of a precipice. The preaching of Knox and Luther, of Edwards and the Wesleys, is full of illustrations of this power. The influence of the Spirit apart, these results were due to the principle in question. In the lives of the most eminent actors, orators, and pleaders of history, where no such special influence is presupposed, the results are similar.

This expression of personal feeling in order to awaken that of others is governed by a two-fold condition.

A—*It must be genuine.* We are not now speaking of those departments of Discourse in which emotion is purposely feigned, as in the drama and in fiction. Even in these, however, the results are measured by the discourses's ability to make the passion appear, at the time, perfectly natural. If as a dramatist, actor or novelist he so identifies himself with his character as to forget himself in it, the illusion is complete and the feeling has the character of genuineness. Emotion is pre-eminently ingenuous and natural. It cannot be for any length of time successfully feigned or forced. It is too delicate and tender to be trifled with, and if abused will react with dangerous results. Affectation in Discourse is as repulsive as it is in character, and human nature is quick to discern and despise it. The hired mourners of the East who for so much an hour bewail the loss of the dead are no more revolting to a sensitive soul than is that discourses who "tears a passion all to tatters," as an expedient to atone

for the absence of true emotion. Feeling must be frank in order to rouse and influence the feelings of others.

B—*Special care is to be exercised as to the measure of its expression.* This is to be partial, gradual or reserved, rather than abrupt and exhaustive. This principle has been alluded to in the discussion of Force, and it was there stated that of the two methods of expression of feeling, the subdued and the demonstrative, the former was often the more effective.

There is, in the very nature of emotion, an element of modest reserve. Though, at times, as in the orations of Demosthenes against Philip or of Cicero against Catiline, the boldest and fullest outbursts of passion are in place, the milder and more gradual method is generally preferable.

So true is this, that when genuine feeling really exists in the soul, its partial expression is most effective. The attitude of the Saviour toward the Syro-Phœnecian woman (Matt. xv. 21-28) is a notable instance of this. His apparent indifference accomplished the end he designed. Despite his language and his manner that mother knew that he had sympathy for her and persevered until he placed all things at the disposal of her faith. There is such a thing as reserve force—a “hiding of power”—latent heat. Always to express the full measure of our feeling not only argues defect of judgment but indicates poverty of feeling. No discourses can afford to appear to exhaust himself. To express just enough feeling to indicate its presence and the fulness of it in the soul is the source of power. In fact, the deepest emotion is inexpressible by language. If it were not so, it would not be necessary to give it exhaustive utterance. All that is demanded is, that it be evident to other minds that the emotion is in the soul rich and full. It may be added, here, that this expression of our feeling both as to its form and measure is largely modified in oral Discourse by what is termed *elocution*. Attitude, gesture, voice, countenance and general manner may have an important part to play. There is great difference as to the way in which different orators conceal and reveal their emotion, and reveal by concealing. The secret power of what is called Personal Presence, the communication of thought and passion without words, is here involved. Soul communes directly with soul. Mutual feeling fuses their natures into one and the life is one.

In the sphere of dramatic representation marvellous results are accomplished by the mere elocutionary skill of the actors. Plays have been interrupted by the demonstrations of an aroused audience.

(D.) *By placing the subject we are presenting in the line of the strongest feelings of those addressed.* This elicits their fullest sympathy in it and on the ground of self-interest commits them to it. Here may be said to lie the most cardinal principle of this form of Discourse. Taking for granted that the hearer's attitude toward the subject is known, if the subject and his strongest feelings run counter we must modify and adjust each to each. Manifestly, there must be mutual concessions, and the skill of the discourser will be shown when, conceding what he can without the sacrifice of principle, he moves those addressed to a radical change of sentiment. It is in this respect that Antony's speech over the dead Cæsar has no parallel in literature. The deepest hostility was changed to cordial sympathy by his consummate art. It is also the divine method carried out by the in-working of the Spirit. The truth and the man meet and coalesce.

(E.) *By the influence of authority.* This authority is based on the intrinsic right which the truth has to be heard and the discourser's personal right to utter it. The best illustration of this principle is in the sphere of preaching. Here, the truth is infallible and the herald of it divinely commissioned. The old prophets always spoke "with authority," as did the apostles and Christ Himself. If a man is called to the ministry, he has, thereby, a claim to be heard. He must speak and men ought to listen. So potent is this principle that the most timid have been supported by it. Jeremiah said, "I cannot speak, for I am a child." Moses said, "I am not eloquent. I am

slow of speech and of a slow tongue." Paul said, "Who is sufficient for these things!" and Luther tells us that he never went to the pulpit without tremor. Such were the natural feelings of these worthies, and yet, so sure were they of the power of the truth and their call to utter it, that they are historic models of moral courage. Men were subdued and softened before them. Hence, false prophets have always been wise enough to take advantage of this principle. They have come, as Mohammed came, with claims. They have usurped that moral authority which they knew to be essential to success. So it is in secular Discourse, both oral and written. Before we can enlist the sympathies of others we must come with credentials, and, other things being equal, he will awaken and sustain the deepest interest who utters his thoughts with that boldness and directness which come from the consciousness of plenary power to utter it. Such power is based on a sincere love of the truth, the possession of it in its purity and fulness, a deep desire to circulate it, and an actual commission from God and man to express it.

Such, then, are the methods by which our own emotion and that of others is to be awakened. Based as they are on a sound philosophy, and practical as they are within the sphere of impassioned Discourse, they may commend themselves to every student of the art. The negative side of this subject—How feeling may be allayed—needs no discussion, as it is practically included in the principles given. As far as indifference exists, the work is all that of arousal, and as far as prejudice and hostility exist, these depart as new

and better feelings enter. In the case of extreme feeling, this may be modified and tempered by the gradual methods already mentioned.

We are now prepared for the discussion of the fourth and final specific form of Discourse—The Persuasive.

### PERSUASIVE FORM (Oratorical).

#### *Definition.*

This form has special reference to the Will and Conscience. It effects its object by the presentation of Motives, that object being, to secure an immediate effect, more or less permanent, upon the will and conduct—to lead to present and personal action. It includes Persuasion and Dissuasion. The first as the positive type gives the name to the form. The difference between Persuasion and Conviction has already been noted.

#### *Importance.*

As already suggested, inasmuch as this is the final form it may be regarded as the most important. It is so in its relations rather than in itself. Hence, the entire art has often been defined in terms of this form, *e. g.*, Plato defines Rhetoric as, "The power of persuasion by speaking." Socrates terms it, "The worker of persuasion." Aristotle styles it, "A faculty of considering all the possible means of persuasion on every subject." "It is," says Quintilian, "that art or talent by which Discourse is adapted to its end." The end is, as Campbell expresses it, "to move the will." Its office, says Bacon, is, "To apply reason

to imagination for the better moving of the will." In all these definitions the will is prominent, and the persuasive form is not so much one of many, as the all-inclusive one. Its place as final and its object, also, give it prominence.

These definitions, though extreme upon the face of them, are substantially correct in that the presence of the other forms and the action of the other faculties is involved. In our previous discussion of the Relation of Forms, the student will note the proper place of this one, and its close connection with the Impassioned Form.

### *Characteristics.*

(A.) *This form is especially oratorical.* The preceding ones are so, to a good degree, but this still more emphatically. The reason of this is, that it is the most *objective* form of Discourse. The respective results of the other forms, *instruction*, *conviction* and *impression*, may be purely subjective. This form presupposes a definite, immediate and external end—the movement of the will to outward action. Hence, the relation of this form, as written to oral Discourse or to oratory proper is much more intricate than that of any other form. It is transitional between written and oral Discourse proper. Hence, we shall find it convenient in discussing it to examine some of the varied types of oratorical Discourse.

(B.) *It is especially ethical.* It has principally to do with the Will and Conscience as moral faculties, with men as influenced by motives, as possessed of moral character, and morally responsible for their actions as

free agents. Hence, a brief discussion of Motives, Will, and Conscience, will be essential to clearness. Discourse as a moral art or process is nowhere more fully manifest than at this stage. The faculties employed, the agencies and methods and aims, are moral rather than mental. The questions at issue turn less upon clearness or truth than upon right and obligation. As the previous characteristic brings us into the province of Oratory, this brings us into that of Moral Science, Ethics, and the special sphere of Sacred Discourse, as pre-eminently persuasive. A brief discussion of the faculties employed in this form is essential.

### The Will.

The Will is the faculty of all others—the Executive in the City of Man-Soul. It is what many philosophers have termed The Active Power, in distinction from the purely intellectual. Through it the man is determined to positive action. There is, indeed, the presence of this active element in the other powers. We see it in the Intellect when, as soon as a conception or conviction is received, there is the tendency to express it in external form. Still more manifest is this element in our Emotive nature, where it would seem to require a good degree of will to refrain from giving expression to our feelings. Still, many are able to stop short of this. In this sense, therefore, the Will is the final power in that the others work towards it. It is *effective*. As to a more particular view of the constituents of Will power, we may note, as sufficient here, Desire and Volition. Desire precedes Volition and is in the line of motive to action,



though the ability and occasion to act may not exist. It tends directly toward action. It is, however, a tendency only. To desire, is one thing; to determine, is another. Volitions mark the positive action of the Will. They are tendencies transformed into settled purpose—the media through which desires pass into act, wishes into will.

As to the relation of Will to Motive it is sufficient to say—that it always acts under the influence of motives, that in the conflict of motives it acts under the influence of the strongest motive, and that it acts freely.

### Conscience.

This is a faculty in its nature, province, and function, distinctively moral and, thus, prominent in Persuasion. It may be defined as that *faculty* and *sensibility* by which we come to the *knowledge* and *appreciation* of the moral in character and act. It is a Moral Faculty and a Moral Sense. It involves a judgment pronounced and an emotion experienced. As a faculty, its decisions are based on moral truth, and as a sensibility, its experiences are based on these moral decisions. Its close relation to the Will may be seen in that the moral perception and enjoyment of a lovely character may be the motive to its imitation. The knowledge and appreciation of anything as morally right or wrong, in fact, obliges the Will to its performance or omission.

The Word of God is full of instruction on this point. Men are addressed persuasively as moral beings, possessed of Will and Conscience—as thus amenable to motive. It need simply be added here that Con-

science is an original and universal faculty; that its dictates are supreme; and that it assumes the presence of reason and liberty of action.

### Motives.

A motive is that which occasions or incites to action. Man is a moral being and agent, that is, under the influence of motives. Reason, consciousness and experience confirm this. He is not a mere subject of mechanical or physical influence—a creature of necessity—but free to act in accordance with motives presented.

(A.) *Men are responsible for their motives.* They are bound to be actuated by right motives in the sum total of life and in each separate act. Our motives themselves are moral or immoral. Even the desires and affections preceding them are such.

(B.) *Motives are a true test of character*—a measure of morality. Men cannot be finally judged simply by the external act. Benevolent acts may spring from the love of doing good or from the love of fame. Much of the fallacy of the judgments of men with reference to each other lies here. The judgment is purely external. The solemnity of man's relation to God is thus shown. His omniscience sees the motive. The very word *conscience* (*con-scio*) indicates this.

(C.) *Motives in themselves, however good they may be, are not sufficient to justify an act.* If evil is done that good may result, it is still, so far, evil. The end does not sanctify the means or the act. The act it-

self must be essentially right. These two things—rightness in the *motive* and in the *act*, constitute the completed morality. Either apart, the act is defective.

(D.) *The standard of motive is, ultimately, the Word of God as the source of truth. Mediatly, it is the Conscience. An enlightened conscience is the only safe guide. If not enlightened, it must still be heeded, and the results are disastrous. Every man is bound to have an enlightened conscience, and then to follow it.*

From what has been briefly stated thus far, it is evident that the successful discourser as a Persuader must be conversant with the Moral Nature of Man, his Will, and Conscience; how they are affected by motives; and must know the relations of this nature to the mental and emotional. He must be conversant with Moral Science, with Ethical Psychology. Here, again, the philosophical side of Discourse is prominent.

#### CLASSIFICATION OF MOTIVES.

Various divisions have been given.

Of Pleasure and Pain—present and future.—*Bain.*

Of Goodness and Happiness.

Animal, Intellectual, Æsthetic, Moral, Spiritual.—*Hope.*

Intellectual, Emotional, (Motives Proper).—*Day.*

The division which we shall present is as follows:

RATIONAL,  
EMOTIONAL,  
MORAL.

*Rational Motives.*

These have their basis in the Intellect, Reason, or Judgment. Though it be true that there can be no motive entirely devoid of feeling, there are some in which the mental element predominates. This is well illustrated in what we aptly term The Conflict of Motives. It is a conflict between our motives as emotional and rational. The tendency of our feelings is one way and the firm conviction of our judgment is another. Rational motives are furnished by exposition and argument and are supposed to have weight with educated men. Such men might, in the best sense of the term, be called Rationalists. They insist, and very properly, upon seeing the reasonableness of things proposed for adoption.

Prudential Motives, so called, having reference to expediency, might be included here. By these Rational Motives fewer men are affected than might be supposed. Men far too often violate the dictates of their judgments. They act irrationally. Men perfectly sane are extremely rare.

*Emotional Motives.*

Some men are affected only through their *sensibilities*. They must feel the object proposed to be a proper one. In this class of motives are included all the emotions as classified and discussed. *Emotions*, as the word indicates, are not simply passive results of influence from without but agents in effecting results. They are motors to the Will. Men are persuaded by them. "The Love of Christ," says Paul, "constraineth us." Emotions and Motives, Affecting

and Effecting, are, respectively, from the same root. It is to be specially noted that the classification already given of the emotions, into Higher and Lower, has its application here. This opens a large field for the operation of motives. All the affections, instincts, appetites, and passions of the soul, noble and base, are here included—subjective or objective—humility and arrogance, reverence and irreverence, philanthropy and misanthropy, gratitude and ingratitude, loyalty and treason.

The passions, good or bad, are in the nature of the case, and as shown by experience, eminently persuasive. Such motives have more or less influence with all men. With impassioned natures, they have special influence. *Æsthetic* motives, in so far as taste involves sensibility, are here included.

As to the *lower* emotional motives, an important distinction is to be made. Some are perfectly legitimate and have their proper function within proper limits. Such are the purely physical or animal feelings—the action of our bodily senses. Our Sensations, Instincts and Appetites are of this character. Others are base, extreme, and as such, always improper.

We call them The Lower Instincts, The Baser Passions. They are sensual and degrading and ally the man to the brute. Operative as they are with large numbers of men, they are to be known only to be avoided. We are dealing only with the nobler natures.

Persuasion is ethical.

### *Moral Motives.*

As already suggested, all motives are more or less ethical. They are moral in character, proceed by

moral processes, and pertain to moral ends. Some, however, are eminently so. They are addressed directly to the conscience and are supposed to have weight with all good men. All men should acknowledge them. "Commending ourselves," says Paul, "to every man's conscience in the sight of God."

### *Relations of Motives.*

The three classes of motives presented have reference, respectively, to that which is reasonable, pleasurable (higher or lower) and right,—to the Intellect, Feelings (including Taste) and Conscience.

According to nature, therefore, these should all co-exist and interact in the man as agents of persuasion to the Will. Men should act, first of all, thus and thus because it is right; then, because it is reasonable; and then, because it is pleasurable. Nor is such a union merely imaginary.

Moral Motives must be more or less rational in that Conscience is a mental faculty, and more or less emotional in that it is a Moral Sense. As matters of fact, moreover, the Christian world exemplifies the union of the three classes.

The relation of the first and third classes is especially vital. That which is morally right is always and thereby rational in that God is its original source.

What were presented as the Higher Emotional Motives, in distinction from the Lower, may be regarded as ranking with the Moral. The Lower Emotional Motives, in so far as they are proper, are the least valuable and must ever yield in case of conflict with the higher. In so far as they are improper, they should never be allowed to operate.

### Use of Superior and Inferior Motives.

As a theory, we ought in Discourse to use simply the superior motives—the moral, rational and higher emotional. Practically, the use of the inferior motives in so far as proper is often found to be expedient and necessary. The higher nature of man is often reached through his lower—his soul and mind through his instincts and appetites. If methods are optional, this one is to be avoided; if the only one, it is admissible.

It is suggestive to note that Jehovah in his dealings with the Hebrews seems to adopt this lower method as preparative to the higher. He appeals to them on the basis of temporal and present rewards as an incentive to moral obedience; promises them corn and wine and oil, protection against their foes, and national prosperity, and final possession of the Land of Promise. As their moral enlightenment would warrant it this temporary method gave way to a more spiritual order of dealing, and in the New Testament Moral 'Suasion takes the place of visible reward. This lower method is equally manifest on the negative side—Dissuasion. There was a mount of cursing as well as of blessing, threatening as well as promise, punishment as well as reward, the fear of personal and material evils as well as the hope of future good.

The same method, positive and negative, is adopted by men in every age as they seek to persuade others. The personal tastes and sentiments of men are consulted, their likes and dislikes, their hopes and their fears, and the problem is, how to run the object to which we would incite them parallel with such views and feelings. Society and the State take full advantage of this principle.

Fear of punishment, or of social disgrace, holds the hand from crime when all other motives might be vain. The dishonor of defeat and the dread of death or capture makes many a brave soldier where loyalty would not do it.

These are the lower and yet legitimate motives that have weight, in fact, with the masses of mankind. Hence it is to be emphasized, if it is necessary to use them, they are to be used only as a necessity, to be used as a means by which to reach the superior motives, to be modified as the people rise in true sentiment, in knowledge and morality, and when possible, totally abandoned for the higher motives. Every high-minded discourseser will so use them. The violation of this principle has wrought widespread disaster among the nations. Ignorant or designing men have begun with these lower motives and have ended there, or, worse than that, have descended to those still lower motives to which it is morally degrading for a man ever to appeal.

### Conditions of Persuasion.

(a.) It must be shown that the end proposed is *desirable*, or, under the circumstances, *expedient*. This does not, necessarily, rise to the high level that it be morally good or right. This element may or may not be included. With good men it is always so. With men in general, however, the end must appear desirable, pleasurable, at the time, whatever the ground of it may be. It must be seen to conduce to their interests and happiness. The statement of Paley, "Whatever is expedient is right," will not bear sifting in its application here.



It may be noted that this desirability of the end is best shown through an appeal to the feelings, including those that are moral. The emotions themselves, thus, become motives. The object is held up until feeling is excited by it and toward it. All the methods discoursed in the previous form are applicable here.

(b.) It must be shown that the end proposed is *practicable* or *feasible*, that the means suggested are conducive to the end. As in determining where the Presumption lies, the question of right is more important than that of mere existence, so, here, feasibility is more important than mere desirability, as applied to persuasion. Any reform, political or moral, proposed to a people must meet this condition. So as to personal character and conduct. The object must be attainable. Revolution, however desirable or right, is justifiable only on this principle. Apart from this, the more desirable the end the more unfortunate. It is fatal to all effort. If men act against such odds it is the part of absolute desperation. They are motiveless men. It may be noted that as the desirability of the end is to be shown by an appeal to the feelings, the practicability of it is to be shown by proof. The first condition connects this form of Discourse with the Impassioned, and the second condition, with the Argumentative.

As to these two conditions mentioned, it is to be added that their *presence* does *not necessarily* lead to *action*. Though expedient and attainable, other elements may enter to prevent the realization of the end. All that the discourser can do, however, is to show that these conditions are met in any given case and leave the result with the mind addressed. Some

minds cannot be persuaded; some will not be. It is the discourser's part to present all feasible motives with clearness and force, and cast the responsibility of action upon the mind addressed. Men cannot act for each other. It is manifest from what has been stated that Dissuasion, the negative side of this form, is to be effected by showing the end proposed undesirable and impracticable, or, still further, by introducing a stronger counter motive. What Chalmers calls, "The expulsive power of a new affection," is applicable here. In its expulsive agency, it drives out existing motives. This last method finds its best illustration in the moral sphere, with which Persuasive Discourse has specially to do, *e. g.*, Moral reformers are beginning to learn that the best way in which to dissuade from Intemperance is, by infusing Christian principle into the souls of the tempted.

Humility will expel pride; generosity, avarice; and any higher motive, a lower one.

So, in the secular sphere, a nation may be dissuaded from the conquest of a weaker power by motives of political honor.

### FORMS OF PERSUASIVE DISCOURSE.

It has been stated that the characteristics of Persuasion are, that it is Ethical and Oratorical. It is to the latter of these that special reference is now to be made. Persuasion may now be viewed as definitely oratorical. As intimated, this form of Discourse marks the transition between written and oral Discourse. The writer with his oration in manuscript is ready for the Elocutionist.

### Primitive Forms.

The old classification of Aristotle is as follows:—

(A.) *The Demonstrative Oration*. It had reference to *present* ends. Having to do especially with motives, it may be termed *moral*. Its object was, to praise or blame, to show the honorable and dishonorable.

(B.) *The Deliberative Oration*. Called, also, political. It had to do with the *future*. Its aim was to exhort and dissuade, to prove proper (expedient) or improper.

(C.) *The Judicial Oration*. This had to do with the *past*, with accusation and defence. Its aim was, to prove just or unjust.

We shall discuss the forms as:—Secular and Sacred. As we have to do but incidentally with the latter, the Secular may be discussed as,

(a.) JUDICIAL—The Bar.

(b.) FORENSIC—The Senate.

(c.) POPULAR—The Platform.

#### (1.) The Judicial Form.

Its *general* end is, to secure justice between man and man as individuals or as nations. Its *specific* end may be said to be, to secure a favorable verdict in any given case. The entire province of criminal law is here opened to the discourses. In this sphere, the power of jurists is persuasive. The pleader arises to persuade. There is no type of Discourse in which the various forms that have been studied combine more vitally than in this. It is similar to debate in this particular. There is first of all, on the part of the jurist, the exposition of the law. He then ad-

duces his proofs for and against and presents these with impassioned earnestness in order to persuade. Instruction, conviction and impression unite in order to persuasion. So marked is the power of feeling here that the Athenians permitted no appeal to the feelings in addressing the judges of the Areopagus. Nothing but pitiless logic, "even-handed justice," was admissible. This exaction was extreme. The Emotions must have a place in this form. Though the immediate object is conviction, the ultimate one is persuasion and in all true persuasion feeling has a function to perform. This principle enters even into civil and statute law when the jurist is pleading for the repeal of some iniquitous law or for the adoption of some great legal principle essential to the safety of the state. In such cases the mere attorney or counsellor is lost in the impassioned pleader. Judicial Discourse in its written form is found in Reports of Cases and Arguments.

#### REQUISITES.

A—*General knowledge of law.*

B—*Special knowledge of the case in hand.*

This has been a marked feature of all successful pleaders. They have thoroughly informed themselves as to the merits of the question before them and anticipated all objections. They knew the evidence on which the case rested and were ready to defend it. Each case brought before a jurist will thus have its own sphere. The judicial orator must examine it in its separate claims and also as related to general jurisprudence. No better example of this principle can be found in American history than Rufus Choate.

It should here be remarked that if the Legal Profession in this country is to be worthy of its antecedents it must resist the tendencies which at present are at work to degrade it into a mercenary trade, and build upon those foundations which were laid by Choate and his able forerunners.

C—*Power of presenting a case with clearness and cogency.* This applies to all successful Discourse, but more especially to this type. The jurist, in so far as his oratorical character is concerned, must be a man of clear conceptions, deep convictions, and forcible expression—able so to array his arguments before his audience that their weight shall be felt.

It is needless to add that the personality of the man and the jurist enters here as an important factor.

## (2.) The Forensic Form.

It takes its name from the Roman Forum. It is Ciceronian in origin. As a modern type, it is Parliamentary or Congressional. Its *general* aim is, to unfold, maintain and enforce the laws of the state as expressed in codes and constitutions. Its *specific* aim is, to persuade a legislative body to adopt or reject a given code or resolution. It seeks to affect the public will as represented in its national legislators. The orator is now a representative man. The court has given place to the senate chamber.

The Judicial and Forensic forms are, however, closely allied. Political life is often the goal of the jurist. As far as our own country is concerned, our most able congressional orators have been jurists. Webster and Hamilton are notable examples. The political history of England and America has its full

share of able forensic discourses,—Calhoun, Clay, Adams, Otis, Pitt, Fox, Burke and Macaulay are conspicuous.

After Otis had spoken against “writs of assistance,” “Every man,” says Adams, “appeared to go away as I did, ready to take up arms against them.”

Mirabeau in the French Assembly speaking against the nobility; Cicero in the Forum against Catiline; Sumner in the Senate defending the Civil Right’s Bill—all were forensic orators. The written specimens of this form of Discourse are found in State Papers and Proceedings.

#### REQUISITES.

A—*A deep devotion to the national good.* The representative should not be the extreme partisan. One of the evils of American politics is, that loyalty to a constituency is so often made to conflict with the duty that every statesman owes to the general good.

B—*Knowledge of Government*—its origin, functions, forms and aims, of constitutional law and political science. This involves, more specifically, knowledge of the particular government of which the speaker is a member and exponent. He must be intimate with its organization as national, state and municipal; with its elements of strength and weakness; with its genius or spirit as monarchical or liberal. The special defect of American statesmen lies just here. As to the Science of Government and the constitution of the state, most of them know nothing. Legislation is simply a personal and mercenary matter, and the exalted principles which ruled in the minds of Webster and Madison are unknown.

. The relation of the English Universities to the English Parliament is a salutary one. It lends character to statecraft. Such a man as Gladstone is the typical statesman. Liberal culture would not be amiss in our political leaders. It would give breadth and balance.

### (3.) The Popular Form.

Its *general* object is, to move the will of the people, to sway the masses.

*Specifically*, it aims to secure a definite expression of their opinion through the ballot-box. It is best exhibited among us on the platform at national elections, or on some question of public interest in social morals, education or trade. The audience is the people as such, rather than any part or distinctive class. In no one of the forms is the oratorical feature more prominent. It is all objective as to source, method and aim, of and by and for the people. Hence, the range of subjects is much wider than in the previous forms. It embraces all topics in which the people are interested.

Its methods, also, are more varied and flexible. In the other forms, these are professional and defined. In this, they are popular. They vary with the popular will, taste, and general condition. Public Opinion is changeable, and though the high-minded discourser aims to control and elevate the people, still, there is a sense in which public caprice, prejudice and habit must be consulted. This form unites freely with the Forensic. When the representative comes before the people on some national question, as Gladstone before the English, this union is seen. When such an ora-

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tor is also a jurist, the three forms are combined. It may be stated that such combinations are becoming frequent in all representative governments.

Hence we note that the Popular Form is, eminently, the Liberal or Democratic Form. It could not exist in an Absolute Monarchy, or exist in its best expression in any other than a Free State. In such countries as England and France it is rapidly increasing, owing to the increasing strength of the popular element in politics. It is the American form. As written, it is found in the Press. Potent, however, as the influence of the Press is in Public crises, the living orator is demanded. Persuasion is based on Personality.

#### REQUISITES.

A—*Devotion to the public good.*

B—*Knowledge of the people*—their tastes, opinions and needs.

C—*Knowledge of methods* by which they may be reached and influenced.

This is partly instinctive, and partly acquired.

The subject of Motives is prominent here. The discourser must know what motives have weight with the people, and, in so far as proper, appeal to them. He must know the Public Will and Conscience. The coercive method must yield to the moral.

Force is here admissible, but it must be force of character and conscience. Persuasion is ethical.

#### The Sacred Form.

A single reference or two will suffice as to this form. In regard to audience, general aim and method,



it is closely allied to the Popular form. It is that form in the sacred sphere. In specific aim and method, it is moral and not secular. In this respect it is distinctive and marks an advance.

It may be said to be the most comprehensive form, in that all secular truth can be utilized in addition to that which is purely religious; and also the most effective form, in that moral truth appeals most forcibly to man.

The basis of this kind of persuasion is Exposition and Proof. Men are more and more suspicious, and rightly so, of mere appeals apart from previous enlightenment. The argument for an educated ministry lies here. An ignorant exhorter does positive mental and moral harm. Intelligence granted, preaching is persuasive. "We persuade men," says Paul. Men are to be led to commit themselves to a definite line of life.

### The Typical Form.

- (a.) Its Basis—The Word of God.
- (b.) Its Leading Argument—The Love of God.
- (c.) Its double End—The Glory of God in the Salvation of Man.
- (d.) Its Sphere—The Moral Nature of Man.
- (e.) Its Sanction—The Divine Commission.
- (f.) Its Aid—The Spirit.
- (g.) Its Relations and Results—Spiritual and Eternal.

An able and impassioned preacher pleading with and for the people is the highest example of persuasive oratory. Not Webster at the Bar, nor Chatham in Parliament, nor Henry on the Hustings, but Paul

on Mars' Hill, represents the model persuader and highest type of human address.

#### REQUISITES.

A—*Personal piety.*

B—*A mental and spiritual knowledge of Scripture.*

C—*Acquaintance with the moral nature and needs of man.*

D—*Skill in the use of moral means and dependence on the Spirit.*

E—*Love for the souls of men.*

F—*Power to instruct and impress men.*

All Discourse, as Theremin has taught us, is, in a sense, ethical. It has reference to principle and character; to conscience and motives; to influence and action. Discourse is the expression of mind and character in order to influence mind and character. In its origin, laws, methods and ends, it rises above the sphere of the merely verbal and æsthetic to the higher and broader planes of the mental and spiritual.

The principles of Discourse are grounded ultimately on the mental and moral constitution of man, and, whatever the intermediate and incidental objects may be, the final and crowning object is, the formation of moral purpose with reference to moral practice. "The orator," says Quintilian, "is an upright man who understands speaking." The discourser, we might add, is an upright man who understands discoursing. The expression of thought, oral or written, to instruct, convince, impress or persuade is a mental and moral process. It is based on culture and character.

## POETRY (METRICAL DISCOURSE.)

## (1.) Origin of Poetry.

Poetry in its *origin* is *natural* and *ancient*. It arose out of the spontaneous action of the soul, and, historically, precedes prose as a form of expression. Before historians and essayists and philosophers wrote, the bards and minstrels sang and played the songs which they had composed. The word *Αοιδός* in Greek expresses this two-fold office ere poetry and music were, in a sense, separated. The composer and the performer are now distinct. Different nations, but more especially the Greeks, have claimed to exhibit the first examples of the poetic art. Its rise has been ascribed to Orpheus and Musæus. If poetry is natural in its origin, however, we must go back of the civilization of Greece and the older nations to primitive and pastoral life, to the forests and meadows of hunters and herdsmen, to that simplicity of thought and life which disappears as history advances. Poetry in some of its forms, religious or secular, lyric or dramatic, pastoral or descriptive, might be supposed to be, as it is, the first expression of human feeling. At first it was the only medium of instruction and pleasure, and the first productions that were handed down by transcription or tradition were poetical. As Macaulay aptly argues in his "Essay on Milton," these earlier periods of the world's life, its infancy and childhood, were adapted to that unrestrained, emotional and figurative expression which is essentially poetic. "In a rude state of society," he says, "men are children with a greater variety of ideas. It is, therefore, in such a

state of society that we may expect to find the poetical temperament in its highest perfection. The most wonderful proof of genius is a great poem produced in a civilized age." The history of literature confirms this language. Religious, philosophical and political authors, in Greece and elsewhere, embodied their thoughts in poetry. Even the laws (*νόμοι*) were in this form, and up to the very age of the Fathers of History the annals were metrical. As in Greece, so among the nations of Gothic Europe and in the Isles of Britain. It may with truth be said that in the earliest times all poetry was not only for pleasure but was didactic in aim. By it the people were taught as well as charmed.

In discussing the origin of poetry it is most interesting to note that not only is religious poetry, as found in Scripture and elsewhere, older than secular poetry, but that by the ancients all poetry was supposed to be sacred in origin, character and purpose. It was the handmaid to religion, the gift of the gods. Hence, it was first used at altars and temples in the worship of Deity. It was an inspiration, a divine afflatus. The poet was an inspired man, or, as they were wont to call him, the wise man, possessed of more than earthly wisdom. He was the Vates of the Romans, the Seer or Prophet, gifted with special insight and foresight as to the mysteries of life.

Hence, the bards, as in Britain among Celts and Saxons, were regarded with religious veneration. They were priests and judges and teachers. Their functions and persons were sacred. What they said was oracular and the staff on which they leaned and on which their verses were carried was magical in its

virtue. Poetry, then, is the most natural and ancient form of the expression of the human soul.

## (2.) Definition of Poetry.

The history of definition at this point is full of interest, as showing the variety of view that is possible upon a subject with which every educated man is more or less familiar. A few of these definitions may be adduced.

Bacon speaks of poetry as "feigned history." Shelley calls it, "The language of the imagination." Byron terms it, "The feeling of past worlds and future." Aristotle styles it, "An imitative art," imitative of the "passions and manners of men." "By poetry," says Macaulay, "we mean the art of employing words in such a manner as to produce an illusion in the imagination." According to Keats, its elements are, "Invention, imagination and wit." Milton defines it as, "Simple, sensuous, passionate." Elliot calls it, "Impassioned truth." John Stuart Mill describes it as, "The influence of the feelings over our thoughts embodied in metrical language." To all these Dewey adds: "Poetry may be said to be an art both imitative and inventive, of which truth is the object, whereby is expressed, in metrical language, man's conception of the relation between the actual and the ideal." The defect of the definitions given is, that they are either too brief or too long, and are descriptions rather than definitions proper.

Bearing in mind what has already been said as to the faculties employed, the form assumed, and the object in view, a simple and satisfactory definition may be reached. It is the expression of *thought* through

the *imagination* and the *feelings* in *metrical form*, for the special *object* of *pleasing* the taste.

### (3.) Characteristics of Poetry.

(a.) It is marked by *freedom*. The word *proprus* (*proversus*), from which we get Prose, indicates a direct, uniform method of expression as distinct from that more circuitous method which is allowable in poetry. What is called Poetic License, is thus based on the principle that the action of the imagination and the feelings is freer and more varied than that of the reason. Pleasure, as the object of poetry, would also lead to the same result. Poetry must have wide range. As Shakspeare states it:

“The poet’s eye in a fine frenzy rolling,  
Doth glance from heaven to earth,  
From earth to heaven.”

He must have the liberty of all time and all space.  
He must follow where imagination leads.

The single limitation to which the poet is confined is, that he keep within the *limits* of the *rational* and *credible*. “Beyond the actual works of nature,” says Hobbes, “a poet may go; beyond its possibilities, never.” He must not pass beyond the probable. Though he may soar above the natural, he must not violate, contradict or abuse it. It is his imagination, rather than his fancy, that must guide him. The statement of Macaulay, “Perhaps no person can be a poet or enjoy poetry without a certain unsoundness of mind,” is misleading and extreme. The poet’s flights and visions and reveries, however exalted, must never overrun the confines of reason. His “fine frenzy”

must be under control. There must be a "method in the madness." Poetic License is not poetic lawlessness.

(b.) Poetry is a Fine Art. The distinction made between the Fine and Useful Arts is based on their respective ends. In the one, it is pleasure and ornament; in the other, it is utility.

Poetry thus ranks with Music, Painting and Sculpture as a Fine Art, whatever utility it may serve being incidental to its governing purpose. As such, it is distinguished from all the more important forms of Prose. The Art of Discourse therefore, in its unity, is both a fine and a useful art, the practical element largely predominating.

(c.) It is *eminently figurative*. This characteristic would also naturally follow from the definition given. The imagination is the symbolic, the representative faculty. It forms images or pictures. Poetry freely uses the figurative element just because it is novel, a departure from the ordinary or declarative form. Hence, the best examples of figures may be found among the standard poets, sacred and profane.

(d.) It has a *diction* and type of *sentence peculiar* to itself. There is such a thing as a poetic diction and a poetic arrangement of phrase and clause. The vocabulary is rich and full. As to the use and disuse of words, new and old, it is a law unto itself. Expressions that would be out of place elsewhere, add special force and beauty. So as to the sentence. It constructs it upon its own plan. The inversions and transitions are its own. There is thus a kind of surprise ever possible to the experience of the reader. He cannot forecast as in prose.

(e.) Poetry is the best *interpreter* of the *works* of

*nature.* The communion of the soul with the material universe about it can be carried on in this language only. Prose is too formal and practical to be used as a medium of sentiment and sympathy. Poets have thus been lovers of nature and her solitudes. Mountain, mead and stream, birds and flowers, have evoked their deepest affection. From Chaucer to Burns and Wordsworth this peculiarity is manifest.

That large province of poetry which may be termed Descriptive illustrates this. Lyric poetry in some of its forms is full of this element. In Cowper, Thomson, Crabbe and Goldsmith we have notable examples of it.

The poetry of nature may be called, in the best use of the word, sensuous. It is the poetry of the Senses, as media between the outer world and the soul. Everything in it is poetic, its sights and sounds and manifold forms.

"To him who, in the love of nature,  
Holds communion with her visible forms  
She speaks a various language."

Such language is always "simple, sensuous, passionate." It is poetry itself.

(f.) Poetry is the best *interpreter* of the *soul* of *man*. His hopes and fears, his loves and hates, his joys and sorrows, can find no better medium of expression. The various forms that poetry has assumed are simply various ways of expressing that inner life of the soul. In its sublime experiences it becomes Epic or Dramatic. In its more common experiences of daily life it becomes Lyric and Descriptive, Meditative and Pathetic. It has a form for every phase of feeling. It is the language of the heart rather than of the head.



(g.) Poetry has a *spiritual* element. It is the language of the ideal. It connects the present and the future, the earthly with the heavenly. "All truth," says Dewey, "which awakens within us the feeling of the infinite is poetic." It is "the vision and the faculty divine," that is at work. The element of moral sublimity is germane to it. There are far too many immoral poets and far too many frivolous and degrading poems; still, poetry in its nature and province is purifying and uplifting. It tends upward. Just as the ideal of all the older sacred poetry was a Paradise, all true poetry carries the soul aloft. The actual and the real are but the base of the ladder on which the angels ascend and descend before the poet's eye. Here, again, the ethical element in Discourse rises into prominence. •

#### FORMS.

The best division of the forms of poetry is a five-fold one, the various forms being stated in the order of their importance.

*Epic,*  
*Dramatic,*  
*Lyric,*  
*Descriptive,*  
*Didactic.*

#### Epic Poetry.

##### *Name.*

This is sometimes called *heroic* poetry, in that it is essential that it have a *hero*—some central character, about whom is gathered all the interest of the poem.

It is moreover essential that the *theme* of such a poem should be heroic or sublime, on the general principle of Discourse that the theme should be in keeping with the character and object of the whole production.

It is at times called *narrative* poetry, in that it involves a statement in poetical form of historical events. The epic includes a story. It is called epic poetry from the Greek word *ἔπος*, a word or tale, a discourse, the plural *ἔπη* referring to Discourse in metrical form—a hexameter poem.

### *Definition.*

It may be given as follows: The presentation in metrical narrative of some event heroic in its nature.

### PROMINENT FEATURES.

(a.) It is the most *important* and *exalted* form. The terms of the definition already given would indicate this. Its central element is the heroic. In its conception and basis, in its progress and final purpose, it is sublime. Hence, all the elements of the sublime in Discourse are here present—vastness of view, mental and moral power, absence of all that would degrade or diminish, and that simplicity of thought and language which always marks the heroic style. Men of inferior mould can have no success in this sphere of poetic expression. It demands largeness of soul, a pure, lofty and catholic spirit.

(b.) It is thus the form *most difficult to produce*. The explanation of this is two-fold. As already suggested, men of grand and sublime characters are rare. They have not the capacity either to project, execute

or even appreciate such a production. It lies in its altitude quite above the level of their highest life. Further, in the mental aspect of it there is an order of intellect and imagination demanded in the epic which but few men possess. Nothing short of an original mind will suffice. The imitative must give place to the creative; expression, to invention, to inspiration. The imagination, as symbolic and constructive, must rise to its best work, while the man, mental, moral and emotional, must be of the highest type—a representative man able to effect a representative result. To choose a sublime theme and treat it in a sublime manner, to instruct, impress and please the reader, to maintain unity of structure with a vast amount of incident and detail, to keep aloft upon the highest plane of thought and emotion—this is a work to which but few are competent. Hence, in all literatures the epic is rare, and in some, altogether absent. Even among those accepted as epics, much difference of opinion may be held as to the justness of the claims of many of them to the highest rank. If this be so, its effect both upon composer and reader must be stimulating and ennobling. In this sense the epic is eminently moral. The most exalted examples are brought to view, the highest sentiments and actions. Virtue is magnified and vice rebuked. All that is low is in abeyance, and for the time being the better nature of man is in authority. In fine, as moral heroism is the sublimest form, the epic as conspicuously grounded on moral tastes and principles is a moral poem. It assumes the moral integrity and exalted origin of the race. It appeals to their original beliefs and deepest feelings as still potent, and is a solemn protest in poetic form

against all those kinds of philosophy that tend to degrade the nature of man.

(c.) The Theme of the Epic must be one. This is termed, by Aristotle and others, The Unity of the Epic. It is, simply, the important law of unity in its special application to this form. The heroic action must be one. Whatever the variety of the details may be, they must be arranged in subordination to the central thought. The Epic as narrative or historical demands this. The events occur in regular order, and all with reference to some leading personage or principle. Episodes, thus, are admissible, as related more or less directly to the main action, as naturally introduced, as lending variety to the general narrative, and as marked by special beauty of literary form. Unity in the epic, as Aristotle suggests, involves the idea of completeness, "a beginning, middle and end," so that all that is essential to a full view of the narrative is given to the reader. This characteristic or condition of the Epic has been well illustrated in all the leading epic poetry of literature.

*Examples of Epics.*

Homer's "Iliad" and "Odyssey,"

Virgil's "Æneid,"

Milton's "Paradise Lost,"

Tasso's "Jerusalem Delivered,"

Camoen's "Lusiad,"

Dante's "Divina Comedia,"

"The Cid,"

"The Niebelungen Lied,"

"Beowulf,"

Lucan's "Pharsalia,"

Statius' "Thebaid,"

Voltaire's "Henriade,"

Glover's "Leonidas,"

Cambray's "Telemaehus."

## SUBORDINATE FORMS OF THE EPIC.

A—*The Metrical Romance*. This differs from the Epic Proper simply in being less marked by the majestic element, and making the adventurous or fanciful feature somewhat more prominent. Legend and myth are often found as well as history. The element of chivalrous love is here conspicuous.

Spenser's "Faerie Queen" is the leading example under this type of epic. It would not be a serious error to regard it as an Epic Proper.

The Anglo-Norman and Early English Literatures are replete with this form. Then was the golden age of the romantic narrative. The publications of the Early English Text Society will furnish abundant examples. It was the Normans, indeed, who brought this style of epic to England. After their possession of the country it became popular among the English, and versifiers multiplied. Beginning about 1200 A. D. it reached its height two centuries later, until it gave place, at length, to the Pure Romance. It was reserved for Sir Walter Scott to reintroduce it into England. Among these earlier romances may be noted:

"Sir Tristram,"  
"Sir Havelock,"  
"King Robert of Sicily,"  
"The Death of Arthur,"  
Chaucer's "Romaunt of the Rose."

The poetry of the troubadours of France is marked by this. The earlier period of almost any literary people will illustrate it. In English literature of modern times we note as examples:

Scott's "Marmion" and "Lady of the Lake,"  
Tennyson's "Idylls of the King," and  
Byron's "Don Juan."

B—*The Metrical Chronicle*. In this, the narrative feature is even more conspicuous than in the Great Epics. It is *history in metre*. In that it is written for purposes of instruction, it might be called didactic. It is epic, however, in that the heroic element is prominent. The examples of this form are rare. Three or four of the best may be mentioned.

Barbour's "Brute and Bruce,"  
 Harry's "Wallace,"  
 Drayton's "Poly-olbion,"  
 Robert of Gloucester's "Chronicle,"  
 Layamon's "Brut,"  
 Robert of Brunnes' "Chronicle."

It is a fact of some literary and historical interest, that the metrical chroniclers were really our first English writers. They were poet-historians and aimed to present in this primitive and more attractive form the glories of old Britain, borrowing at will from Latin, Welsh and Norman sources.

#### BALLADS AND TALES.

These are the shortest specimens of narrative verse, love being the predominant feature in connection often with martial exploit, *e. g.*—

Macaulay's "Lays of Ancient Rome,"  
 Tennyson's "Princess,"  
 "Chevy Chase,"  
 Longfellow's "Evangeline,"  
 Byron's "Corsair,"  
 Keats' "Eve of St. Agnes,"  
 Tennyson's "Enoch Arden,"  
 Schiller's "Diver,"  
 Thackeray's "Ballads."

So the various Tales that enter into Chaucer's "Canterbury Tales."

What is called the Mixed Epic, as Byron's "Childe Harold," evinces the characteristics of many forms. What is termed The Mock-Epic or Mock-Heroic is essentially satirical. Pope's "Rape of the Lock" is the best example in all literature.

### Dramatic Poetry.

#### ORIGIN OF THE DRAMA.

The full discussion of this subject belongs, properly, to the department of literary history. A suggestion or two will have to suffice.

(a.) The general statement of interest is, that its origin is a *natural* one, arising out of the tastes and feelings of men. "Dramatic Poetry," says Guizot, "could originate only among the people." The disposition to imitate and personate is inherent in the race, evincing itself, as it does, in the earliest years of childhood. We are told that even among the rudest peoples, the South Sea Islanders, some form of dramatic representation exists. Though some nations seem to have been comparatively unacquainted with the drama, such as the Hebrews, Egyptians, Arabians, Persians and others, still, this remark has reference rather to the fully perfected art than to the germs or beginnings of it. These germs or dramatic tendencies are well nigh universal. This natural origin of the drama, moreover, does not interfere with the historical fact as to the vast difference that exists in this respect among different nations, as between the Greeks and the Romans, the Spanish and Portuguese. There are reasons, also, why the highest forms of this art should not find expression among certain peoples who

are speculative in character and habit. We thus find the drama in Greece as it developed from the songs of the travelling rhapsodists to the perfected plays of Æschylus. We see it in the early history of Rome, and Seneca, Plautus, Terence and Horace contributing to its maintenance. In the various countries of Southern Europe, from Italy to Spain, we note its rise and progress. In Germany it began in the ballads of the Minnesänger and reached its full expression in the pages of Goethe and Schiller and Lessing. The dramatic instinct and tendency are in the nature of man, and in one form or another will find expression.

(b.) The drama may be said to be *religious* also in its origin. The earliest plays were composed by the clergy and exhibited for sacred purposes. They were an important part of the moral teaching of the time. By necessity, the acting was soon transferred from the churches to the courts about them, and then to a distance. Here may be noted the beginning of those influences which, at length, caused the clergy to retire from these representations. The laity soon had complete control of them and their distinguishing religious character was lost. In fact, the chief denunciations against the stage in after days came from the clergy. "Scriptural dramas," writes Matthew Paris, "composed by ecclesiastics, furnished the nations of Europe with the only drama they possessed for hundreds of years."

It must be added that the later opposition by the clergy was just as consistent as their earlier sanction. Despite them, the drama had been degraded.

The illustration of this moral element is especially



clear in the history of the English dramas. We see it, first, in what are termed *Miracle Plays*.

These arose in England soon after the Norman Conquest (1066), and were first introduced by Hilarious. The three celebrated plays, "St. Nicholas," "The Raising of Lazarus," and "The History of Daniel," were written by him. In these and similar plays the prominent facts and incidents of Scripture, as well as the legends of the saints, were presented in attractive form to the people. They were called *Miracle Plays* from the supernatural character of subject and contents. The *Passion Play*, as exhibited in Ober Ammergau, in Upper Bavaria, every ten years, is of this character.

Written at first in Latin, they began in the fourteenth century to be written in the vernacular. According to Morley, it is probable that these were first acted at Chester in 1328, and that their author was Ralph Higden.

These plays were sometimes called *Mystery Plays* (*ministerium*). The technical distinction was that these last were biblical in character and history, while the first were non-biblical. There was a still further type of play called *Morality Plays*.

These were performed in England as early as the fifteenth century, not superseding the other plays referred to, but existing with them. The main feature of them is the allegorical. The characters were not real, but were simply personified qualities.

The term *morality*, as applied to them, is used in its wider sense, indicating reformation or common virtue rather than piety. Here was a sphere for the secular rather than the sacred orders, both as to prep-

aration and presentation. We find them thus used for partisan purposes in the state, and as the media of the most stinging satire. From such crude exhibitions as these in the Miracles (Mysteries) and Moralities, English dramatic literature and dramatic art found some of its elements. Although the modern drama is traceable to the revival of literature, and carries us backward to the classical dramatists, still, no true and full account can be given of it apart from a reference to these facts.

It is strange that the old biblical plays held their place among an ignorant people as long as they did. The time for a change had come and the old gives place to the new. As might be supposed, the churchmen retired before the laity, and the religious before the social. It was in strict accordance with the decline of an exclusive Catholicism and the rise of a liberal Protestantism that supernatural mysteries should give way to natural moralities, and the theoretical to the practical. In the language of Collier, "They touched upon public events, popular prejudices, and temporary opinions."

#### *Definition.*

Dramatic Poetry is that form in which the action is not related, but represented in dialogue.

#### *Characteristics.*

Some of these have already been mentioned—

(a.) It is *representative*, and not, as in the epic, *narrative* or *historical*. It portrays or presents to the eye something as taking place at the time. The very

word *δρᾶω*, *to do, to act*, indicates this. Some dramatists, indeed, introduce a large amount of narrative.

An important reference is here to be made to the terms *dramatic* and *theatrical*. The first refers to the inner character of the production—its poetical nature. The second refers to its adaptability for the stage. The first may exist apart from the second, as in dramatic prose and most dramatic poetry unsuited to the stage. Each of these is present in the model dramatic poem as a representative and representable poem. Such a poem must have in it a power of exciting attention and interest, a power of impression vivid and definite. It must, in a word, be oratorical, adapted to be seen and heard as well as read.

The dramatic poem, the play, must be capable of producing an impression upon an audience, or it fails of its final purpose.

(b.) The *form* of presentation is that of *dialogue*. In the epic, this is incidental only. Here, it is prominent. This element was introduced into the drama of Æschylus in the latter part of the fourth century B. C. At first, subordinate to what was called the chorus, it at length superseded it as it now exists in the drama proper. Here lies, indeed, one of the vital distinctions between the modern and classical drama.

In some epic poets, such as Homer, an unusually large place is given to dialogue. A dramatic cast is thus imparted.

Most of the interest of dramatic poetry is traceable to the dialogue. It secures and preserves attention and elicits all those elements of excellence which arise from the contact of one mind with another. Hence,

soliloquy is admissible in this form of poetry only in the way of variety and special need.

(c.) In this form, the *author* is not *manifest*; others speak for him. *Their words* and the dress and appearance and general manner in connection with the scenic display, convey the author's thought. There have been cases, indeed, both among the ancients and moderns, as in Æschylus and Sophocles, Molière and Shakspeare, in which the dramatist presented his own plays. As a law, however, the author and the actor are different persons, and the function of the latter is to personate and fully represent not even the author himself but the characters whom he has introduced into the play—the *Dramatis Personæ*. In these the author himself is lost. It is an interesting historical fact that, at first, the prologue to the play was often spoken by the author. This was a mark of literary courtesy. Once opened, the play was then given to the actors.

(d.) In dramatic poetry, the main feature is *action*. We might call it *life*. Schlegel, in speaking of this subject, remarks, "Action is life itself." The experiences of men are here delineated. A full-size portrait of what makes up human existence is disclosed to us. It is a speaking picture, a moving picture of the life of man—its duties, trials, struggles, destiny, joys and sorrows; its individual and social aspects; its practical and speculative, its secular and moral, phases. As the prince of dramatists tells us:

"All the world's a stage,  
And all the men and women  
Merely players."

It is by this human element in the drama as in fiction that the play and the novel will ever be the two most popular and potent forms of literary art.

They "hold the mirror up to nature." Hence, the most successful dramatists have been those who were the most conversant with mankind and the world; men of broad and catholic natures, deep-seeing and far-seeing. Shakspeare, for this reason alone, would stand above all others. His knowledge of man, in its keenness and reach, was well nigh superhuman.

(e.) Dramatic poetry might be called the most *comprehensive* of all the forms. There is in fact no leading feature of the poetic art that is not illustrated in one or other of its types. The elements of the Epic and Lyric, Descriptive and Didactic are in it. Just because it is the form which represents the life of man in the world, it must be world-wide in its province and function. It has all the dignity of the epic, all the passion of the lyric, and all the philosophic and pictorial power of the didactic and descriptive. The explanation of the fact that the able dramatists of the world are but few is largely traceable to the further fact that they are but few whose order of mind is spacious enough to compass the scope of the art.

(f.) Dramatic poetry has a *moral* quality. The allusion here is to this form of literature when in its truest and best expression, its natural expression. It has to do with life in all its phases, with men as possessed of reason, conscience, and will, with free and accountable beings. This is especially true of tragedy. "In its general strain and spirit," says Blair, "it is favorable to virtue." It is in this respect akin to the

epic. It tends to elevate and awe the mind, to elicit the deeper and better feelings,—as Aristotle holds, “to purify the passions.” It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the dramatists of the world have exemplified this principle. A notable British author has gone so far as to say, “There is no instance of a tragic poet representing vice as fully triumphant.” This is extreme, but it involves an important truth. Most of our dramatic poetry brings guilt to shame and pleads on behalf of virtue, however unfortunate, and where it does not, it violates the true spirit of poetry. “Nothing in the conduct of tragedy,” says one, “demands a poet’s attention more than to leave upon the spectators impressions favorable to virtue and to the administration of Providence.” The drama is moral then in tendency, because it represents life, and life is moral in character and aim. The distinctively religious origin of the drama well comports with this moral tendency. That Plato should have banished dramatic poetry from his republic shows the abuse to which it was subjected.

(g.) The Unity of the drama is to be marked. Among the ancients this subject was always discussed in a three-fold aspect. Unity of action, of time and of place. As to the first of these, it is simply the general law of unity in Discourse applied to this special form. It is almost axiomatic. In the drama it is termed *unity of action*, inasmuch, as already seen, action is the central idea. The law demands, that whatever the divisions of the plot may be, and however numerous the characters, the leading ideas and leading characters shall ever be prominent and that,

over all, the one leading idea and character shall appear, and that from first to last there shall be progress in the action. This idea of progression in force and interest is essential to the drama and to its unity of action. This very progression is its action, its movement onward through act and scene to final catastrophe. Even in the prologue and epilogue, this unity should be manifest.

Unity of Place demanded that there should be no changing of the scene, that the action should be carried on throughout in the same place in which it began.

Unity of Time required that the time taken for the performance of the action and the time given it in the representation should coincide.

As to the first of these unities—that of action—there has been no material change. In the nature of the case it must remain. It is simply unity in dramatic Discourse.

As to the others, a change has been made and rightly. Though their object was, to make the representation more real, the end was overreached and they made the drama mechanical and local. These were, in a sense, proper to the ancient stage, as in Greece, inasmuch as the play went on without interruption. The division of it into acts was not adopted. The stage was never vacated. The whole play was one act, and thus the unity of time and place was possible and natural. In the modern theatre, this has all been changed. Plays are divided into acts. There are intervals between them. The stage is vacated and a rigid adherence to this principle of time and place is less essential.

Care is to be taken, however, lest in the present

drama the opposite extreme of undue freedom be reached.

In addition to unity of action, these unities of time and place have a partial force. In each act taken by itself they may be said to have, still, their original function, and it is only in the pauses between the acts that a larger liberty is allowable. Abruptly to vary place and scene as an act is going on is wrong in theory and practical effect. The fact is, that unity is essential, and if this be fully observed as to the action, its application to time and place will be self-adjusting.

#### DIVISIONS OF DRAMATIC POETRY.

##### (1.) Tragedy.

The word means: The Song of the Goat (*Τραγὸς ᾠδή*). The goat was offered in sacrifice to Bacchus and songs were chanted to his praise. Some have supposed that the goat was given as a prize to those who rendered the song in the best manner, or that the first actors were dressed in the skin of the goat. By way of variety and relief to the chorus, a person, at length, was introduced, who, between the songs, recited verses. This modification was made, as all historians agree, by Thespis, in the first half of the sixth century B. C. Half a century later, Æschylus introduced two persons in dialogue and here were laid the laws of the regular tragedy in Greece and elsewhere. In less than a quarter of a century, Greek tragedy was at its height. Tragedy, is, without question, the highest expression of the dramatic art. It has all the majesty of the epic itself. It appeals to the deepest passions and principles of our natures, and demands, on the part of the poet, that high creative genius which is so rare a gift



to men. "Earnestness," according to Schlegel, "is the essence of tragic representation." He means by this, all that is sublime in character, method and purpose. Nothing is allowable that tends to degrade or belittle. There must be a profound seriousness throughout, ever deepening as the plot deepens. Tragedy might be defined as, *the representation of human life in its more serious aspects*. The modern tragedy allows, as the ancient allowed at times, a happy conclusion to the play, as in "Measure for Measure," and Massinger's "New Way to pay Old Debts."

## TRAGIC POETS.

The most notable are:

Æschylus,	}	<i>Greek.</i>
Euripides,		
Sophocles.		
Seneca.		<i>Latin.</i>
Corneille,	}	<i>French.</i>
Racine,		
Voltaire.		
Lope de Vega.		<i>Spanish.</i>
Lessing,	}	<i>German.</i>
Goethe,		
Schiller.		
Alfieri.		<i>Italian.</i>
Shakspeare,	}	<i>English.</i>
Jonson,		
Beaumont & Fletcher,		
Marlowe,		
Massinger,		
Dryden,		
Congreve.		

## (2.) Comedy.

The word means: The Song of the Village (*Κωμὴ ὠδὴ*), referring to the players as strolling about from town to town, or it may mean, a festive song (*Κωμὸς ὠδὴ*). Its origin, as in Tragedy, takes us back to the songs in praise of Bacchus. It is the representation of human life in its more jovial and cheerful aspects. It is gay rather than grave; sportive rather than serious; animal, or emotional, rather than moral.

As tragedy is based on the virtues and vices of men, this is based on their pleasantries and follies. In the one, we see guilt and punishment; in the other, innocent and ludicrous mistake. Pity and awe give way to merriment and ridicule. Hence, it is far inferior to the tragic form, though having an important function of its own and essential to a complete portraiture of human life. Light and humorous as it is, it has a moral element. Men who may not be affected by the guilt of sin may be affected by the foolishness of it. They may be laughed out of evils out of which they could not be reasoned or alarmed.

It is to be noted, moreover, that comedy comes, in a sense, closer to men. Devoid as it is of the morally sublime, it meets men upon their own levels. It deals with present events and places. Comedy to be successful must be timely and appropriate to the spirit of the age. It must "catch the manners living as they rise." "I hold a perfect comedy," says Walpole, "to be the perfection of human composition."

The distinction often made between comedy of

character and comedy of intrigue is not important. The phrase, *comedy of life and manners*, would include both.

## COMIC POETS.

Aristophanes,	}	<i>Greek.</i>
Menander.		
Plautus,	}	<i>Latin.</i>
Terence.		
Molière.		<i>French.</i>
Lope de Vega,	}	<i>Spanish.</i>
Calderon,		
Cervantes.		
Ariosto.		<i>Italian.</i>
Lessing,	}	<i>German.</i>
Goethe,		
Schiller.		
Shakspeare,	}	<i>English.</i>
Jonson,		
Beaumont & Fletcher,		
Dryden,		
Congreve.		

## SUBORDINATE DRAMATIC FORMS.

A—*The Tragi-Comic*. This is called, also, the Serio-Comic, Mock-Heroic, Burlesque, or Travesty. It represents the combination of the two forms. The comic element takes the precedence. There is just enough of the tragic involved to form by contrast a basis for irony and ridicule. Pope's "*Rape of the Lock*," is of this character. It has in it some of the elements of the epic.

B—*Historical Plays*. In these we have the tragic and comic combined in their best forms, as in Shakspeare. They are called historical, in that the narrative element is prominent. Facts are the basis.

C—*Opera*. This is a dramatic poem or play in which music takes the place of stage oratory.

D—*Melodrama*. In this, music and oratory combine.

E—*Farce*. This is a short comedy, consisting of one or two acts.

F—*Masque*. Formerly, this was one of the most common types

of the dramatic art. They abounded in Elizabeth's time and were often composed by Jonson, as his "Masque of Blackness," of "Beauty," of "Queens." These were marked by the introduction of allegorical characters, fairies and giants. The displays in connection with them were brilliant and imposing. It has passed out of use. Milton's "Comus," is properly a Masque.

G—*Pantomime*. As the word indicates, this is all mimicry, a dumb show. The only language used is a sign language. Attitude, gesture, and all the possible forms of expression other than language itself, are used. The term *histrionic* (*histrion*, an actor), as applied to the dramatic art, is largely used to express this form of it, buffoonery or pantomime.

It remains simply to state that dramatic literature includes prose as well as poetry. In addition to the prose that is found in poetic dramas, and in such works as Plato's "Dialogues," which are dramatic in cast, we find specific prose dramas, as in Goethe, Jonson and others. The dramatic element in fiction is very marked, so, also, in epic verse, and history.

## Lyric Poetry.

### ORIGIN AND DEFINITION.

The primitive idea connected with this form was, that it was sung to the lyre or some instrument of music. It is to be borne in mind, however, that as poetry and music were formerly connected, this characteristic was common to all poetry. After their separation, certain poems which were to be set to music and sung were called *odes*. They were lyrical. In this form are found the very *first* expressions of poetic thought. This is natural in that through the ode all the varied feelings of the soul may be communicated. Here, we reach a further and the main feature of Lyric Poetry in that it is *emotional*. How-

ever fully this may be expressed in other forms, as in the epic, and especially in the Dramatic, in this form it is conspicuous. Lyrics, in the best sense of the word, are sentimental. They express passion, fervor, devotion. It thus differs from the epic in having little to do with the narration of facts.

### *Characteristics.*

In addition to the special use already mentioned and as suggested by it, may be noted,—

(a.) It employs the *excited* rather than the *creative* imagination. It arouses and stimulates rather than originates. In this particular, it ranks as the third form, the epic and dramatic being superior.

(b.) The author himself expresses his *own* emotion. In this respect, it differs from the dramatic, in which the author is personated by another. There is no form more individual than this. The fact simply embodies his experience in verse.

(c.) It is a *comprehensive* form. In this particular, it ranks with the dramatic. It is eminently human and life-like. It has to do with all possible phases of character and experience, running up and down the entire scale of the emotions. It is thus said to employ a wider variety of versification than any other form.

### DIVISIONS OF LYRIC POETRY.

Bearing in mind that all its varieties may be included under the general term *Ode*, there may be—

(1.) *Sacred Odes.*

(2.) *Secular Odes.*

## (1.) Sacred Odes.

(A.) *Inspired or Scriptural Odes.* These abound in Hebrew Poetry. Moses' Song at the Red Sea (Ex. xv.) is supposed to be the most ancient specimen extant. Other examples occur until we come to the Golden Age of Biblical Lyrics under David as represented in the Psalms. All possible varieties are here found in that all the varied life of the human soul is portrayed. In Lamentations is seen a distinctively mournful lyric; an Elegy. In David's lament over Absalom (2 Sam. xii. 4) and over Abner (2 Sam. iii. 31) the same phase is manifest. In the Song of Solomon, the Pastoral Ode is exhibited in connection with what might be termed the Amatory Ode, the mutual love of Christ and the Church. The songs of Moses and Deborah, as many of David's, may be termed Heroic Odes, full of the martial spirit.

(B.) *Religious Odes.* These are distinct from the others, as being uninspired. They have, however, a common aim. Their best illustration is in the Hymnology of the Church, odes composed for Christian worship. English Literature is rich in this department, as may be shown in the poems of Watts, Wesley, Newton, Doddridge, Montgomery and Heber.

Mediæval Latin poetry, also, abounds in these odes. The most valuable are "Dies Iræ" and "Stabat Mater."

(C.) *Moral Odes.* These are not inspired, nor are they strictly religious or designed for sacred service. Their general object, however, is to elevate and pur-

ify moral character. Some are found in Homer. Spenser's celebrated poems, *Heavenly Love* and *Heavenly Beauty* are of this character. Those are often called philosophic odes; they inculcate virtue.

(2.) *Secular Odes.*

(A.) *Heroic Odes.* These are a kind of epic in miniature. As far as they go, they carry out the conditions of the epic. They are different in that facts are subordinated to feeling. They express elevated sentiment. The expression of loyal devotion to principle or country would fitly assume this form, *e. g.*, Collins' "*Ode to Liberty*"; Keats' "*Ode to Liberty*"; Wordsworth's "*Sonnets dedicated to Liberty*," abound in these. Milton's *Sonnets* give some examples. Such, also, are "*The Marseillaise*" and Burns' "*Scots wha ha'e wi' Wallace bled*."

(B.) *The Comic or Humorous Ode.* This marks the extreme of pleasantry, as the other, of sublimity. They are liable to abuse in the line of low passion. Burns gives us specimens both of these correct and incorrect types. Moore's poetry is marked by this kind of ode.

(C.) *The Love Song, or Amatory Ode.* This is, in one sense, the typical ode or lyric, in that love is the ruling passion in life and death. This is, eminently, the sentimental ode. This is not confined to the mutual love of the sexes, but includes the province of personal friendship. The ardent devotion of friend to friend, as of Damon and Pythias, would thus be expressed, and the love of kindred and of home. In

Sappho and Horace; in Burns and Moore; in Shakespeare and others, such songs are found.

(D.) *The Mournful Ode—the Elegy.* This is simply the expression of sad feeling, as in Milton's "Lycidas" and "Il Penseroso," Gray's "Elegy," Shelley's "Adonais," Tennyson's "In Memoriam." Many of these are scattered throughout the writings of our lyric poets. Burns is unequalled in this species. Examples of this in sacred poetry have been given. It may be noted that in such long examples as "In Memoriam," the term Ode is used as synonymous with poem.

(E.) *The Pastoral Ode.* This was called by Theocritus, who first composed it, the Idyll (*εἰδυλλιον*, a short picture or representation). This word is now used by Tennyson and others in a different sense. The "Idylls of the King" are rather epic in character and method. Though not historically the oldest form of the lyric, it carries us back in its suggestion to primitive shepherd life. It has a most beautiful illustration in the account of our Lord's nativity. The pastoral poem is eminently natural in its origin. It expresses those feelings of happiness and innocence which all are wont to indulge as they contemplate rural life. There is, indeed, a religious as well as a romantic element mingled with it. It recalls and glorifies the better past. It sings of a Paradise Lost and fondly hopes for a Paradise Regained. If the pastoral life is, at times, marked by servility and degradation, the poet loses sight of this fact and treats of it only as representative of peace and plenty. Good examples of this form are:



The Eclogues of Virgil.

The Idylls of Theocritus.

The Pastorals of Pope, Philips, Shenstone; and Gay Ramsay's "Gentle Shepherd" is of special beauty even to others than Scottish readers. Among the Italian pastorals those of Tasso and Guarini are justly prominent.

*Exceptional use.* The pastoral poem is sometimes used to express humor and irony. Under the guise of simple swains, the upper classes are attacked. Spenser's "Shepherds' Calendar" is of this character. Through the pastoral form he writes of London life. Gay's "Shepherd's Week," in which he ridicules Philips, is of this nature. This satire or dramatic cast, however, is not the ordinary one, and is, in some senses, quite averse to that innocence and rustic peacefulness so germane to the shepherd life. Sarcasm and plot are out of place.

*The Sonnet* (A little song). This falls properly under Lyric Poetry, in that it is short and expressive of emotion. It was imported from Italy to England. Petrarch is the father of it. After the time of Henry VIII. it was popular in English poetry, the best of our poets having written more or less in it. It is safe to say, however, that by reason of the nature of the respective languages and peoples it can never flourish upon English as upon Italian soil. The most notable examples are those of Petrarch, Shakspeare, Milton and Wordsworth.

### Descriptive (Mixed) Poetry.

This form may best be represented by the word *descriptive*, and yet it is less a separate form than it is a combination in various proportions of the other

forms. The Lyric and Didactic, especially, are combined in it, as in Thomson's "Seasons" and Cowper's "Task," and it enters also as an element into each of the forms. All that was said under the discussion of Description as a Process applies, in a measure, here. The use of the imagination in its representative function; the vivid grasping by the mind of the object to be described, and its vivid presentation to others; the use of a graphic diction; the selection of the right details; skill in the choice and use of figures—all this is assumed as present. Inferiority here, is more repulsive than elsewhere, and as this form is made up of elements from the others, it may be said to mark a good degree of talent. In addition to the examples mentioned, reference may be made to

Milton's "L'Allegro,"  
Keats' "Endymion,"  
Beattie's "Minstrel,"  
Burns' "Cotter's Saturday Night,"  
Tennyson's "Princess."

Nearly every prominent poet, in fact, may be said to give us examples of this mixed form. It is abundant because it is unrestricted.

### Didactic Poetry.

As the word means, it is the special object of this species of poetry to *instruct*. For this reason, some have denied the justness of its claims to a place in the poetic sphere—the object of poetry being, to please. To this it may be said—

(a.) Though the instructive element is more prominent here, that of *pleasure* is also present—instruction and pleasure combined. If, on the one hand, the poetry is made instructive, the instruction, on the other hand, is made poetic. The truth is that poetry as

didactic cannot represent the highest form but it represents an important form. It fills a place in Discourse that could not be filled by prose, or by any other species of poetry. This is clearly shown by the numerous examples of it in literature. These are not explained on the principle of the ease of writing prose-poetry, demanding, thus, a second order of talent. It meets a felt need and has been used by many of our ablest authors.

(b.) It is written in strict *metrical* form. Not only so, but we find in it some of the most correct versification of our literature. If verse or metre is the most essential mark of poetry, this species must have place.

This form is often termed Moral, Philosophical or Meditative, as distinct from the Dramatic or Lyric. It may be added that the method of the poem in this form is supposed to be somewhat more exact and regular than in some of the others. Also, episodes or proper digressions are here more allowable, in that this form as didactic needs more variety and relief than those which are more strictly poetic.

*Examples.*

Horace's "Art of Poetry,"  
 Virgil's "Georgics,"  
 Lucretius' "De Rerum Natura,"  
 Boileau's "Art of Poetry,"  
 Akensides' "Pleasures of the Imagination,"  
 Rogers' "Pleasures of Memory,"  
 Campbell's "Pleasures of Hope."  
 Pope's "Essay on Man,"  
 Pope's "Essay on Criticism,"  
 Young's "Night Thoughts,"  
 Pope's "Epistles and Moral Essays,"  
 Wordsworth's "Excursion."

In the line of satire special reference may be made to Juvenal, Horace, Dryden, Pope, Butler, Swift and Byron.

## STRUCTURE OF POETRY.

## Versification.\*

## DEFINITION OF TERMS.

(A.) *Versification*. It is the arrangement of words on the basis of quantity. It is the making (structure) of verses. It is what De Quincey would call the *mechanism*, as distinct from the *organism*, of poetry. It has nothing to do with the quality of poetry as good or bad. A correct structure may be seen in foreign verse whose meaning is unintelligible to us or in verse of our vernacular which is inferior or even senseless. It is to be noted, however, that the vital relation of subject-matter to form has an application to poetry as well as prose. The more natural and excellent the poetry itself, the more readily should it admit of a pleasing and effective structure. It is thus that our first creative poets, Chaucer, Spenser, Shakspeare and Milton, wrote naturally, and their versification is a model. Dryden and Pope followed as didactic poets, and however correct their versification may be, it lacks freedom and simplicity. The older authors are preferred.

(B.) *Verse*. There are two senses in which this word is used. A Verse, as distinct from a stanza, means, a single line—a turning (*verto*). The stanza refers to a number of lines unified by some common idea. In a more specific sense, however, it is a word synonymous with metre. Poetry is written in verse; it is metrical.

\* No one who writes upon this subject can fail to acknowledge his large indebtedness to Everett, De Mille and Lanier.

(c.) *Melody*. This is the result of the union of the sounds of *one* voice or instrument.

(d.) *Harmony*. The result of the union of *two* or more voices or instruments which are accordant.

(e.) *Metre* or *Foot*. These terms refer to the meting or measuring of the structure—marking it off step by step. A metre is a collection of feet. The Foot is the unit or standard of measurement. It is a number of syllables one of which must be accented. Metres vary as the number of the feet varies. The Feet vary as the number of unaccented syllables vary and as the position of the accented syllable varies as related to them. In words other than monosyllables, accented and unaccented, syllables are respectively long and short.

(f.) *Cadence* (*cado*). This indicates the falling of the voice as the sentence or line draws to its close.

(g.) *Quatrain*. A stanza of four lines.

(h.) *Couplet*. Two consecutive rhyming lines. An important principle with regard to it is, that the sense should be complete at its close. This is often violated by our poets. Subject-matter and form are thus confounded.

(i.) *Quantity*. Arrangement of syllables as to time.

### Varieties of Line.

The length is determined by the number of feet. It, therefore, has a large variety. This is generally restricted to six or eight forms:

Monometer,  
 Dimeter,  
 Trimeter,  
 Tetrameter,  
 Pentameter,  
 Hexameter,  
 Heptameter,  
 Octometer.

As will be seen, the last two varieties may be divided into Tetrameters and Trimeters.

### Kinds of Feet.

These are not confined absolutely to any given number and vary in number among different languages. The classical tongues exhibit a greater variety than the English. As a matter of fact, we speak in English of four varieties of feet which may be called Primary. There are other kinds which are used in exceptional instances and might be regarded as secondary. The primary feet are as follows:

IAMBUS    ~ —  
 TROCHEE    — ~  
 ANAPÆST    ~ ~ —  
 DACTYL    — ~ ~

### EXAMPLES OF IAMBIC VERSE (— —).

*One Iambus—Iambic Monometer—*  
 Shē slēeps.

*One Iambus and a half—*  
 Mÿ Brōth | ěr.

These two forms are both rare.

*Two Iambuses—Iambic Dimeter—*  
 “Tō mē | thē rōse  
 Nō lōn | gěr glōws.”

*Two Iambuses and a half—*  
 “Nō shād | ōws yōnd | ěr.”

These two forms are, also, rare.

*Three Iambuses—Iambic Trimeter—*

Whēn Ī | rēflēct | ōn wār.

*Three Iambuses and a half—*

“Ānd ēv | ěry Āl | bān būrgh | ěr.”

These two forms are abundant.

*Four Iambuses—Iambic Tetrameter—*

“Thēn sāw | thē fiēlds | lāid bāre | ānd wāste

“Thē dāy | ōf wrāth, | thāt drēad | fūl dāy.”

This is often termed the octo-syllabic measure and has most abundant and happy illustration in many of our best English poets, as Burns, Scott, Byron, Gray and others. It is often combined with other forms of Iambic verse, especially with that consisting of two iambuses, and is well adapted to express pathos, pleasantry and vivid description.

*Four Iambuses and a half—*

“Āh mē, | hōw quick | thē dāys | arē flitt | ĩng.”

*Five Iambuses—Iambic Pentameter—*

“Thēre ĩs | ā plēas | urē ĩn | thē pāth | lēss wōods.”

“Nēar yōnd | ěr cōpse | whēre ōnce | thē gārd | ěn smīled.”

This is often called the Heroic line, as it is used in epic and dramatic poetry. It is admirably adapted to elevated sentiment. It does not preclude the intermingling of other feet. It thus answers to the regular Hexameter of classical poetry. Most of our English poetry is written in this form. It is peculiarly adapted to what is termed Blank Verse, as in Milton and Shakespeare. Other notable illustrations are “Childe Harold,” “The Faerie Queen,” Gray’s “Elegy,” “The Task,” “The Seasons,” “Essay on Man,” “Essay on Criticism,” “Annus Mirabilis.”

*Five Iambuses and a half—*

“Ī cōme | tō būr | ŷ Cāe | sār, nōt | tō prāise | hīm.”

*Six Iambuses—Iambic Hexameter—*

This is generally called The Alexandrine line, as it is supposed to have been first used in a French poem on The Life of Alexander.

“Whät Ī | cān ne'ēr | ěprĕss, | yĕt cān | nōt āll | cōncēal.”

This measure is largely used at the close of stanzas, as in Spenser and Byron, in connection with the Iambic Pentameter. Historically, it is traced back through Dryden and Cowley and Spenser. It is Pindaric in character. It seems to have been adopted to supply a strength and tone not fully enough given in the ordinary Heroic.

Modern authors have insisted more strenuously upon the sufficiency of the Heroic and justify the use of the Alexandrine rather in the way of poetic variety. Its special beauty, undoubtedly, is at the end of the stanza. It is a singular and significant fact that we find no example of this regular Hexameter in purely Blank Verse. It uses, as seen, the old Heroic.

*Six Iambuses and a half—*

“Ä mīr | rōr ānd | ä bāth | fōr Bēau | tÿ's yōun | gĕst dāugh | tĕrs.”

*Seven Iambuses—Iambic Heptameter.*

This is properly two lines, made up, respectively, of four and three feet. It is what is called Common Metre in Sacred Poetry.

“Whĕn āll | thÿ mēr | ciĕs, Ō, | mÿ Gōd,  
Mÿ rī | sīng sōul | sŭrvĕys.”

The first line is thus tetrameter, and the second, trimeter. Secular poetry abounds in this species as may be seen in Burns, Cowper, Addison, Coleridge and Scott.

It is used largely in Lyric Poetry, and, at times, for purposes of humor.



*Seven Iambuses and a half—*

“Sweet thē | mōmēnts | rīch īn | blēssīng  
Which bē | fōre thē | crōss Ī | spēnd.”

*Eight Iambuses—Iambic Octometer—*

This corresponds to Long Metre in Hymnology and may be illustrated in the Doxology of that metre, “Praise God—” If the lines are viewed separately, they are Iambic Tetrameter. The Short Metre differs from this in having but one line—the third—a tetrameter. The others are trimeter.

“My soul be on thy guard,  
Ten thousand foes arise;  
And hōsts | ōf sīn | āre prēs | sīng | hārd,  
To draw thee from the skies.”

## EXAMPLES OF TROCHAIC VERSE (— —).

*One Trochee—Trochaic Monometer—*

Winking.  
Blinking.

*One Trochee and a half—*

Eārly | dēws.  
Sīlvēr | haīrs.

These forms are rare.

*Two Trochees—Trochaic Dimeter—*

Jōys āre | pāssing.

*Two Trochees and a half—*

“Āll thāt’s | brīght mūst | fādē.”

Rare as separate forms.

*Three Trochees—Trochaic Trimeter—*

Whēn ōŭr | tēars āre | strēāmīng.

*Three Trochees and a half—*

“Hāste thēe, | nŷmph, ānd | brīng wīth | thēe.”

This second form is frequent and has been used with good effect in dignified and grave discourse.

*Four Trochees—Trochaic Tetrameter—*

“Shōuld yōu | āsk mē | whēnce thēse | stōriēs.”

Though somewhat difficult, it is one of the best measures and is happily illustrated by Dryden, Burns and Pope. It is well adapted to the expression of earnestness and love.

*Four Trochees and a half—*

“Ōnlŷ | knēel ōnce | mōre ā | rōund thē | sōd.”

This second form is not frequent.

*Five Trochees—Trochaic Pentameter—*

“Ōh! thē | strīfe ōf | thīs dī | vīdēd | bēīng.”

*Five Trochees and a half—*

“Thōse ē | tērnāl | bōwērs | mān hāth | nēvēr | triēd.”

These forms are rare.

*Six Trochees—Trochaic Hexameter—*

“Hōlŷ, | hōlŷ, | hōlŷ! | āll thē | sāints ā | dōre thēe.”

*Six Trochees and a half—*

“Cāstīng | dōwn thēir | gōldēn | crōwns ā | rōund thē | glāssŷ |  
sēa.”

These forms are not common.

*Seven Trochees—Trochaic Heptameter.*

Gēntlŷ | āt thē | evēning | hōur whēn | fādīng | wās thē | glōrŷ.

Infrequent.

*Eight Trochees—Trochaic Octometer—*

“Ōnce ūp | ōn ā | mīdnīght | drēārŷ, | ās Ĩ | pōndēred, | wēāk ānd  
wēārŷ.”

This last example, if regarded as two lines, would illustrate the Trochaic Tetrameter.

It may be said that such a division of lines may be carried out in the examples preceding this, as far back as Trochaic Hexameter which some have regarded as properly the longest Trochaic line. The same principle, as we have seen, holds as to the Iambus. The length of the line will, thus, depend somewhat upon the discretion of the critic.

## EXAMPLES OF ANAPÆSTIC VERSE (— — —).

This is a verse of easy construction and often used. It is specially adapted to the expression of animated sentiment and exultant hope. The number and position of its short syllables would indicate this. Hence, it is better adapted to forms that are short. It is used with good effect in enlivening other verse.

*One Anapæst—Anapæstic Monometer—*

Īn thē strēam

Ōvērhōrne.

*One Anapæst and a half—*

With ā chēer | īng.

*Two Anapæsts—Anapæstic Dimeter—*

Ō! hōw jōy | oūs āre wē!

*Two Anapæsts and a half—*

Hē wās lēd | tō thē mōunt | ain.

*Three Anapæsts—Anapæstic Trimeter—*

“Frōm thē plāins, | frōm thē wōod | lānds ānd grōves.”

*Three Anapæsts and a half—*

Hē hās gōne | ōn hīs wēa | rīsomē jōur | nēy.

*Four Anapæsts—Anapæstic Tetrameter—*

“Thē Āssyrī | ān cāme dōwn | līke ā wōlf | ōn thē fōld.”

*Four Anapæsts and a half—*

“Thōu ārt gōne | tō thē grāve | būt wē will | nōt dēplōre | thēe.”

The first of these forms is one of the favorite Anapæstic lines; the second, is supposed by some critics to be the longest line of this foot.

Other forms, however, are possible.

*Five Anapæsts—Anapæstic Pentameter—*

“Āt thē mōrn | ānd āt nōon | ānd āt ēve, | āll thē dāy | tōiled hē  
ōn.”

*Six Anapæsts—Anapæstic Hexameter—*

“Ānd thē bēes | keēp thēir tīre | sōme whīne  
Rōund thē rēs | īnōus firs | ōn thē hīll.”

### DACTYLIC VERSE (— — —).

This is the least frequent of the primary feet. Quite unknown formerly, it is still rarely used. Some prefer to rank it as a secondary foot. Milton, Scott and others illustrate it.

*One Dactyl—Dactylic Monometer—*

Tëndërlŷ.

*Two Dactyls—Dactylic Dimeter—*

“Ōne mōre ūn | fōrtūnatē.”

*Three Dactyls—Dactylic Trimeter—*

“Still lăy thē | rānks ōf thē | ēnēmŷ.”

*Four Dactyls—Dactylic Tetrameter—*

“Tëndërlŷ, | lōvīnglŷ | laīd thēy hīm | ’nēath thē sōd.”

*Five Dactyls—Dactylic Pentameter—*

Deēpest ānd | strōngēst ānd | pūrēst ōf | eārthlŷ thīngs | wās hīs  
lōve.

*Six Dactyls—Dactylic Hexameter—*

The words *to his Lord* added to the previous line will give an example.

It is plain that such structures may be divided and thus be brought under previous varieties.

It would seem to be one of the principles of verse structure that after a certain length of line or repetition of the foot in use has been reached, there is a tendency to return rather than to advance.

In the Iambus and Trochee, this limit is reached at the Hexameter; in the Anapæst and Dactyl, at the Tetrameter. Brevity and simplicity are sought, also, in Poetry.

Secondary feet are:

SPONDEE — —

PYRRHIC — —

AMPHIBRACH — — —

TRIBRACH — — —

These are called secondary, in that they are found only as separate feet mingled with others. They do not alone make up the metrical structure of any form.

THE SPONDEE (— —).

This is adapted to dignified and solemn sentiment and is found as a prominent foot in classical poetry. It may be found at any part of the line, but in English is used with best effect at the opening or the close of the line.

THE PYRRHIC (— — —).

This is adapted to light and animated discourse and has special beauty when used with the heroic or Alexandrine line. It is to be noted that this foot cannot well be used as the last one of the line and is most effective as the third or fourth foot.

THE AMPHIBRACH (— — —).

This only of all the secondary feet may be used throughout a line when short, though not throughout an entire form. It is, thus, nearer than the others to the character of a primary foot.

A line made up of two of these feet is marked by its beauty. An amphibrach at the end of a line is always pleasant to the ear. It is often found with the Iambus and is well adapted to the expression of the burlesque as may be seen in Butler's *Hudibras*.

THE TRIBRACH (— — —).

This foot is used simply by way of variation. Composed as it is of three short syllables in succession, it could not be used freely. Its best application is seen in the blank verse of Milton.

As regards sacred poetry it may be stated, that, in addition to the use of the Iambus in Long and Short and Common Metre as already shown, the use of the other primary feet is also illustrated. The indication of the measure may be made by the use of numerals and the name of the foot.

“Jesus, lover of my soul.”—7’s *Trochaic*.

“Sweet the moments, rich in blessing.”—8’s, 7’s *Trochaic*.

“I would not live away; I ask not to stay.”—11’s *Anapaestic*.

It may be added that in poetry, secular or sacred, a verse is catalectic when it lacks a syllable; hypercatalectic, when it has more than is needed; acatalectic, when complete.

### Rhythm.

#### *Definition.*

It is the arrangement of syllables with reference to the sound. It is based on accent, and implies an easy and pleasant succession of sounds, occurring at regular periods. “It is an orderly succession of beats of sound.” It is a wider term than metre, and may exist where metre, strictly defined, has no place. It is freer and more informal than metre. Having a similar relation to sound with Rhyme it is far more unfettered and is wider in its province.

#### *Importance.*

It is the rhythm of poetry that more than all else makes it what it is, as to its structure and æsthetic effect.

## RHYTHM IN PROSE.

It enters as an element into all the best prose, but as subordinate. It is sometimes termed the law of harmony and insists upon the choice of proper sounds and their proper arrangement. The prose of the Old Testament is full of it. What is called Poetical Prose has an unusual amount of it and may almost be measured off as metrical discourse. Such writers as Sidney, Taylor, Bunyan, Macaulay, Irving, Ruskin and Hawthorne exhibit this element.

## Rhyme.

*Definition.*

This word is derived from the Anglo-Saxon *riman*—to count, *rim*—number, and refers to the regular counting of the feet and syllables. Its two main elements are—similarity of sound in the syllables, and similarity as to position or adjustment in the line.

*Importance.*

It is not essential to poetry. Blank verse, as we have seen, is rhymeless and it is the most frequent and important species of verse. As versification is the mechanical part of poetry, rhyme is the mechanical part of versification. It has to do simply with sounds and their relations and but indirectly with the sense and accent. It is designed for the pleasure of the ear and taste and must be abandoned when the mind is creative and the soul deeply moved by some great truth.

It belongs to the artifice rather than to the art of poetry. Still, it has a place and function of its own

and best succeeds when it keeps closest to the inner sense.

#### VARIETIES OF RHYME.

As to the number of rhyming syllables, there may be noted—

##### *Single Rhymes.*

This is the common form—well  
tell

The accented syllable is final.

##### *Double Rhymes.*

glory  
story

Here, one unaccented syllable follows the accented.

##### *Triple Rhymes.*

Culminate  
Fulminate

Here, two unaccented syllables follow the accented.

Quadruple and even Quintuple rhymes are found in some of the poetry of the East. They may be regarded as literary curiosities.

As to the position of the rhyming syllables, the end of the line is the usual one. What are called Sectional Rhymes refer to those which occur at some other part of the line. They are rhymes within rhymes,

“The splendor *falls* on castle *walls*.”

*Moaning and groaning* he went his way.

The Saxons termed these line-rhymes as distinct from final rhymes.

##### *Alliteration.*

This refers to similar sounds at the beginning of the line.

(A.) *Initial Vowels alike.* This is an infrequent form.

On ! on ! over oceans he went.



(B.) *Initial Consonants alike.*

Round and round the ring he ran.

This is the oldest and most common form.

(C.) *Initial Vowels and Consonants alike.*

Fiddling and fisting,  
Rating and racing.

Alliteration may be said to be a kind of rhyme.

This was a prominent feature of Anglo-Saxon poetry. A complete verse had three alliterating syllables, two in the first section and one in the second. It is found even in the prose of that early date.

In modern English and in modern languages, this element is altogether secondary. Used with discretion, however, it has a pleasing effect and should not be utterly discarded. It has a natural basis. Sounds are associated as ideas are.

### Law of Rhyme.

In what may be called *perfect rhyme*, the accented or final vowels and the letters following are alike—

face  
grace

The vowel, if different, must sound alike—

must  
crust  
thrust

Hence, there are two forms of single or final rhyme which are frequent and yet improper.

(a.) When the consonants only are alike—

reprehend  
countermand—

This errs on the side of defect. The Saxons called it Half-Rhyme.

(b.) Where the consonant preceding as well as following the final vowel is the same. This errs by excess—

vague  
prorogue

From these statements it follows that the rhyming syllable must be an accented one, and that the consonant preceding the final vowel must be different in the two syllables.

Assonant rhymes are those in which the vowels only are similar—

hat  
man

Consonant rhymes have the vowels and consonants similar—

man  
ran

Many rhymes are allowable which are not perfect. Everett has given the following—

haste	bear	women
repast	rear	seven
shared	seen	poor
bard	men	adore
appeared	killed	throne
reward	field	son
care	reared	down
war	heard	stone
car	beget	stood
war	wit	good
wan	try	tongue
fan	victory	wrong
surveys	abode	school
seas	good	rule
sought	flood	chariots
fault	food	garrets

## LAWS OF ENGLISH VERSE.

(a.) It must be *uniform*, as to the kind of feet, making up the line. What is called Mixed Verse is improper in that symmetry of structure as well as poetic force is impaired by mingling the various feet. Unity is a principle in poetry as well as in prose.

By this it is not meant that there is not in our poetry and in all poetry an interchange of feet and metres. This, however, is not sufficient to break up the structure of the verse. There is a prevailing foot—Iambic or Trochaic or Anapæstic or Dactylic, and if others enter, it is only in the way of necessity and variety.

In classical poetry, mixed verse is common, and efforts, mainly unsuccessful, have been made to construct English poetry on this system. Critics have referred to the efforts of Longfellow and others in this direction.

(b.) The *accentual* element, in distinction from the *syllabic*, must be the chief one. Here, again, the English differs widely from the classical poetry. In the latter, the feet are determined by the element of time and remain unchanged in their quantity. In English, the accent rules the syllable. It varies as the accent varies. As was said with regard to Mixed Verse, so, here, some of our poets, as Pope and Dryden, have attempted with poor success to make the classical system the dominant one.

The attempt was contrary both to the practice of our best poets and the genius of the language. It

may be added that what is called Elision is easily explained on this accentual system. By this is meant the suppression of letters either for the sake of the measure or to prevent a hiatus (the co-existence of two vowels), when the next word begins with a consonant, or to prevent a hiatus (immediate succession of vowels) when the next word begins with a vowel.

“Fast by the oracle of God.”

On the classical method, where syllables have an unchanging quantity, the difficulty is serious. On the accentual method, there need be no elision either by the pen or voice.

“Who durst defy th(e) Omnipotent to arms—”

Here, on the English method, the system of pauses removes all difficulty. The two syllables—*the*, *Om*—occupying the place of one, may both be pronounced so as to take up the time of but one.

## THE POETIC PAUSES.

## The Cæsura.

The word is derived from, *cædo*, to cut, referring, as in the classics, to the division of a word so as to have its final long syllable begin the following foot, or referring, as in English and the modern languages, to the division of a line into hemistichs.

Kames has well stated the following laws governing this pause:

(a.) It should never divide a word.

(b.) It should not separate an adjective from the noun after it, or an adverb from the verb after it. When the adjective or the adverb follows the words which they qualify, respectively, the pause may be placed between them.

(c.) A pause may be placed between the active verb and object.

To these principles it may be added that Blank Verse, as illustrating Inversion, is better adapted to pauses; that the pause at the beginning indicates sprightliness; at the middle, uniformity; and, at the close, slowness. As to the place of the pause in the line, it may be stated, that in the Hexameter Proper it falls in the middle of the line, and in the Heroic or Iambic Pentameter it may fall after the fourth, fifth, sixth or seventh syllable; although the pauses and the sense of the poetry may not always correspond, the result is most satisfactory when such is the case.

“But anxious cares || the pensive nymph oppressed.”

“Now morn, her rosy steps || in th’ eastern clime.”

“Yet simple nature || to his hope has given.”

In the first of these lines, the pause falls after the

fourth syllable; in the second, after the sixth; in the third, after the fifth. The pause after the fourth or fifth is the most common one. In the octo-syllabic line, where the pause almost always falls after the fourth syllable, monotony is apt to be produced. Here, as everywhere, variety should be desired.

There are two other pauses with regard to which a word or two will suffice.

### **The Secondary Pause.**

This is so called in that it is less essential to our verse than the Cæsura, or Principal Pause. Unlike the Cæsura, it may divide a word. When it precedes the Cæsura, it is always after the first long syllable. Following the Cæsura, it falls after the fourth foot. At times, it is found after the third and in the middle of the third or fifth. It is to be noted that though the secondary pause preceding the principal one is never omitted, that following it is often absent.

“Though deep, yet clear, || though gentle, yet not dull,  
Strong, without rage, || without o'erflowing full.”

In each of these lines, the Cæsura falls after the fourth syllable or second foot. In the first line, the preceding secondary is found after the first foot (deep); in the second line, in the middle of the first foot (strong). In the first line, the following secondary is found after the third part (gentle), and in the second line, after the fourth (o'erflow).

### **The Final Pause**

This is the pause at the end of the line and corresponds, generally, with the meaning of the line. It needs no discussion.

These three pauses refer especially to Iambic or Heroic verse and apply to lines of four feet and over. They are found in other verse, as the Trochaic and Anapæstic, but are adjusted by different principles. In the Trochaic line of more than two Trochees, the Cæsura falls, generally, in the middle of the second foot. At times, it is found in the middle of the third.

“Oh! be less || be less enchanting.”

In Anapæstic verse, there is less difference between the principal pause and the secondary ones, than in other verse. The monotony of this verse results, in part, from the character of its pauses. There is a pause, indeed, after every accented syllable.

The Final Pause, as such, belongs to all verse.

### Stanzas.

The number of lines of which any stanza may be composed is subject to the taste of the poet. Among those that have been attempted, special ones may be selected as typical.

(a.) The *Spenserian*. Its scheme is as follows—

1	“And on his breast a bloodie Cross he bore,	1
2	The deare remembrance of his dying Lord,	3
3	For whose sweet sake that glorious badge he wore,	2
4	And dead, as living, ever Him adored;	4
5	Upon his shield the like was also scored,	5
6	For soveraine hope which in his helpe he had,	7
7	Right faithfull true he was in deede and word	6
8	But if his cheere did seeme too solemn sad;	8
9	Yet nothing did he dread, but ever was ydrad.”	9

It is made up of nine lines. With the exception of the last line, which is Hexameter, the metre is Iambic Pentameter. As to the rhyme, it will be seen that there

are two regular quatrains, that these are connected by the last line of the first and the first line of the second rhyming and that the eighth and ninth lines rhyme. The use of this stanza by Spenser, Byron and others exhibits its beauty and poetic force.

(b.) The *Eight Line Stanza*. This is a variety of stanza in frequent use. Byron's *Don Juan* illustrates one form of it which is of special beauty.

- |   |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| 1 | " 'Tis sweet to hear the watch-dog's honest bark | 1 |
| 2 | Bay deep-mouthed welcome as we draw near home;   | 3 |
| 3 | 'Tis sweet to know there is an eye will mark     | 5 |
| 4 | Our coming, and look brighter when we come;      | 2 |
| 5 | 'Tis sweet to be awakened by the lark,           | 4 |
| 6 | Or lulled by falling waters; sweet the hum       | 6 |
| 7 | Of bees, the voice of girls, the song of birds,  | 7 |
| 8 | The lisp of children and their earliest words."  | 8 |

Here, the metre is Iambic Pentameter throughout and the structure of the stanza regular and pleasing.

It will be seen, however, that instead of two common quatrains, the stanza might be divided into two parts, of six lines and two lines, respectively. In the first part, the first, third and fifth lines rhyme, and the second, fourth and sixth, the second part constituting an ordinary couplet.

The common form of this eight line stanza—two quatrains—is indicated thus—the brackets, as before, indicating the rhyming lines.

- |   |                                  |   |
|---|----------------------------------|---|
| 1 | "From Greenland's icy mountains, | 1 |
| 2 | From India's coral strand,       | 3 |
| 3 | Where Afric's sunny fountains    | 2 |
| 4 | Roll down their golden sand;     | 4 |
| 5 | From many an ancient river,      | 5 |
| 6 | From many a palmy plain,         | 7 |
| 7 | They call us to deliver          | 6 |
| 8 | Their land from error's chain."  | 8 |



Other varieties of it may be seen by the following schemes:

1	"Hark to the solemn bell	1 }
2	Mournfully pealing;	3 }
3	What do its wailings tell,	2 }
4	On the ear stealing?	4 }
5	Seem they not thus to say,	8 }
6	Loved ones have passed away,	5 }
7	Ashes with ashes lay?—	6 }
8	List to its pealing."	7 }

The following is what is known in Sacred Poetry as *Hallelujah Metre*. The metre is Iambic and has eight lines: the first four are trimeters, the last four, dimeters.

1	"Lord of the worlds above,	1 }
2	How pleasant and how fair	3 }
3	The dwellings of thy love,	2 }
4	Thy earthly temples are!	4 }
5	To thine abode	5 }
6	My heart aspires	8 }
7	With warm desires	6 }
8	To see my God."	7 }

Other forms are numerous, as in Gray's "Ode to Adversity," and in Hood's "Song of the Shirt."

The kind of feet and variety of line may differ in these different forms.

(c.) The *Seven-Line Stanza*. This is used by Chaucer in the "Man of Lawes Tale," and by later writers. It is called, also, Rhythm Royal, in that James I. of Scotland used it in imitation of Chaucer in a poem called The "King's Quhair."

1	"In vertue and in holy almesse dede	1 }
2	They liven alle, and never asonder wende;	3 }
3	Till deth departed hem, this lif they lede;	2 }
4	And fareth now well, my tale is at an ende.	4 }
5	And Jesu Crist, that of his might may sende	5 }
6	Joye after wo, governe us in his grace,	6 }
7	And kepe us allé that ben in this place."	7 }

The verse is Iambic Pentameter. The first four lines constitute an ordinary quatrain. The last line of the quatrain rhymes with the fifth and the two closing lines form a couplet. Though a pleasing form, it does not appear to be a common one with our best poets.

Other varieties of this verse are as follows:

- |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | "Nobody knew how the fisherman brown,         | 1 | } |
| 2 | With a look of despair that was half a frown, | 2 | } |
| 3 | Faced his fate in that furious night,         | 3 | } |
| 4 | Faced the mad billows with hunger white,      | 4 | } |
| 5 | Just within hail of a beacon light,           | 5 | } |
| 6 | That shone on a woman fair and trim           | 6 | } |
| 7 | Waiting for him."                             | 7 | } |

—*Larcom.*

This differs from the first in that the couplets take the place of the quatrain.

(d.) The *Six-Line Stanza*. This is one of the more frequent forms.

This is Long Particular Metre in Sacred Poetry. It is, also, used, as by Mrs. Browning and others, in Secular Poetry.

- |   |                                  |   |   |
|---|----------------------------------|---|---|
| 1 | "To me, fair memories belong     | 1 | } |
| 2 | Of scenes that used to bless,    | 3 | } |
| 3 | For no regret, but present song, | 2 | } |
| 4 | And lasting thankfulness,        | 4 | } |
| 5 | And very soon to break away,     | 5 | } |
| 6 | Like hopes into a purer day."    | 6 | } |

—*Mrs. Browning.*

This is simply the union of three couplets; Pope's "Dying Christian to his Soul," illustrates it; also, Byron's "Maid of Athens."

This was a favorite measure with Burns; Campbell has, also, given us an example of it.

(e.) The *Five-Line Stanza*. This is finely illustrated in Shelley's "Ode to a Skylark," and in Burns.

1	"Hail to thee, blithe spirit!	1
2	Bird thou never wert,	3
3	That from Heaven, or near it,	2
4	Pourest thy full heart	4
5	In profuse strains of unpremeditated art."	5

(f.) The *Four-Line Stanza*. This is so common a form—the quatrains proper—that examples need not be given. There is, at times, a modification. Tennyson's "In Memoriam," is written thus:

1	"Our little systems have their day:	1
2	They have their day and cease to be;	2
3	They are but broken lights of thee,	3
4	And thou, O Lord, art more than they."	4

This is used by Burns, the first three lines rhyming and the last being independent—a kind of refrain,  
e. g.—

1	"When faith is strong and conscience clear	1
2	And words of peace the spirit cheer,	2
3	And visioned glories half appear—	3
4	'Tis joy, 'tis triumph, then to die!"	4

—Mrs. Barbauld.

There is something exquisitely beautiful in the structure.

(g.) The *Three-Line Stanza*. This is known as, the Triplet, though having considerable merit, it is but little used. The best specimen of it is in "Dies Iræ" as translated:

1	"The day of wrath, that dreadful day	1
2	Shall the whole world in ashes lay,	2
3	As David and the sibyls say."	3

In Dryden's "Æneid" we also find it.

The Stanza, strictly viewed, cannot consist of less than three lines. The next structure is the ordinary couplet and this brings us to a verse—one line—the basis of all the forms of stanza.

### THE SONNET STANZA.

The nature and history of the sonnet have already been referred to.

The Sonnet Stanza, as to its construction, is the most complex of all. The lines are more numerous, the rhyming more frequent and any error in versification more marked and injurious. It is made up of fourteen lines. These are divided into two sections of eight and six lines, respectively, each section containing two rhymes. These sections are sometimes called, Majors and Minors, or Octave and Sestet. Of this Stanza there are several varieties. The brackets, as in former examples, indicate the rhyming lines.

(a.)	1 }	9 }
	4 }	12 }
	5 }	10 }
	8 }	13 }
	2 }	11 }
	3 }	14 }
	6 }	
	7 }	

This first form is well illustrated in Milton, Keats and Byron.

- 1 "When I consider how my light is spent
- 2 Ere half my days, in this dark world and wide,
- 3 And that one talent which is death to hide,
- 4 Lodged with me useless, though my soul more bent
- 5 To serve therewith my Maker, and present
- 6 My true account, lest He, returning, chide;

- 7 "Doth God exact day-labor, light denied?"  
 8 I fondly ask: but Patience, to prevent  
 9 That murmur, soon replies, "God doth not need  
 10 Either man's work, or his own gifts; who best  
 11 Bear his mild yoke, they serve him best; his state  
 12 Is kingly; thousands at his bidding speed,  
 13 And post o'er land and ocean without rest:  
 14 They also serve who only stand and wait."

—Milton.

(b.)	1 }	1 }
	3 }	3 }
	2 }	2 }
	4 }	4 }
	5 }	5 }
	7 }	6 }
	6 }	
	8 }	

It will be noticed that in this form the two parts represent the union of one of the forms of the eight-line stanza (two quatrains) and one of the six-line stanza (a quatrain and couplet) Coleridge and Shakespeare exemplify it.

(c.)	1 }	1 }
	4 }	3 }
	2 }	5 }
	3 }	2 }
	5 }	4 }
	7 }	6 }
	6 }	
	8 }	

This is less frequent; Byron has at times used it. Of these three forms, the first and second are the most correct. English poets, however, have used the third and other forms, quite forgetful of their Italian models.

## MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES IN VERSIFICATION.

“Cannon to right of them,  
Cannon to left of them,  
Cannon in front of them,  
Volleyed and thundered.”

—*Tennyson.*

“Once, upon a midnight dreary,  
While I wandered, weak and weary,  
Over many a quaint and curious  
Volume of forgotten lore.”

—*Poe.*

“Oh for a lodge in some vast wilderness,  
Some boundless contiguity of shade,  
Where rumor of oppression and deceit,  
Of unsuccessful or successful war,  
Might never reach me more !”

—*Cowper.*

“Should you ask me whence these stories,  
Whence these legends and traditions,  
With the odors of the forest,  
With the dew and damp of meadows.”

—*Longfellow.*

“Ye flowery banks of bonnie Doon,  
How can ye blume sae fair,  
How can ye chant, ye little birds,  
And I sae fu' o' care.”

—*Burns.*

“Who would seek or prize  
Delights that end in aching ?  
Who would trust to ties  
That every hour are breaking ?”

—*Moore.*

“From the streams and founts I have loosed the chain  
 They are sweeping on to the silvery main,  
 They are flashing down from the mountain brows,  
 They are flinging spray on the forest boughs,  
 They are bursting fresh from their sparry caves,  
 And the earth resounds with the joy of waves.”

—*Mrs. Hemans.*

“Up from the meadows rich with corn,  
 Clear in the cool September morn,  
 The clustered spires of Frederick stand,  
 Green-walled by the hills of Maryland.”

—*Whittier*

“God of grace ! oh let Thy light  
 Bless our dim and blinded sight;  
 Like the day-spring on the night  
 Bid Thy grace to shine.”

—*Churton.*

“Softly sweet in Lydian measures,  
 Soon he soothed his soul to pleasures.”

—*Dryden.*

“This is the forest primeval. The murmuring pines and  
 the hemlocks.”

—*Longfellow.*

“Not a pine in my grove is there seen,  
 But with tendrils of woodbine is bound;”

—*Shenstone.*

“What hallowed ground where heroes sleep?  
 ’Tis not the sculptured piles you heap !  
 In dews that heavens far distant weep  
 Their turf may bloom;”

—*Campbell.*

“Hear the sledges with the bells—  
 Silver bells—

What a world of merriment their melody foretells !”

—*Poe.*

“When life as opening buds is sweet,  
And golden hopes the spirit greet,  
And youth prepares his joys to meet,  
Alas ! how hard it is to die.”

—*Mrs. Barbauld.*

“Hail to the chief who in triumph advances !  
Honored and blest be the evergreen pine.”

—*Scott.*

“The splendor falls on castle walls.”

—*Tennyson.*

“Silently sat the artist alone,  
Carving a Christ from the ivory boue.”

—*Boker.*

“Truth, crushed to earth shall rise again;  
The eternal years of God are hers.”

—*Bryant.*

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